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ABSTRACT 
Sixty five years after the forced exodus of the majority of the Palestinian 
population that inhabited the territory on which Israel was established (known as 
Nakba, translated to catastrophe), forced displacement is still an important feature 
of the Israeli policies towards Palestinians. Not only does Israel prevent the return 
of refugees, but it is still inflicting more displacements through measures that have 
been undertaken within the framework of the Israeli legal system whether in its 
civil or military varieties. Unfortunately, despite the fact that a peace process has 
been launched since almost 20 years, Palestinian refugees and internally displaced 
persons have not been provided with remedies. On the one hand, the Israeli legal 
system is part of the problem, and on the other hand, the political process is not 
yet leading anywhere. 
Against this background, scholars and other contributors have been debating 
solutions that could end the plight of the refugees within the context of the peace 
process. A new approach has emerged, attempting to use the transitional justice 
framework in solving the plight of the Nakba victims. Most of the new literature 
looks into the possibility of designing truth commissions to heal the pains caused 
by the Nakba. 
This thesis aims at defining the parameters of a transitional justice approach in 
relation to displacement in Palestine/ Israel. It does so by attempting to employ a 
transitional justice methodology, which stresses the significance of 
comprehensiveness. Towards this end, the thesis starts by studying the measures 
that Israel took to inflict displacements during times of war and peace. Then, the 
legality of these measures in international law is examined. Finally, the thesis looks 
into transitional justice mechanisms and how they redressed forced displacement 
in similar contexts. As a result of this study, the thesis concludes that using 
transitional justice in the Palestinian-Israeli context cannot be limited to truth and 
reconciliation commissions, but needs also to comprehensively address the human 
rights violations by advancing such rights. This requires a number of remedies that 
must include, at a first step, the immediate end of the forced displacement regime. 
This can only happen through deep reforms in Israel’s legal frameworks and state 
institutions. In addition, this shall be coupled with reparation programs including 
truth, return, restitution of property, compensation; as well as designing a policy 
concerning the criminal justice element of the crime of forced displacement. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
1.1 Brief Research Project Introduction 
By the end of 2011, some 66 percent of the whole Palestinian population was 
displaced as a result of Israeli policies of forced displacement.1 Since its creation, Israel has 
used its superior military power and its legal system to change the demography of areas it 
controlled in Mandatory Palestine to secure a Jewish majority and to change the 
demographic fabric of areas under its rule.2  
Recent historical research based on declassified Israeli archives3 has demonstrated 
that the concept of “transfer,” a euphemism of forced displacement, has been deeply 
rooted in the mainstream leadership’s political strategies since before the establishment 
of the state.4 The practice of this displacement took place in times of war and calm, and 
no remedies have been provided, thus far, to the victims. 
This doctoral research project focuses on the displacement of Palestinian groups 
and individuals throughout the history of the conflict, its legality and its remedies within 
the transitional justice framework. It will start by analyzing Israel's policies that de-
populate the Palestinians from Palestine/Israel and examine the legality of those acts. 
Then, remedies for the illegal acts will be studied, learning from other conflicts that 
utilized the transitional justice framework in other parts of the world.  
The selection of this project is justified by the following gaps in the collective 
knowledge of academics and practitioners (including human rights organizations, 
                                                     
1
 Badil, Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, Survey of Palestinian 
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2010-2012 (Beithlehem: BADIL, 2012), xvii. 
2
 This will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
3
 The declassification of some Israeli official archives in the late 1980s opened the gate for a 
number of historians to review them and reveal plenty of facts that had been partly known but consistently 
denied by Israel. See, A. Shlaim, “The Debate About 1948,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, 
no. 3 (1995): 302. 
4
 Nur Masalha, A Land Without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-96 (Faber and 
Faber, 1997), ix; Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political 
Thought 1882-1948 (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992); Israel Shahak, “A History of the 
Concept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionism,” Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 3 (1989): pp. 22–37. 
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negotiators, and other relevant contributors or users of knowledge) concerning displaced 
persons in Palestine/ Israel. The first and most important one is the scarcity of 
methodologically rigorous research projects that use the transitional justice framework to 
find remedies that look at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the anticipated political 
solutions, and the destiny of millions of displaced Palestinians. Most of the studies, as will 
be shown in the literature review below,5 focus on demonstrating the illegality of different 
displacement activities and calling on stopping the contemporary acts and reversing the 
older ones. While this kind of work is extremely important, there continues to be a serious 
gap with what our knowledge needs to be in a transitional phase from conflict to post-
conflict situation.  
Another gap in knowledge that will also be further identified in the literature 
review below is the scarcity of comparative studies that draw from lessons learnt from 
other conflicts with similar problems. This study aims at exploring a wide range of 
remedies, learning from the experiences of other conflicts.  
A third gap in knowledge is the scarcity of studies that examine the problem of 
displacement as a whole and attempt to find fundamental solutions that see the macro 
picture, rather than one specific incident or pattern. Legal academics and practitioners 
have consistently chosen to review the different waves of displacement separately. One 
would find a lot of literature on the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war, a number on the 
1967 war refugees and a number of separate studies on each of the contemporary 
displacement activities. While this is certainly justified by the authors and defenders’ need 
to focus on a certain violation, it seems important to start looking into the macro picture 
of displacement, especially when time will come for justice options to be put into practice. 
This thesis will present a comprehensive approach in studying the displacement methods 
within its scope, in an endeavour to tackle the roots and the symptoms of the issue 
simultaneously. 
In light of the gaps in knowledge briefly presented above, this study will examine 
the potential of a transitional justice framework in remedying the Palestinian 
                                                     
5
 See Section ‎1.3 below. 
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displacements. There are only a few over a handful of publications that consider 
transitional justice mechanisms, and in many cases these publications focus on truth and 
reconciliation and ignore other mechanisms that are normally used like repatriation, 
restitution, compensation legal and institutional reform and accountability for the 
perpetrators of the crime of forced displacement. Hence, this thesis will present its major 
contribution to knowledge by examining the displacement problem and its remedies 
within the transitional justice framework comprehensively and by defining the parameters 
that would govern using this framework to redress the victims of forced displacement. The 
comprehensiveness that this thesis will seek includes two elements: First, the factual 
examination of the problem of forced displacement will seek a wide scope of policies and 
events; and second, the remedies that will be examined include the whole range of 
redress measures affiliated with the transitional justice framework.  
As will be shown below, the major goal of this study and its main contribution to 
knowledge is to define the parameters of a transitional justice approach to redressing the 
victims of forced displacement in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
The main research question for this project is: What are the parameters, suggested 
by the transitional justice theory and international practice, which would govern a process 
of transitional justice aiming at redressing the victims of Israeli forced displacement? 
1.2 Historical Background: Forced Displacement in the Palestinian-
Israeli Conflict 
The idea of creating a Jewish state in Palestine came into being around the end of 
the 19th century as an attempted answer to the increasingly rising anti-Semitism in 
Europe and other places in the world.6 Although Jews were only a small minority of the 
Palestinian community then,7 those who adopted the idea of creating a Jewish state 
                                                     
6
 John Quigley, Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice (Duke University Press, 1990), 3–13. 
7
 A census conducted by the British indicated that in 1922 the percentage of Jews in the total 
Palestinian population was only 12.91%. See, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Jewish Problems in 
Palestine and Europe, A Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945  and January 1946 for the 
Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), 
142. 
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created a movement called “Zionism” that aimed at colonizing Palestine with Jews in 
order to create a “Jewish state.”8 
Palestine was occupied by the United Kingdom during the hostilities of the First 
World War, and later put under its mandate.9 Although Jews were a small minority in 
Palestine then, the United Kingdom still decided to adopt the Zionist Movement's goal, 
and therefore, helped to invite Jewish settlers and build Jewish towns.10 However, until 
the time its mandate ended in 1948, Jews were only 33% of the population of Palestine.11 
One year before the end of the Mandate, the United Nations General Assembly 
recommended dividing Palestine into two states: one Jewish and one Arab. However, 
according to this plan, the Jewish state which would be built on 54% of Palestine would 
have an enormous Arab minority of 45% of the population.12 Following this resolution, 
hostilities started between several armed Zionist militias and local Palestinians.13 As a 
result of these hostilities, over 250,000 Palestinians were displaced by the Zionist militias 
by the time United Kingdom ended its mandate in May 15th 1948.14 Upon the end of the 
mandate, the leadership of the Zionist movement announced the establishment of the 
state of Israel.15 Then neighbouring Arab states sent troops that participated in the war 
that ended in 1949, with Israel establishing itself on 78% of the total land of Palestine. By 
                                                     
8
 Quigley, Palestine and Israel, 10. 
9
 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 
Report to the General Assembly (UN General Assembly, September 3, 1947), para. 68, A/364, Official 
Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/07175DE9FA2DE563852568D3006E10F3. 
10
 Henry Cattan, Palestine and International Law: The Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, vol. 
Second (London: Longman, 1973), 15–19. 
11
 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 
Report to the General Assembly, para. 13–4; Cattan, Palestine and International Law: The Legal Aspects of 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Second:15–19. 
12
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine,” November 21, 1947. 
13
 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 13; Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford Oneworld, 2007), 51; 
Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failiure,” in The War for Palestine: 
Rewriting the History of 1948, ed. Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 13. 
14
 Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 40. 
15
 “Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel,” May 14, 1948, Published in the Official Gazette, 
No. 1 of the 5th, Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948)., 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+Establishment+o
f+State+of+Israel.htm. 
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that time, around 700,000-900,000 Palestinians, who constituted around 80% of the 
Palestinian population in the newborn state, where displaced, and became known as the 
“Palestine Refugees” or the “Palestinian Refugees.”16 This incident has been referred to by 
Palestinians as the “Nakba,” the Arabic word for catastrophe. 
After the war ended, Israel continued to exercise a policy called “transfer” which 
aimed at further decreasing the number of Palestinians living on its territories by inflicting 
forced displacement upon them.17 
In 1967, a war erupted between Israel and a number of its neighbouring countries, 
which resulted in Israel occupying vast territories that included the rest of Palestine, the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, that constituted 22% of the total area of mandatory Palestine. 
Israel won the war in 6 days, and then started to exercise a policy of forced displacement 
in the occupied Palestinian territory (hereinafter OPT).18 The “transfer” policy that started 
during the 1947-1949 war (known as the 1948 war), has not ended yet, and has been 
exercised in several forms, such as military operations, the denial of citizenship and the 
revocation of residencies.19 The legal regimes which Israel implements in its sovereign 
territory and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (hereinafter OPT) have played a major 
role in inflicting the continuous displacement of Palestinians.20 
Although a Palestinian-Israeli peace process has been ongoing since 1993,21 no 
final status agreement has been reached yet, and the 'transfer' policy continues to be 
                                                     
16
 Morris asserts that the number of refugees has been disputed, and estimates that it would be 
around 700,000 Palestinians. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited; The United 
Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine estimated the number of refugees displaced by the war as 
between 800,000 and 900,000. United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, “Historical Survey of 
Efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to Secure the Implementation of 
Paragraph 11 of the General Assembly Resolution 194(III): Question of Compensation (Working Paper 
Prepared by the Secretariat),” October 2, 1961, U.N. Doc. A/AC.25/W/81/Rev.2, 
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/3e61557f8de6781a052565910073e819?OpenDocument There are 
many other estimates provided by the parties to the conflict, academics, and many other contributors, but 
the real number of refugees is not the focus of this thesis. 
17
 Masalha, A Land Without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians, 1949-96, ix. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 These policies will be examined thoroughly in Chapters 2 and 3.  
20
 An analysis of these policies will be presented in Chapters 2 and 3.  
21
 Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements” (Signed in Washington DC, September 1993). 
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exercised on a daily basis.22 As will be shown in the literature review below, several 
studies have been conducted to shed light on policies and actions that resulted in these 
displacements, mainly focusing on documenting the policies and actions, and examining 
their legality in international law standards. However, there has been scarce work on how 
to deal with this issue once the conflict is over. This has created an important gap in 
knowledge that this study aims to bridge. 
1.3 Literature Review 
Displacement in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been examined by 
several Palestinian, Israeli, and international scholars and human rights organizations. This 
has been done mostly by focusing on a certain event, incident, or pattern as opposed to 
forced displacement as a consistent policy within Israel that is exercised both in times of 
war and peace, and both in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (hereinafter 
OPT). This section will review the relevant literature and work presented by human rights 
organizations and practitioners, as well as academics. Because of the nature of this topic, 
it is of high importance to closely look at the work of relevant contributors whether they 
were academics from all disciplines, or human rights advocates working on three 
disciplines: The fact analysis of the policies of forced displacement; the international law 
analysis that examines their legality; and finally the work on remedies that should be 
available to the victims. 
Before reviewing the legal work presented, it is important to review the new 
historical research on which part of the factual foundation of this work is based. The 
factual analysis in this thesis is partly based on the work of Israeli and Palestinian 
historians who have used their relatively recent access to formal Israeli documents to 
draw the link between incidents of displacement and an Israeli intention to change the 
demographic balance by the forcible displacement of Palestinians.  
The literature review will be divided into three parts: the first discussing the work 
done to collect and analyze facts and information about the displacement of the 
                                                     
22
 The position of refugees and internally displaced persons within the Palestinian-Israeli peace 
process will be discussed further in Chapter 5.  
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Palestinians, whether during old or recent waves of displacement. The second will shed 
light on the work on the legality of Israel’s displacement policies. Finally, the third part will 
explain the work on remedies, and show the gaps in research on this topic. 
1.3.1 First: Research on Facts and Data 
The displacement of Palestinians has been documented and reported in different 
ways, depending on the historical period in which it took place. The Palestinian exodus of 
1948 happened when Human Rights organizations had no clear presence or activity in the 
region, and therefore the details of what took place was mainly known through the oral 
history that was documented during and after the Nakba, and from reports of the United 
Nations and the states neighbouring Palestine/Israel. Information between then and 
slightly after 1967 is provided mainly by the work of scholars who have researched 
archives, oral testimonies and other sources.  
The more recent displacement activities, the ones that are still continuous, have 
taken place in an atmosphere of an active Palestinian, Israeli and international civil 
society. Therefore, the information about the contemporary displacement can be found in 
the reports of human rights organizations, Supreme Court petitions and other similar 
sources of information. 
1.3.1.1 The 1948 Exodus and Israel’s Responsibility 
Israel has consistently maintained a position, according to which it was not 
responsible for the exodus of the Palestinians from their homes in the 1948 war neither 
legally nor morally.23 However, from an early stage, Palestinian historians like Arif Al- Arif 
in his book about Al-Nakba (The Disaster: The Disaster of Jerusalem and the Lost Paradise 
1947-52) mentioned that: 
Whoever thinks that Palestine’s Arabs exodus from their homes was merely a 
result of the conditions and incidents that took place following the Partition 
resolution in 29 November 1947 is wrong. The truth is that it was an inevitable 
result of a plan, designed by those calling for a Jewish National Home, and 
whoever supported them in the west. They started designing the plan at the 
                                                     
23
 Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 71–7. 
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beginning of the twentieth century, when they started to say: ‘Palestine is a land 
without a people! It should be given to a people without a land.’24 
Al-Arif reached this conclusion while he did not have access to Israeli documents. It 
was not until the late 1980s, when Israel allowed access to part of its official archives for 
researchers, that Israeli evidence was found concerning the Palestinian narrative of the 
exodus.25 
A pioneer in this research was Benny Morris, who wrote his first book in 1988,26 
exposing facts that revealed that the majority of the Palestinians who were displaced in 
the war were forcibly displaced. In his more recent book The Birth of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem Revisited he maintained that “the displacement of Arabs from Palestine 
or the areas of Palestine that would become the Jewish State was inherent in the Zionist 
ideology and, in microcosm, in Zionist praxis from the state of the enterprise.”27 However, 
he also argued that “there was no pre-war Zionist plan to expel ‘the Arabs’ from Palestine 
or the areas of the emergent Jewish State.”28 In spite of that, his conclusion still included 
that there was no clear consistent pre-war plan to expel the Palestinians. He argued: 
“Haganah and IDF units acted inconsistently, most units driving out Arab Communities as 
a matter of course while others left... villages and townspeople in place.”29 But in 
conclusion he argued that  
If a measure of ambivalence and confusion attended Haganah/ IDF treatment of 
Arab communities during and immediately after conquest, there was nothing 
ambiguous about Israeli policy, from summer 1948, toward those who had been 
displaced and had become refugee and toward those who were yet to be 
displaced, in further operations: Generally applied with resolution and, often, with 
brutality, the policy was to prevent a refugee return at all costs. And if, somehow, 
refugees succeeded in infiltrating back they were routinely rounded up and 
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expelled... In this sense, it may fairly be said that all 700,000 or so who ended up 
as refugees were compulsorily displaced or ‘expelled’.30 
Hence, even though Morris denies that Israel worked according to a clear plan to 
displace this number of Palestinians, he still believes that Israel is responsible for not 
allowing all those refugees to return once the war was over. 
Ilan Pappe agreed with Morris on the fact that Israel forcibly displaced the majority 
of the Palestinian population in the areas it controlled during and after the 1948 war. 
However, he also found that this took place according to a plan designed prior to the war, 
called “Plan Dalet.”31 Pappe also disagreed with Morris’s methodology, depending solely 
on Israeli military archives, which are not all exposed yet to the readers and which also did 
not include the whole story.32 Pappe agreed with the Palestinian sources that the Zionists 
started their transfer policy even before the British mandate ended in 1948, and had 
already transferred quarter a million Palestinians by May 15th of that year, the date in 
which the mandate ended.33 
Nur Masalha did extensive work on the concept of Transfer in the Zionist ideology 
and practice between the years 1882 and 1996 in two separate books. In his first book, 
(Expulsion of the Palestinians, The Concept of “Transfer” in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-
1948) he researched piles of files from the Israeli archives, looking at the details of the 
Zionist movement’s goals from the time of the founder of political Zionism, Theodore 
Hertzel, until the establishment of the state in 1948.34 He quoted letters, speeches, 
conference and meeting minutes, and other official documents in which he found 
consistent evidence that not only did transfer have an ideological background in Zionism, 
but that there was a consensus among the Zionist leaders (left and right wing) to exercise 
such a transfer. Indeed, the exodus of the Nakba was a direct result of this movement.  
In Masalha’s words, he concluded:  
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[t]he notion of transfer was born almost at the same time as political Zionism 
itself, with Herzl’s hope to ‘spirit the penniless population across the border.’ The 
desire to have a native population was a constant in Zionist thought, but it was 
tempered with a great deal of pragmatism on the part of the Zionist leadership 
and even at times of considerable scepticism as to its practicability.35  
Given this ideological background that fuelled the will to displace as many 
Palestinians as possible, Masalha argued that “the evacuation of the great majority of the 
Palestinian population in 1948 took place against the background of war and military 
campaigns; it was a time during which opportunities... were not missed.”36 
He, as Pappe did, disagreed with Morris that the Zionist leadership had no pre-war 
plan to transfer the native population of Palestine.37 Masalha argued that  
The fact that no written blanket orders unambiguously calling for the wholesale 
expulsion of the Arab population have been found has been cited as indicating the 
absence of premeditated design; in similar vein, the inconsistencies in the 
behaviours of the various field commanders are given as proof that the exodus 
was born of the exigencies of war. But the exodus was not the less the result of 
painstaking planning and an unswerving vision... The exodus is nothing if not 
testimony to the endurance of a vision that runs in an unbroken line from the 
early days of Zionist colonization to this day.38 
In his second book, Masalha presented important details about the period that 
followed the 1948 exodus, demonstrating that the concept of “transfer” continued to be a 
practice in the state of Israel driven by its ideology, and showed that Israel’s main stream 
leaders planned other transfers that took place between 1949 and 1996.39 He argued that 
Israel continued to design transfer plans during the fifties, the period during which it ruled 
its Palestinian minority with a military government, and that the idea of transfer revived 
after the occupation of 1967 when Israel suddenly found itself ruling another big number 
of Palestinians.40 
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These findings have multi-fold significance. First, they demonstrate that the 
displacement of Palestinians in this conflict was not only desired by Israel, but also 
inflicted through designed policies. They serve in the factual examination of the incidents 
that led to the different displacements, especially in a period during which there was not 
an active civil society documenting and reporting international law’s violations. Secondly, 
they demonstrate the ideological framework that leads the Israeli institutions to act the 
way they do today towards the Palestinian population it controls. Finally, the findings can 
serve in the remedy finding process as basis for the truth element in a post-conflict 
transitional justice process. 
1.3.1.2 Contemporary Displacements 
Unlike the displacements that happened in the earlier stages of the conflict, data 
on contemporary displacement is easier to find. This is due to the large number of Israeli, 
Palestinian and international organizations that work daily to document Israel’s violation 
of international law, especially human rights and international humanitarian law. These 
organizations normally write periodical reports or other publications to spread universal 
awareness about the violations and advocate ending them. Some organizations challenge 
one or more of Israel’s actions in its own courts, trying to change its policies by creating 
precedents.  
Organizations working in Palestine/ Israel have identified several ways of forced 
displacement, including direct or indirect methods used by the state to change the 
demographic structure of certain areas.  
Al-Haq, a human rights organization based in Ramallah, keeps a record of human 
rights violations documented by its own field workers.41 It has issued a few reports 
documenting and examining the legality of specific population transfer actions taken by 
Israel. Since Al-Haq’s mandate is the Occupied Palestinian Territory, it has not worked on 
the areas beyond that territory. It issued reports, including one about the villages near the 
Latroun area (‘Imwas, Yalu, and Beit Nouba), describing the demolition of the villages in 
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1967 and examining the legality of the action.42 This is an example of Israel’s direct 
military forced displacement that took place during the war.43 
Al-Haq also published a report about forcible displacements during the second 
intifada, focusing on the deportation of 39 persons in 2002 in the aftermath of the military 
incursions in the West Bank following an agreement held with the chairman of the 
Palestinian Authority at that time to end the siege that Israel held on the Church of the 
Nativity in Bethlehem.44 The report examined the deportations and the agreement, and 
also concluded that they were illegal in international law.45 
Other organizations have also published on the direct displacements. Bt’selem, an 
Israeli organization working on the human rights violations in the occupied territories has 
documented a few incidents of forced displacement of Palestinians in the occupied 
territory. B’Tselem published a report in 1993 documenting and examining the legality of 
Israel’s deportations of Palestinians from the occupied territory, focusing on the 
deportation of 415 Palestinians in 1992.46 In 2000, B’Tselem raised the issue of the 
expulsion of some 700 Palestinians from Southern Mount Hebron area in a case study 
report.47 
In addition to their work on direct deportations and transfers, human rights 
organizations have been monitoring, documenting and reporting ways in which Israel has 
been de-populating certain areas in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian territory using 
regulatory measures. These organizations also issued case studies, reports and other 
publications to expose these policies. 
An example is Al-Haq’s case study on Al-Numan Village, which argues that the 
village is facing an, in Al-Haq’s words, “indirect transfer” taking place as a result of 
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“hardships imposed on the population” which are, according to the report, “concerted 
and deliberate policy on the part of Israel to force the villagers to leave.”48 In this report, 
Al-Haq also used data it collected about the hardships the village goes through and 
concluded that the Israeli authorities aimed at displacing the Palestinian population living 
in that village.49 
Similarly, B’Tselem has issued a report on the “isolation of Sheikh Sa’ad Village” in 
2004, noting that very strict movement restrictions on this village have resulted in the 
displacement of at least one quarter of the residents of the village, a result that was 
described as “catastrophic” by B’Tselem.50   
Another kind of activity that has been widely reported by several organizations is 
the “Quiet Deportation,” as called by HaMoked and B’Tselem, referring to the revocation 
of residencies from Palestinians in Jerusalem and other areas.51 These two organizations, 
in addition to a few others including Al-Haq, Badil and Adalah have documented and 
challenged this policy. According to B’Tselem and HaMoked, Israel’s policy of residency 
revocation in Jerusalem aims at creating a “demographic balance” in East Jerusalem, by 
“maintaining a permanent and conclusive Jewish Majority in Jerusalem.”52 In addition to 
the residency revocation, B’Tselem and HaMoked argued that other policies like 
“restrictions on building in east Jerusalem, insufficient allocation of resources to the 
eastern part of the city, and the poor quality of municipal services provided there” were 
also means to achieve the same objective.53 
Similarly, Badil referred to the revocation of residency rights as a method of 
displacement, mentioning that only “by 1991, Israel had revoked residency rights of more 
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than 10,000 Palestinians by administrative decision” in the occupied territory, and that 
Israel focused on revoking Jerusalem’s residents’ residency status following the peace 
agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.54 
Another method of silent transfer used by the authorities is Israel’s restriction of 
family reunification both into Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory has been 
documented and challenged by Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations. In 1991 
B’Tselem published a report documenting the case of deporting women and children in 
the occupied Palestinian territory for not having acquired an approved family reunification 
permit from the military government in the territory.55 In 1999 another report was issued 
by HaMoked and B’Tselem looking at the issue of family re-unification in a more general 
way, finding that tens of thousands of Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territory have 
not been able to live with their spouses in Palestine.56 According to the report “the only 
way for these families to live together is by emigrating from the Occupied Territories.”57 
The report further concludes that: 
Israel’s position is dictated by political considerations, whose objective is to 
change the demographics of the Occupied Territories by blocking immigration of 
spouses of residents of the Occupied Territories into the area and by encouraging 
emigration of divided Palestinian families. This political consideration also dictates 
Israel’s policy in other areas affecting Palestinian rights, including the 
“establishment of Israeli settlements, revocation of residency in the Occupied 
Territories, including East Jerusalem, and the internal creation of a housing 
shortage.58 
These two organizations also issued a position paper in 2008 documenting Israel’s 
separation of families in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and “active measures to locate and 
forcibly remove Palestinians from the West Bank and to the Gaza Strip, based on the claim 
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that they were ‘illegal aliens’ in the West Bank since their registered address was Gaza 
Strip and they did not have a ‘permit to remain’ in the West bank.”59 
The same policy has been monitored in Israel and East Jerusalem, but by the 
introduction of a law that prevents family unification for people married to Palestinians 
that later expanded to those married from anyone from countries that Israel considers 
enemy states.60 According to a report by B’Tselem and HaMoked, this policy has been 
introduced for demographic control reasons.61 The report mentions that the motivation 
behind this law is not the one that was presented officially by the state in the petition that 
was filed against it in the Israeli High Court of Justice, but that “the state [Israel] cited 
other reasons to justify the policy, including the danger to the Jewish character of the 
state resulting from family unification, and the claim that residents of the Occupied 
Territories exploit the family unification procedure to carry out a ‘creeping right of 
return.’”62 
1.3.2 Work on Examining Legality of Israel’s Forced Displacements  
As shown above, Israel’s transfers have been conducted in several ways and 
contexts since the beginning of the conflict. The displacement has taken the forms of a big 
scale of ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of a war as in the exodus of 1948 and partly in 
1967, and continuous transfers by using law and/ or military orders.  
There is not one study that takes the whole displacement policy and examines its 
legality in international law; however, a lot of work has been conducted by academics, 
human rights organizations and others to examine the legality of Israel’s actions. Deeper 
legal analysis of the different policies will be demonstrated in Chapter 4 of this thesis. This 
section aims at scanning the most important work on legality presented by legal scholars 
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and human rights organizations, for the purpose of showing this study’s links to existing 
work and identifying the gaps that justify the scope and objectives of this study. 
The topic that got most of the attention of scholars has been the Palestinian 
refugees (also called Palestine refugees), in 1948. During the Nakba of 1948, while the 
forced displacements were still in process, the UN General Assembly called Israel to allow 
“the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours” to 
return to their homes “at the earliest practicable date” and called Israel to pay 
compensation to those “choosing not to return.”63 
Ever since UN resolution 194 was issued, plenty of literature has been dedicated to 
study the legality of Palestinians' displacement in 1948 and the suggested UN remedy, 
namely, the right to return. Several authors have found that the forced displacement of 
the majority of the Palestinian population during the 1948 war was illegal.64 They based 
their findings on several bodies of international law, especially human rights law, 
international humanitarian law, refugee law and nationality law.65  
Although other displacements, which will be focused on in Chapter 3, have gotten 
less attention from international scholars, they have been worked on both by human 
rights organizations, and their legality has been examined. 
The work of human rights organizations in Palestine/ Israel has mostly been based 
on three pillars: monitoring and documentation of human rights violations and examining 
their legality, reporting them to the world, and challenging them using the mechanisms 
available in the Israeli system.  
The different activities designed for the expulsion of the Palestinian population, as 
briefly shown above, have been examined in international legal terms. As many of them 
                                                     
63
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 194 (III),” 1948. 
64
 Gail Boling, The 1948 Palestinian Refugees and the Individual Right of Return: An International 
Law Analysis (Bethlehem, Palestine: Badil, 2001); John Quigley, “Displaced Palestinians and a Right of 
Return,” Harvard International Law Journal 39, no. 1 (1998): 171–229; Victor Kattan, “The Nationality of 
Denationalized Palestinians,” Nordic Journal of International Law 74 (2005): 67–102; W. Thomas Mallison 
and Sally V. Mallison, “The Right of Return,” Journal of Palestine Studies 9, no. 3 (April 1, 1980): 125–136; 
Mutaz Qafisheh, “Bases for the Palestinian Refugees’ Right of Return Under International Law: Beyond 
General Assembly Resolution 194,” accessed November 26, 2012, http://www.cjicl.org.uk/index.php/cjicl-
blog/entry/bases-for-the-palestinian-refugees-right-of-return. 
65
 The aspects of the illegality of the Israeli forced displacement policies will be analyzed in Chapter 
4 
28 
 
were found illegal, some of them were reported and challenged by one or more human 
rights organizations. 
Al-Haq, Badil, B'Tselem, HaMoked, Adalah and other organizations have all 
contributed to the legal discussion. For example, the second smaller scale exodus of the 
three Latroun villages in 1967 was examined in Al-Haq's study, and was found illegal 
according to International Humanitarian and human rights laws.66 Similarly, Al-Haq found 
that the deportation of the Church of the Nativity incident in 2002 was illegal in spite of 
the international agreement that took place prior to it.67 It also reached the conclusion 
that this displacement violated international criminal law and constituted a war crime.68 
The contemporary displacement activities have also been studied by the numerous 
organizations mentioned above. Using International Humanitarian law, Human rights law 
and other international legal instruments these activities were found illegal. For example, 
the consequences caused by the strict movement restrictions were found a result of a 
violation of the principle of freedom of movement.69 
In Al-Nu’man village case, Al-Haq not only found the illegality of Israel's action in 
the hardships caused, but also argued that the Authorities were planning on indirectly 
transferring the population from the village. The main legal arguments brought forward by 
Al-Haq included violations of freedom of movement, access to education, property rights 
and family life.70 
The revocation of residencies has also been argued illegal by many organizations. 
B’Tselem and HaMoked saw that this revocation entails a discrimination policy between 
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Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.71 The ban of family unification both in the OPT and Israel has 
also been found to be a violation of international law and a discriminatory policy.72 
As mentioned earlier, the legality of the incidents that are within the scope of this 
study will be examined in chapter 4. But for the purposes of the present review of 
literature, one can conclude that the existing literature studies displacement waves as 
separate events, not as a whole systematic policy of displacement and persecution based 
on national origin. As will be shown throughout the current study, a comprehensive 
approach to examining the policy of displacement as a whole can contribute also in the 
legal discourse, especially when it is found that displacement is systematic and 
widespread. It will be argued in Chapter 4 that any displacement within the context of a 
widespread policy of displacement is condemned as a crime against humanity. Hence, a 
comprehensive approach to examining the legality of policies since 1948 until today can 
make a significant contribution to the legal discussion. 
1.3.3 The Remedy Discourse 
Since the Nakba in 1948, Israel has consistently denied the right of the refugees 
and internally displaced persons to return to their homes. Furthermore, as will be 
explained in Chapter 3, Israel also continued to design more policies that inflict 
displacement. Unfortunately, despite the fact that a peace process has been ongoing for 
twenty years, the 1948 refugee issue has been postponed to the “final status” 
negotiations,73 while Israel blocked any progress in relation to redressing those who were 
displaced in 1967 or whose residencies were revoked.74 Moreover, Israel has maintained a 
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position according to which it was not responsible for the displacement of the refugees 
and, as a result, has no obligation to allow them to return or enjoy other remedies.75 
Against this background, a number of schools of thought have emerged to suggest 
remedies based on a number of frameworks. The mass exodus that took place as a result 
of the 1948 Nakba received most of the attention of the contributors. The two major 
approaches that emerged in this discussion were a “realistic approach” and a “rights-
based approach.” Let us review each of the two schools.  
The “realistic approach” argued that since it is impossible that Israel will allow the 
return of the refugees to Israel, the Palestinians should be “realistic” about their demands 
and forfeit the right of the refugees to return to Israel. For example, Ziad Abu Zayyad 
argued in an article published in 1994 entitled “The Palestinian Right of Return: A Realistic 
Approach:”  
[W]ith a realistic solution becoming more possible than ever, the Right of Return 
became a highly relevant topic for discussion. However, the reality of Israel's 
existence and its concern about staying a Jewish state, represent an obstacle to 
the practical application of the Right of Return for the 1948 Palestinian refugees.76 
Aware of the importance of the right of return in the Palestinian cause and 
identity, Abu Zayyad made a distinction between the right of return in theory and its 
implementation in practice.77 He argued that the claim to return does not have to be 
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dropped all together, but that the implementation shall be subject to Israel’s agreement 
to symbolic returns.78 He expressed this idea in the following manner: 
This [right of return] claim can be satisfied either through the actual return of a 
mutually acceptable number of refugees, or a symbolic number of them, or 
through compensation, or even through the implementation of any other option 
agreed upon through the negotiations on a comprehensive settlement to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.79 
Other contributors to the “realistic approach” started to actively advocate for this 
framework, especially after the failure of the year 2000 Camp David negotiations between 
the PLO and Israel and the spread of violence. In 2002, the prominent Palestinian 
intellectual and president of Al-Quds University Sari Nusseibeh80 and the Israeli retired 
military officer and later parliament member and minister Ami Ayalon suggested and 
promoted an unofficial agreement to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of 
“two states for two peoples,” Palestine being the “only state of the Palestinian people” 
and Israel “the only state of the Jewish people.”81 On the right of return, the following text 
was provided:  
Recognizing the suffering and the plight of the Palestinian refugees, the 
international community, Israel, and the Palestinian state will initiate and 
contribute to an international fund to compensate them.  
Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews will return only 
to the state of Israel.  
The international community will offer to compensate toward bettering the lot of 
those refugees willing to remain in their present country of residence, or who wish 
to immigrate to third-party countries.82 
Thus, the initiative suggested that the refugees would re-build their lives outside 
their country of origin and that they either be resettled in the Palestinian state, remain in 
their current countries of asylum, or be re-settled elsewhere. Monetary compensation 
would be paid to the refugee families from an international fund.  
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Nusseibeh’s approach has been to weigh the total interests of the Palestinian 
people and the refugees themselves against the “impossible” right of return. As a result of 
this approach, he found that the Palestinians need to prioritize their most urgent needs as 
opposed to what they are simply entitled to. He wrote in his recent book: 
The argument involves weighing the rights of individuals against the well-being of 
the Palestinian people as a whole. Placing the refugees’ right to return to their 
original homes at the top of the priority list would prevent the establishment of 
the best-option scenario (which is by definition a negotiated and therefore 
conditioned two state solution), and thus would prevent even a partial, watered-
down version of that right from being implemented.83 
Hence, Nusseibeh’s argument is based on a philosophical and moral arguments 
related to the welfare of the Palestinian people as a whole in light of the urgent need to 
end the conflict and exercise rights that are achievable within the current political 
circumstances. 
Later in the same year, the Palestinian politician Yasser Abed-Rabbo and the Israeli 
Knesset Member Yossi Belein signed their suggested draft agreement known as the 
“Geneva Accord.”84 Their agreement provided compensation for the refugees’ victimhood, 
as well as for loss of property. In terms of return, the agreement left any return to Israel 
subject to “sovereign discretion of Israel” and in limited numbers.85 
As can be noticed here, the “realistic approach” has advocated a number of 
suggested solutions to the refugee problem within the context of an overall resolution of 
the conflict in a two-state solution framework. Their options are taking into serious 
consideration Israel’s total denial of responsibility and consequences, and finding 
solutions in light of this position; as well as the lack of power balance between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis. It is justified by a notion of prioritizing reaching a peace 
agreement over demanding a full “impossible” justice.  
A number of academics and human rights practitioners disagreed with the 
“realistic approach” and proposed resolving the refugee issues based on a “rights based 
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approach.” The contributors who belong to this school usually use legal analysis 
methodology to suggest remedies to violations of international law, based on the 
implications of state responsibility and Israel’s failure to abide by its international legal 
obligations. The big exodus of the 1948 war received most of the attention of contributors 
affiliated with this approach. This seems to be due to the number of those affected by the 
exodus and, most importantly, because it appeared clear that the victims of this specific 
wave of mass forcible displacement were the most vulnerable to continuous displacement 
in light of Israel’s strong position of denial. Similarly, the 1967 exodus received some level 
of attention, where it was advocated that the refugees of that wave of mass displacement 
were entitled to similar remedies. 
Continuous contemporary displacement has not been considered yet within the 
framework of conflict resolution and the advancing of peace. It should not be understood 
that human rights organizations have ignored such displacements. On the contrary, these 
displacements have been a core issue in the work of such organizations, as shown in the 
section above. Nonetheless, they have not been put in the wider context of redressing 
displacement as part of the attempts to advance peace and reconciliation. It appears that 
the human rights organizations are busy with documenting the violations, reporting them 
and arguing their illegality to an extent that prevented them from theorizing a framework 
for the solutions. As will be shown below, this is one of the contributions to knowledge 
this study is attempting to present.  
What makes the advocates of the rights-based approach members of the same 
school is their methodology, which follows a strict commitment to justice as expressed by 
the strict implementation of international law. In 1974, Mallison & Mallison explained that 
law was designed to apply to all states, not that each problem would have its own 
framework. They later added:  
International law is no longer only an ideal alternative. It is also the only practical 
alternative to an indefinite continuation of the present situation. It may be 
predicted with considerable assurance that if the present Middle East peace 
conference is to reach toward peace based upon justice; it will have to employ the 
principled criteria of international law. Another so-called “practical” settlement 
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based upon naked power bargaining and calculation will, at best, provide a short 
interlude between intense hostilities.86 
This type of justice that should prevail in peace-building focuses on the individuals 
and their rights under international law. This has been well expressed by one of the 
prominent academics of this school, John Quigley, who wrote explaining the role of 
International Law in transitional societies and in moving towards peace. In Quigley’s view, 
states have to respect the rights of the individual while establishing peace agreements. He 
wrote in that context, after giving an example in the transitions that took place in Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s: 
It has long been recognized that in such situations individuals as such and in their 
collectivity have legally protected interests that the parties must respect. Peace 
agreements routinely require states to respect the rights of inhabitants whose 
ethnic affiliation put them on the side of the erstwhile adversary.87 
Based on the principles of international law, as well as UN resolutions recognizing 
some of the rights (as will be shown in Chapter 5), the contributors of the rights based 
approach consistently advocated for a number of remedies that have to be the outcome 
of any peace agreement. These remedies are the right to return, restitution of property 
and/or compensation. Although these remedies do not have to wait for the resolution of 
the conflict, and in fact need to be implemented immediately as the general principles of 
international law stipulate and the relevant UN resolutions demand, Israel has linked the 
solution of this issue with the political negotiations.  
From a rights-based perspective, the rights of the refugees and other displaced 
persons should not be treated as a political issue, but rather as a justice goal. But since 
redress to displacement has become a topic of negotiations, the criteria to be followed 
while looking for solution should be international law, rather than power balances and 
political considerations. Michael Lynk explained this notion in the following statement, 
which can be seen as representative of the general vision of the rights based approach 
contributors: 
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If this final agreement is to be durable, it must reflect the fair aspirations of both 
parties. As such, it will have to be anchored in the principles of international law, 
and not simply reflect the starkly unequal bargaining strengths between Israel and 
the Palestinians.88 
By the same token, Terry Rempel reviewed the failure of the peace process thus 
far and reflected a rights-based approach judgment to such failure:   
It was the repeated failure to resolve the conflict without reference to the rights 
and obligations of all respective stakeholders that underscored the need to put 
international law at the centre of the peacemaking process.89 
Gail Boling, writing it on behalf of Badil, a Palestinian Refugee Rights Resource 
Centre, explained the illegality of the displacement in International Law stressing on the 
individuality of the right of return.90 She found that each refugee has the right to choose 
whether to return or not, without any coercion to take one choice or the other.91 The 
individual aspect of this right gives it another dimension in the political sphere, stripping 
politicians the option of giving it up or using it as a bargaining chip in negotiations. This 
point was taken further by Glen Rangwala, who conducted a study in 2003 arguing that 
since this right is individual, as opposed to a collective right, the representative of the 
Palestinian people has no mandate to even negotiate it, let alone forfeit it. In Rangwala's 
words: 
[T]he right of return has been conceived as a human right, within the sphere of 
the international law of human rights. In this sense, it is absolute and inalienable, 
and – crucially in this contrast -- it is non-negotiable at the political level. The right 
rests with the individual, and only the individual can choose not to exercise it at 
any point in time. From this standpoint, a governing authority or international 
representative can no more negotiate away an individual's right of return than 
they can dispense with that individual's right not to be tortured.92 
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The same argument has been also made by John Quigley, who argued while 
explaining the role of international law in solving the Palestinian refugee issue:  
The displaced Palestinians should not have to lobby for their right of return, either 
vis-à-vis Israel or vis-à-vis the Palestinian leadership. The right is guaranteed by 
human right norms. Just as a state that tortures is obliged to desist without being 
cajoled and without negotiation, so a state that refuses to repatriate is obliged to 
desist, namely, by repatriating.93 
Hence, the rights-based approach contributors have developed a position 
according to which the right to return is not only a right, but also a non-negotiable one. 
Hence, the role of any peace agreement shall be simply to facilitate the implementation of 
such right, not to negotiate whether to grant its exercise or not.  
Nonetheless, in spite of the amount of work that has been conducted on the 
Palestinian refugee issue, it has been noted that these studies treated this plight as a 
“unique” one, and therefore, comparative studies in which knowledge and experiences of 
other refugee problems have not been sufficiently conducted.94 The uniqueness of their 
case is due to the fact that after their displacement in 1948 the United Nations created a 
special body for administering their affairs, namely the United Nations Relief and Work 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA),95 and that they were explicitly 
excluded from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in article 1 (D), 
stating that “This convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from 
organs or agencies of the United Nations or other than the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees Protection or assistance.”96 
According to Dumper, the perceived uniqueness has led to "a restricted range of 
policy options and operational planning" that draw from the experiences of other 
conflicts.97 In a book he wrote later, he stressed that there are important similarities 
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among the different refugee problems which should lead us to refer more to international 
practice while considering the Palestinian cause.98 Dumper further argued: 
In some sense, all refugee situations are unique in their specificities. Yet at the 
same time, the phase in the refugee cycle of displacement, dispossession, exile, 
local integration, resettlement, return, reparation, and reintegration are also 
features that they all share to some degree with other cases. In this way, legal 
frameworks, operational practices, and agreed procedures that have evolved over 
the past few decades become a critical reference point through which peace 
agreements and those clauses relating to refugees can be evaluated and 
assessed.99 
While the Palestinian and Israeli academics and politicians have been stuck with 
the same discourse of arguing legality, right of return and other basic concepts, they seem 
to have missed learning from the international experience. To put it simply, while 
transitional justice mechanisms have been developing through several conflicts around 
the world, one would only find a handful of writings on their use. As Dumper describes it, 
the discussion about transitional justice in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is 
indeed in its “infancy.”100  
This new stream of scholarship has mainly discussed truth and reconciliation. From 
the survey conducted in this field, it seems that the main understanding of the meaning of 
transitional justice has been linked with reconciliation and truth, while other remedies 
that should be offered were ignored.101 For example, Ron Dudai wrote an article 
emphasising the importance of truth, describing what it means in terms of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, outlining a potential method of establishing it and showing the importance 
of the civil society's participation in a truth commission, in addition to the formal adoption 
of this mechanism by the authorities.102 However, his paper only discussed truth and 
reconciliation, and left out other important justice aspects, such as repatriation and other 
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reparations. In fact, he acknowledges in his conclusions that he does not present his 
model as the only option for transitional justice, but it is “meant to encourage discussions 
and debates on potential options and to contribute to a process of exploring the 
possibilities for truth and reconciliation mechanisms for the area.”103 Similarly, Zinadia 
Miller made another contribution to the debate, suggesting a “commission of inquiry” for 
Israel/ Palestine.104 She also mentioned the importance of truth and how it helped in 
transitional situations elsewhere in the world, while she made no reference to other 
remedies.105  
Stanley Cohen took a different approach, suggesting that each of the two societies, 
Israelis and Palestinians, should have their own truth commissions that they employ inside 
their societies.106 He argues that the truth has been known as a result of the active Israeli, 
Palestinian and international civil society, and proposes that there should be truth seeking 
and reconciliation groups working in each society separately.107 Although Cohen 
recognized later that knowing the truth is different from acknowledging it, he still failed to 
offer models or solutions to this problem.108 
Another important and frequently cited study has been advanced by two 
professors at Tel-Aviv University, Yoav Peled and Nadim Rohana, who presented a few 
guidelines on the use of transitional justice mechanisms to help resolve the refugee 
issue.109 They, unlike many other writers, articulated the right of return and created a 
distinction between the right of return and the means of realizing of that right.110 They 
argue that in a transitional period, Israel should recognize the right of return and accept it, 
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but that the negotiations should later discuss the implementation which should take into 
consideration, according to the authors, the “concerns and interests of Israeli Jews.”111 On 
the issue of truth, they suggested that the Palestinian narrative should become legitimate 
in Israel, and that the Nakba should be recognized.112 The separation between the right of 
return as a moral issue on the one hand and its practice on the other hand clearly 
contradicts with the rights-based approach school, which considers that the refugees are 
entitled to return “as a matter of right, not as a matter of Israeli grace.”113 At the same 
time, Peled’s and Rouhana’s separation between the right of return as part of a narrative 
and a practice echoes some of the suggestions of the realistic approach stream, such as 
that of Abu Zayyad quoted above, where he suggested that the right of return be 
accepted rhetorically but not practically.114 
Hence, this new stream of literature that focuses on transitional justice has been 
generally superficial in considering the range of remedy options offered to the refugees, 
drawing from international experiences. Furthermore, its approach has conflicted with 
that of the human rights organizations and international law experts whose rights-based 
approach focus, as mentioned above, is on repatriation. 
The literature that deals with contemporary displacements normally focuses on 
documentation and argues for illegality, but has not studied the remedies that can be 
used to end the conflict and move into a reconciliation phase.  
In conclusion, the existing literature has covered the factual and historical 
background of the policy of transfer for both the Palestinian refugees issue and the 
contemporary displacements issue, and has also argued the illegality of all those 
displacements. The remedies of the Palestinian refugees issue have been taken into 
account by authors using different approaches. The authors who refer to the rights 
discourse mainly focus on repatriation, while others that do take into consideration the 
question of truth either do not mention, or argue against, a practical nonnegotiable right 
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to repatriation. The contemporary displacements are still being dealt with as violations 
that need to be stopped. The continuous and evolving nature of these violations have led 
human rights organizations to document and argue their illegality, but no consideration of 
post-conflict remedies has been articulated.  
This being the case, the purpose of this thesis is to offer a way to use the current 
knowledge of the  history and the precepts of the rights based discourse to remedy the 
consequences of the forced displacement policy, within the framework of transitional 
justice theory and practice. As noted by Raef Zreik, the rights discourse has its 
shortcomings, most importantly the “renunciation of the frame, the historical context.”115 
He further explains that “the Palestinians have lost not only their rights and their land, but 
also the context that enables them to demand these rights in a way that makes sense.”116 
Zreik also contends that the Palestinians have a “right to seek redress within the 
framework of their loss” which he considers a further “measure of justice.”117 Therefore, 
this thesis will redraw the macro picture of displacement before working on the remedies. 
Similarly, a merely political answer to human rights violations is likely to be driven 
by an imbalance of powers that lead to solutions which do not redress the victims. This 
research will therefore offer an overview of this forced displacement policy and will 
determine potential remedies by drawing from the experiences of other conflicts.  
As the conclusions drawn by the historians and the human rights organizations 
working in the region demonstrate, displacement or, “transfer,” is an important element 
of the conflict caused by ideological reasons. Ending the conflict needs dealing with this 
issue in a comprehensive manner. The thesis will utilize the work of historians and human 
rights organizations when consolidating remedy options. This will be done as an attempt 
to bridge the gap between the two schools of thought, those who believe that truth and 
repatriation are mutually exclusive, and those who do not consider truth in the first place 
because it is not part of the black-letter legal approach.   
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1.4 Objective of the Study and its Contribution to Knowledge 
Given the need for further research on the subject identified in the literature review, 
this research aims at making its contribution by defining the parameters of an appropriate 
transitional justice process that can meaningfully redress the victims of forced 
displacement within the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
As shown in the literature review, there is a clear gap in the collective knowledge of 
academics, human rights practitioners and other contributors on methods to 
comprehensively deal with the injustices and animosity created by the displacement 
policies that started during the Nakba and continue until today. More specifically, the gap 
between the new stream of transitional justice literature, which suggests the use of “truth 
and reconciliation,” and the traditional “rights based approach school” will be part of the 
focus of this study. Observing other conflicts' remedies demonstrate that a great deal can 
be learnt from drawing comparisons with other conflicts and examining the applicability of 
remedies used by them in a future transitional phase to peace, justice and reconciliation. 
The main objective of this study is to draw from the conclusions of the rights-based 
approach contributors, the new transitional justice stream as well as the work of 
historians on the one hand, and the international experience in redressing displacement 
within the context of transitional justice on the other hand in order to define what a 
genuine transitional justice framework in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict entails.  
1.5 Methodology and Scope of the study 
This study will use the transitional justice framework in order to define the 
parameters of a meaningful redress for the victims of forced displacement in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In order to define the scope and research methodology of this 
study, it is essential to first define what the “field” of transitional justice entails.  
 Transitional justice has been defined by the prominent theorist, Ruti Teitel, as:  
[T]he conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront with wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes.118 
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Further to this definition, the International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(hereinafter ICTJ) adopts the following definition: 
[T]he set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by 
different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights 
abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, 
reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.119 
The two authoritative definitions of transitional justice suggest that this 
conception has a number of features and goals, which will determine the methodology of 
this study. First, transitional justice is a “conception of justice.”120 The reference frame for 
this “justice” is international law, most importantly international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international refugee law. 
As argued by Roger Duthie, transitional justice aims at redressing the legacies of massive 
human rights abuses, whereby “’redressing the legacies’ means, primarily, giving force to 
human rights norms that were systematically violated.”121 By the same token, the UN 
Secretary General’s report on Transitional Justice stipulated that: 
For the United Nations, Justice is an ideal of accountability and fairness in the 
protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of 
wrongs... The Normative foundation for our work is advancing the rule of law is 
the Charter of the United Nations itself, together with the four pillars of the 
modern international legal system: international human rights law; international 
humanitarian law; international criminal law; and international refugee law.122 
Hence, the framework of justice that the conception of transitional justice refers to 
is international law. Furthermore, within the transitional justice framework, one can see 
that there is an (almost) anonymous agreement on an assumption that peace and justice 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather complement each other.123 Hence, this thesis will 
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judge Israel’s forced displacement policy against the principles of international law, and 
not any other framework of justice. 
Secondly, the field of transitional justice is concerned with societies in transition 
and is developed by the collective experiences of a large number of countries who seek to 
redress the injustices of the past, as shown in the ICTJ definition,124 by a variety of 
methods.125 As a result of this element in the transitional justice field of study, the current 
research uses not only the theory of transitional justice, but also the practice of states that 
redressed displaced persons within the framework of transitional justice. As will be shown 
in Chapter 5, examples of such states are South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Timor-Leste, Colombia and Estonia. Each one of these countries used one 
or more of the transitional justice measures in redressing the victims of displacement. 
Hence, this study will seek to analyze how these measures were used and according to 
which principles. 
Thirdly, in the transitional justice framework there is a stress on the element of 
comprehensiveness in redressing the legacies of past human rights violations.126 For 
example, the UN Secretary General’s report states:  
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWFpngEfu84&feature=youtube_gdata_player; Furthermore, the UN 
officially adopts this assumption. See, United Nations Security Council, “The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies,” para. 21; In addition, several transitional justice contributors 
have written confirming this concept. For example, see, Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and 
Peacebuilding After Mass Violence,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 
28–48; See also, Rama Mani, “Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict,” 
Development 48, no. 3 (September 2005): 25–34; ICTJ, Pursing Peace, Justice or Both?, Fact Sheet, Focus: 
Peace and Justice (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, April 25, 2009); Marieke Wierda, 
“Remarks by Marieke Wierda,” in American Society of International Law Proceedings (presented at the 
Peace v. Justice: Contradictory or Complementary, American Society of International Law, 2006), 369–370; 
Kai Ambos, “The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the 
Role of the ICC,” in Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Conflict Resolution 
and Development: The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, ed. Kai Ambos, Judith Large, and 
Marieke Wierda (Springer, 2009), 19. 
124
 International Center for Transitional Justice, “What Is Transitional Justice?”. 
125
 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 5–27; Teitel, “Transitional Justice 
Genealogy.” 
126
 Barbara Ooman, “Justice Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy: The Example of Rwanda’s 
Multi-layered Justice Mechanisms,” in Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, 
Conflict Resolution and Development: The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, ed. Kai Ambos, 
Judith Large, and Marieke Wierda (Springer, 2009), 179; Pablo De Greiff, “DDR and Reparations: Establishing 
Links Between Peace and Justice Instruments,” in Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on 
44 
 
Our experience confirms that a piecemeal approach to the rule of law and 
transitional justice will not bring satisfactory results in a war-torn or atrocity-
scarred nation. Effective rule of law and justice strategies must be comprehensive, 
engaging all institutions of the justice sector, both official and non-governmental, 
in the development and implementation of a single nationally owned and led 
strategic plan for the sector. Such strategies must include attention to the 
standards of justice, the laws that codify them, the institutions that implement 
them, the mechanisms that monitor them and the people that must have access 
to them.127 
As accepted by the Secretary General’s report, “satisfactory results” can only come 
about when a comprehensive approach to justice is sought by the transitional society. This 
holistic approach entails two elements:  the first is comprehensiveness in understanding 
the problem by seeking the truth about how, why, by whom and against whom human 
rights violations took place; the second  element is comprehensiveness in seeking redress 
by using the appropriate measures including reparations, accountability of perpetrators 
and reforming the state institutions and legal system.128  
In order to follow the transitional justice framework methodologically, this 
research project has been designed to examine and analyze the facts within the thematic 
scope of the study in a rigorous and comprehensive manner. The methodology of fact 
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analysis is inspired by the mandates of truth commissions in several countries.129 For 
example, according to the mandate of the Timor-Leste Truth Commission, the elements 
that the commission was required to investigate while examining human rights violations 
included:  
The context, causes, antecedents, motives and perspectives which led to the 
violations; whether they were part of a systematic pattern or abuse; the identity 
of persons, authorities, institutions and organizations involved in them; whether 
they were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation on the part of 
the state, political groups, militia groups, liberation movements or other groups or 
individuals; the role of both internal and external factors; and accountability, 
“political or otherwise,” for the violations.130 
This example of a truth commission mandate is representative of dozens of other 
mandates and of the idea of comprehensiveness of the transitional justice framework. 
Since the role of a transitional justice process is to comprehensively redress the victims, a 
full understanding of the problem is required before a meaningful redress is provided. 
Therefore, this thesis will analyze the methods that Israel used in displacing Palestinians 
and making their displacement durable. It will seek to explain patterns of displacement, 
and determine and scrutinize the tools that are used to inflict such displacement such as 
laws, military orders and violence. Furthermore, it will examine the motives behind these 
displacements and their effects on the victims. As will be noted, this thesis will focus on 
the role that the Israeli legal regime, with its laws and military orders as well as civil and 
military courts, has played in inflicting mass displacements. Finally, the patterns that will 
be detected in the factual analysis will inform the remedy options.  
Due to the great meticulousness that is required in analyzing the data and the 
large amount of violations related to forced displacement in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, the scope of this study has been narrowed down thematically to two methods of 
displacements: displacements that took place during the wars of 1948 and 1967 and 
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displacements that were related to Israel’s policy of status revocation or deprivation. 
These issues will be discussed in considerable depth. However, because of the limitations 
of a PhD thesis, other methods of forced displacement will be outside the scope of this 
study. The methods of displacement that have been excluded from this study include 
home demolitions, unrecognized villages, discrimination in zoning and urban planning and 
creating hardships that force populations to leave their villages and towns.  
The second element of comprehensiveness, as mentioned earlier, is the remedy 
options. This thesis will discuss the full range of remedies that can be provided to the 
victims with their four elements: truth, accountability, reparations and legal and 
institutional reform. 
Based on this methodological framework, the research has been conducted taking 
the following steps:  
 Firstly, examining and analyzing the facts of the displacements that fall 
within the scope of this thesis. This scope will be limited to the 
displacements that took place during the major wars, as well as 
displacements that resulted from Israel’s regulatory engineering to revoke 
or deny a legal status to persons and to deport them consequently. These 
facts are examined by analyzing primary materials such as laws, military 
orders and court decisions. Furthermore, secondary materials such as 
reports of human rights organizations and UN agencies, books and journal 
articles have been used extensively. In some cases, the relevant violations 
have been made known only by them being documented and reported by 
human rights violations. Similarly, the findings of historians have a 
significant contribution to the factual analysis of this thesis.  
 Secondly, examining the legality of the Israeli forced displacements within 
the framework of international law. This is done by defining the applicable 
international legal instruments and examining the Israeli policies of 
displacement against them. The primary materials that have been used for 
this part include customary international law, conventions of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, cases from 
international courts and tribunals, UN resolutions and others. In addition, 
secondary materials such as  relevant legal studies, UN reports, human 
rights organizations literature and others have been used.  
 Thirdly, examining the appropriate measures that can be used to redress 
the victims of forced displacement within the framework of transitional 
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justice theory and practice. The primary material that has been used for 
this task includes peace agreements; relevant constitutions, statutes and 
policies of countries that used a transitional justice framework; and official 
reports of truth commissions. The secondary material includes reports of 
non-governmental organizations and research centres as well as academic 
studies.  
1.6  The Thesis Structure 
The thesis contains 4 core chapters. Chapter 2, “Displacement of Palestinians in the 
Aftermath of Wars” will discuss the displacements that took place in the wars of 1948 and 
1967. This chapter will examine how in each of the two wars, Israel used military 
operations, deprivation from status and prevention from return as tools to inflict and 
cement the displacement of the majority of the Palestinian population. The role of Israel’s 
nationality law, prevention of infiltration law and series of military orders and residency 
regulations will be analyzed.  
Chapter 3, entitled “Continuous Displacement and Status Engineering,” will 
examine Israel’s policies that inflicted continuous displacements in areas under its 
sovereignty and in the OPT. These policies include residency revocation regulations under 
its civil and military laws, prevention of child registration, prevention of family unification 
and freezing the ability for people to change their address within the OPT.  
Chapter 4, bearing the title “The Legality of Forced Displacement in the Palestinian-
Israeli Conflict,” examines the legality of Israel’s forced displacement policies. It will start 
by examining the international legal instruments that are applicable to Israel and the OPT. 
After that, it will analyze the legality of Israel’s forced displacement policy according to 
international criminal law, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, 
as well as the laws of nationality and state succession.  
Finally, Chapter 5 entitled “The Parameters of a Transitional Justice Approach to 
Addressing Israel’s Forced Displacement Policies” will offer the application of the 
transitional justice framework to the conflict. It will begin by reviewing how the current 
peace process framework has tackled the issue of displacement with all its elements. After 
that, it will examine the international legal rules on state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility, as a legal foundation for the transitional justice remedies. Towards 
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the end, the chapter will study the potential remedies that can be applied to redress the 
victims of displacement, and the parameters that would govern the use of these 
remedies. Each of the remedy options will be examined against the theory of transitional 
justice and examples of state practice from different regions.  
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Chapter 2- Displacement of 
Palestinians in the 
Aftermath of Wars 
2.1 Introduction  
It was mentioned in the previous chapter that Israel intentionally displaced 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians during the wars of 1948 and 1967 and prevented 
them from returning to their homes. This took place by employing methods that combine 
physical military coercion and regulatory engineering that aimed at controlling citizenship, 
residency and movement to guarantee a sustained exile for the victims of displacement. 
This chapter will examine the measures taken by Israel to inflict these two 
exoduses. It will do so while following the research methodology explained in Chapter 1, 
attempting to give sufficient attention to the context in which the displacements were 
conducted and sustained. The analysis presented in this chapter will attempt to serve two 
goals: establishing a concrete factual basis for the legal analysis that will be presented in 
Chapter 4; and equally importantly, serving as the basis for part of the comprehensive 
remedy approach that will be considered in Chapter 5. These goals can be reached by 
answering the following questions: How did the two exoduses take place during the wars? 
Who was responsible of them? Why did they happen? And finally, how did the applicable 
legal and institutional system deal with them? 
To answer these questions, the war operations will first be analyzed based on the 
work of historians, especially those who found their conclusions based on Israeli archives, 
the statements of eye witnesses, and the documentation of human rights organizations. 
Then, special attention will be given to examining the legal regime introduced by Israel to 
regulate citizenship in Israel and residency in the OPT and how this regime functioned in 
sustaining the displacement of the refugees.  
The measures that Israel used to inflict a durable displacement of the majority of 
the Palestinian population can be summarized by: war operations, prevention from 
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acquiring a permanent legal status and prevention from return. Each of these three 
elements will be examined in relation to the victims of displacement of the wars of 1948 
and 1967. 
2.2 The Nakba: The 1948 War and Forced Displacement 
Following the 1947 UN General Assembly resolution 1811 that recommended the 
division of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, a war broke out in 
Palestine. The first phase of it was described by historians as a civil war that broke out 
between the Arab and Jewish inhabitants of Palestine.2 During this phase of the war a 
large number of atrocities were committed, and around 250,000 Palestinian Arabs took 
refuge in the neighbouring Arab countries.3 One of the most famous of these atrocities 
was Dair Yasin massacre, in which Jewish troops killed indiscriminately a large number of 
civilians of the village of Dair Yasin and raped a number of women.4 According to Pappe, 
“the Jewish leadership proudly announced a high number of victims” to urge the 
inhabitants of other villages to leave their homes.5 
This phase of the war extended between the date of issuing resolution 181 in 
November 1947 until the 14th of May 1948 when the Zionist leadership declared a Jewish 
State, and the following day, the 15th of May when Britain officially declared ending its 
mandate in Palestine and withdrawing its troops. Then, the Arab League, which is a 
regional international organization “that consists of independent Arab States on the 
territory of northern and north-eastern part of Africa and southwest Asia,”6 started an 
armed “intervention” that it justified by a number of reasons, including stopping the 
displacement. They stated justifying their intervention:  
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Security and order in Palestine have become disrupted. The Zionist aggression 
resulted in the exodus of more than a quarter of a million of its Arab inhabitants 
from their homes and in their taking refuge in the neighbouring Arab countries. 
The events which have taken place in Palestine have unmasked the aggressive 
intentions and the imperialistic designs of the Zionists, including the atrocities 
committed by them against peaceful Arab inhabitants, especially in Dayr Yasin, 
Tiberias and others.7 
This phase of the war continued until 1949, when Israel signed four separate 
armistice agreements with Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.8 The end of this war resulted 
in Israel being established on 78% of mandatory Palestine, while the rest, the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, had a Jordanian and an Egyptian military presence respectively. 
By the end of this war, around 700,000 to 900,0009 Palestinians were displaced 
from their homes, and as many as 531 villages were destroyed and de-populated.10 This 
number of Palestinians displaced represents 80% of the Palestinian population in what 
became Israel after the war.11 
The reasons behind this exodus have been disputed. Following the war, there were 
two narratives that described how this large number of refugees was displaced. The Israeli 
narrative blamed the Arab leaders and the refugees themselves for the exodus, claiming 
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that the refugees left either because they did not want to live with the Jews or because 
their leaders told them to leave either through Radio broadcasts or other media.12 In 
contrast, the Palestinians and the rest of the Arabs argued that the large number of 
refugees was a result of a systematic expulsion orchestrated by the Zionist leadership, 
aiming at changing the demographic balance of the areas on which Israel was established 
to tilt in favour of the Jews.13 
Despite the large gap between these two narratives, important facts were unveiled 
by a new stream of Israeli historiography demonstrating several causes for this exodus.14 
The conclusions of most of the new historiography regarding causes of the exodus 
indicated an intentional Israeli involvement to “expel” Palestinians, as will be shown in the 
next section below.15 In addition, the expulsion was cemented and institutionalized by the 
enactment of a number of actions and laws that guaranteed that the refugees will not be 
allowed to return.16 The following three sub-sections will discuss the three elements of 
the expulsion: the war operations, the prevention from acquiring a legal status, and 
prevention from return by military and regulatory methods. 
2.2.1 The War Plan and Operations 
In the late 1980s, a new wave of Israeli historiography on the causes of the exodus 
was launched by the Israeli historian Benny Morris following the opening of part of the 
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Israeli archives for researchers. His book, published in 1988, cited a number of reasons 
causing the 1948 exodus, including direct expulsion orders as part of the military plan 
called “Plan Dalet," as well as what he called “Jewish psychological warfare” referring to 
propaganda designed to create fear and intimidate inhabitants into leaving; in addition to 
what he called the “atrocity factor,” referring to the fear of the Arab villagers based on 
atrocities that actually took place around them, like the Deir Yassin massacre.17 He also 
blamed the Arab leadership for being “disunited” and for not guiding the Arab population 
on how to deal with the situation; but also wrote that the Palestinian leadership resisted 
the exodus by several unsuccessful means, except in certain instances when Arab army 
commanders ordered a temporary evacuation of Arab civilians from dangerous battle 
areas.18 Despite that, Morris wrote that he found no track of Arab instructions by radio or 
other means of communication advising the population to leave, as the official Israeli 
narrative claims.19 Notwithstanding these findings, Morris found that the Zionist 
leadership did not have a premeditated master plan to expel the Palestinians.20 
Several historians have built on the work of Morris and found that the 
displacement of the 1948 refugees was inflicted intentionally by Israel aiming at 
guaranteeing a Jewish majority in the state that was being formed. Some criticized him for 
his final conclusion, especially in light of his own findings of intentional mass expulsions.21 
Nur Masalha researched the Israeli archives and other sources and concentrated 
on the links between the Zionist movement’s ideological motives to create a Jewish state 
with a majority of Jews and the actions conducted by its leadership in the war, concluding 
that “the notion of transfer was born almost at the same time as political Zionism itself, 
with [Theodore] Hertzl’s22 hope to ‘spirit the penniless population across the border.’”23 
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He quoted minutes of meetings and conferences, letters, speeches, and other documents 
he found in the official Israeli archives, and then studied the war and argued that “the 
evacuation of the great majority of the Palestinian population in 1948 took place against 
the background of war and military campaigns; it was a time during which opportunities... 
were not missed.”24 
Ilan Pappe conducted his own archival work and built on both Morris's and 
Masalha's research and argued that the exodus was a premeditated goal translated by the 
Israeli military plan called “Plan Dalet” which according to Pappe “called for their [i.e. the 
Palestinians’] systematic and total expulsion from their homeland,” regardless of whether 
they would collaborate with or oppose the establishment of the Jewish state.25 He cited 
the Plan Dalet text that instructs the expulsion of the population outside the borders of 
the state in case of “resistance.”26 Pappe demonstrated that the Zionist movement in 
Palestine mapped the area that it wanted to establish Israel on in 1946,27 and collected 
intelligence about each city and village in Palestine prior to the war.28 When the plan was 
finished it was given to all the commanders and each one received "a detailed description 
of the villages in his field of operation and their imminent fate- occupation, destruction 
and expulsion."29 
According to an internal report issued by the Israeli army intelligence in June 1948, 
that is, in the middle of the war, around 75% of the 350,000 refugees displaced by then 
were displaced as a result of: direct hostile Jewish operations against Arab towns and 
villages, the effect of operations on nearby towns and villages, Jewish “whispering 
operations,” and ultimate expulsion orders by Jewish forces.30 The rest were displaced by 
a combination of several fear factors, either because of being isolated villages near Jewish 
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colonies, or for fearing of their villages being used as battle fields, or fear of Jewish 
retaliation following major Arab attacks.31 
To summarize, it can be concluded that while the historians disagree about 
whether there had been a master plan for expulsion, they all agree that there were 
enormous mass expulsion orders and intimidation into departure by creating fear through 
massacres and what Morris calls “whispering operations.” They also agree that the 
leadership of Jewish Yishuv (Jewish colonies in Palestine) and later the state of Israel were 
the planners of these operations, and that the army commanders were aware of the plans 
of the state. Khalidi eloquently summarized the methods used for expulsion with by 
writing: “The Zionist offensive which caused the Arab exodus was a mixture of 
psychological and terroristic warfare.”32 
It is also undeniable that the refugees were prevented from return after they were 
displaced. As noted by Morris:  
If a measure of ambivalence and confusion attended Haganah/ IDF treatment of 
Arab communities during and immediately after conquest, there was nothing 
ambiguous about Israeli policy, from summer 1948, toward those who had been 
displaced and had become refugee and toward those who were yet to be 
displaced, in further operations: Generally applied with resolution and, often, with 
brutality, the policy was to prevent a refugee return at all costs. And if, somehow, 
refugees succeeded in infiltrating back they were routinely rounded up and 
expelled... In this sense, it may fairly be said that all 700,000 or so who ended up 
as refugees were compulsorily displaced or ‘expelled’.33 
Morris’s statement here refers to the measures taken by Israel during and after 
the war in order to prevent those displaced from return. These measures can be put 
under two categories: the denial from acquiring citizenship; and the prevention from 
return through physical and regulatory means. These measures will be explained in the 
following two sub-sections.  
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2.2.2 The Denial of Citizenship 
Since the early establishment of the state, Israeli Nationality was regulated 
through two legislations: the Law of Return, 5710-1950 (hereinafter Law of Return)34 and 
Nationality Law, 5712-1952 (hereinafter Nationality Law)35 in a way that served the 
purpose of the main stream Zionist leaders to replace Palestinians inhabiting Palestine 
with Jews.36 The text and enforcement of the laws were an early translation of this aim.  
The Law of Return gave a right to every Jew around the world, regardless of their 
nationality, or whether or not they were falling under any threat of persecution, the right 
to immigrate to Israel as an “Oleh” a special title of Jews immigrating to Israel.37 It states: 
“Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an Oleh,”38 with the exception of those 
who are “engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people or… [are] likely to 
endanger public health or the security of the state,"39 or as added in an amendment to the 
law in 1954 those who have “a criminal past, likely to endanger public welfare.”40 In 1970, 
the scope of implementation of the law was widened to involve “a child of a Jew and the 
grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew, 
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except for a person who has been a Jew and has voluntarily changed his religion.”41 By the 
power of this law, millions of Jews from all over the world have immigrated.42 
Between 1948 and 1952, Israel did not enact legislation on nationality and 
organized its first elections based on residency determining that whoever was an 
inhabitant of Israel participated in the two elections that took place in that period.43 Then, 
in 1952, Israel enacted its Nationality Law44 which was designed to establish two goals: 
Grant citizenships to every past and future Jewish immigrant to Israel, and restrict as 
much as possible the grant of citizenship to non-Jews, especially the Palestinians who 
were displaced during and after the war.45 
The Law of Nationality provided different regulations on acquiring Israel’s 
citizenship for Jews and non-Jews. The Israeli citizenship for Jews was given automatically 
for everyone who was an “Oleh” according to the Law of Return,46 and could also be 
acquired by birth to Israeli nationals.47 However, citizenship to non-Jews was subject to 
the sections of the statute regulating “Nationality by Residency,”48 and “Nationality by 
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Birth.”49 Article 3 (a) of the law, that dealt with “Israeli Nationality by Residence in 
Israel,”50 excluded all the Palestinian refugees, and many of the Palestinians who 
continued to reside in what became Israel after the war, from its nationality.51 It stated 
that:  
A person who, immediately before the establishment of the state, was a 
Palestinian Citizen and who does not become an Israel national under section 2 
[which deals with the 'Oleh' status mentioned above which is given only to Jews], 
shall become an Israel national… if (1) he was registered on the 4th Adar, 5712 (1st 
March 1952) as an inhabitant under the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance, 
5709-1949; and (2) he is an inhabitant of Israel on the day of the coming into force 
of this law; and (3) he was in Israel, or in an area which became Israel territory 
after the establishment of the state, from the day of the establishment of the 
state to the day of the coming into force of this law, or entered Israel legally 
during that period.52 
In other words, the Nationality law granted citizenship only to those Palestinians 
who were physically present in Israel and whose residence was not interrupted by their 
displacement outside the borders, given that they managed to register themselves as 
inhabitants before the deadline set by this law.53 This was a regulatory translation of 
Israel’s policy, as explained by Hofnung, to “prevent the Arab refugees from returning to 
the new state.”54 In addition to that, however, the law had further reaching negative 
consequences to non-Jewish inhabitants of Israel. The Registration of Inhabitants 
Ordinance mentioned in the provision quoted above was enacted in 1949, and gave 
inhabitants of Israel 30 days from its enactment or their entry into Israel to register 
themselves and their minor children.55 Because of the hostilities of the war, many 
Palestinians, who were not even displaced failed to register, and therefore, were unable 
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to claim their citizenship;56 together with those who were displaced. Effectively, not only 
did this law manage to prevent the hundreds of thousands who were displaced from 
Israel’s citizenship, but also affected thousands who were still within the Israeli borders; 
many of whom became later victims of deportation.57 Israel made two amendments to its 
Nationality law in 196858 and 198059 that allowed many of those who continued to reside 
in Israel, but were still rendered stateless as a result of the conditions set by the 1952 
Nationality Law, to acquire citizenship.60 The first amendment to the law in 1968 allowed 
Palestinians who were born after the establishment of the state to apply for citizenship 
between their eighteenth birthday and twenty-first birthday; given that they had not 
gained another nationality and if they had been residing in Israel for “five consecutive 
years immediately preceding the day of the filing of [their] application.”61 The second 
amendment gave citizenship to the majority of the others left stateless as a result of the 
original law and the first amendment, but still excluded all the refugees who were 
displaced during the war and after by deciding that residency in Israel was a condition to 
the acquiring of citizenship.62 
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While these amendments solved the problem of most of those who were not 
displaced, some continued to be stateless.63 But equally importantly it continued on the 
pattern of preventing all those who were displaced beyond the borders of the state from 
return.64 While the legality of this action will be examined in Chapter 4 of this thesis,65 it 
suffices to stress a number of conclusions based on the law examined above. First, the 
Israeli legislations have always excluded, with explicit provisions, the granting of Israel’s 
citizenship to Palestinians who were displaced beyond its borders. Secondly, the 
legislations on nationality (the Law of Return, 1950; and the Nationality Law 1952) are 
discriminatory. It will be shown in Chapter 3 later that the Israeli law regulating nationality 
even turned into further discrimination after the year 2000.66 In addition to 
denationalisation as one element that contributed into the durable displacement of the 
Palestinian refugees, Israel took further measures to guarantee that the refugees will not 
return. These will be explained in the following section.  
2.2.3 The Prevention from Return through Force and Law 
It was explained above that according to the accumulative findings of historians 
researching Israeli official archives and other sources, Israel intentionally displaced 
Palestinians during the 1948 war. The goal was to reduce the non-Jewish residents, and 
more importantly, non-Jewish citizens in Israel.67 
A problem faced by Israel at the early stages of the state, however, was that the 
borders between Israel and the rest of Palestine, as well as the other Arab countries were 
not well closed, and a considerable number of refugees attempted to return back to their 
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cities and villages after the war ended.68 To resist this return, Israel took military and 
legislative steps. 
On the military level, Israel adopted several measures to prevent the return of the 
refugees, as well as the entry of any other Arab across the borders; an act that became 
known in Israel as “infiltration.”69 These actions included, first a “shoot-to-kill" or “free 
fire” policy at the border lines which took place extensively between 1949 and 1951 but 
then decreased gradually in the following years.70 The army used to also arrest and then 
deport the returning refugees, and in a number of cases, arrested “infiltrators” were 
raped and/ or killed.71 To track those who succeeded in crossing the lines and arriving at 
their or other villages, the army conducted operations in the Arab villages in Israel, 
imposed a curfew on them, and attempted to locate the “infiltrators” to arrest and deport 
them.72 Among the specific and immediate goals of these deportations were to prevent 
the returning refugees from any chance to participate in any census that would later result 
in acquiring permanent rights, as indicated in the previous section above.73 
Simultaneously, Israel’s legal system’s approach was to illegalize the return of the 
refugees, not only through depriving them from a legal status as mentioned in the 
previous section above, but also through utilizing and legislating laws that make their 
unauthorized entry to the country not only illegal, but even criminal. While explaining the 
provisions of the Nationality Law, Gouldman represented and justified their 
denationalization by arguing: “Those who crossed to the enemy lines during the War of 
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Independence only to infiltrate back again later were not to be rewarded with a grant of 
Israel nationality.”74  
However, the problem was not only denationalization, but also deportation, 
powered by the Israeli legal system. At the early stages, Israel used the British mandate 
Immigration Ordinance of 194175 to deport the returning refugees (who were not 
registered in the census) considering them illegal.76 Then, in 1952, Israel enacted its 
general Entry into Israel Law (5712-1952) according to which it restricted a legal entry into 
Israel for non-nationals and for those who are not Jewish immigrants with acquiring a 
visa77 and only through “one of the frontier stations.”78 Thus, any return of a Palestinian to 
his/ her village or town without a permit from Israel would be an illegal entry into Israel. 
In 1954, the Israeli parliament passed a law, called The Prevention of Infiltration 
(Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-195479 (hereinafter Prevention of Infiltration Law) 
which treated the return of the refugees, as well as any other unauthorized entries into 
Israel from enemy states (all of the countries bordering Israel in which the refugees 
sojourned), as serious punishable crimes. According to the law, an infiltrator was: 
Anyone who Entered Israel knowingly and unlawfully and who, at any time 
between November 29, 1947 and his entry was:  
1. a national or citizen of the Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Trans-
Jordan, Iraq, or the Yemen; or 
2. A resident or a visitor in one of those countries or in any part of 
Palestine outside Israel [the West Bank and Gaza Strip] 
3. A Palestinian citizen or a Palestinian resident without nationality or 
citizenship or whose nationality or citizenship was doubtful and who, 
during the said period, left his ordinary place of residence in an area 
which has become a part of Israel, for a place outside Israel.80 
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As can be noticed from the wording, the definition is very broad. It explicitly 
includes Palestinians who were residents in areas that became Israel and “left,” and 
includes any “resident” or even “visitor” of all the neighbouring countries. Following on 
the discrimination pattern that was being formed at the early stages of the state, the 
Infiltration Law only applies to non-Jews because the Jews, whether they were Israeli 
citizens or not, were entitled to immigration through “return” and easily acquired 
citizenship.81 
The “infiltrator” was punished with up to five years of imprisonment or paying a 
fine or both,82 and if he had been deported up to seven years or paying a fine or both;83 
and with a life sentence if he was armed.84 Any person who shelters, aids, or trades with 
the “infiltrator” was also to be punished with 5 or 15 years depending if he does it for the 
first time or repeatedly.85 This provision made it costly for family members and friends 
sheltering the returning refugee. Furthermore, the law lays the burden of proof on the 
infiltrator to prove that he is present lawfully,86 and on those who aid, shelter or trade 
with him to prove that they did not know he was an “infiltrator.”87 To weaken the ability 
of civil judicial review, the law was enacted as an emergency law,88 giving the executive 
authority (in this case the minister of defence) extra-ordinary powers.89 For instance, the 
execution was given to military tribunals, not to civil courts,90 and the minister of defence 
was given the power to deport the “infiltrator,” “whether or not he has been charged 
                                                     
81
 Korn, “From Refugees to Infiltrators,” 7; Alina Korn, “Crime and Legal Control,” British Journal of 
Criminology 40, no. 4 (September 1, 2000): 582. 
82
 The Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954, sec. 2. 
83
 Ibid., sec. 3. 
84
 The Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954. 
85
 Ibid., sec. 6–8. 
86
 Ibid., sec. 10. 
87
 Ibid., sec. 9. 
88
 The Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954. Article 34 declares this 
law as a temporary one that would expire at the end of the emergency status. It states:  “This Law shall 
expire when a declaration of the Knesset is published, under section 9(d) of the Law and Administration 
Ordinance, 5708-1948(6), that the state of emergency has ceased.” However, until today this status has not 
ceased, and the law is still applicable. 
89
 Korn, “From Refugees to Infiltrators,” 7. 
90
 The Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954, sec. 11–29. 
64 
 
under this law” with a retrospective effect, that is, a refugee who returned prior to the 
enactment of the law can be also deported without charges.91 
Through using all those methods, both military and legal, Israel succeeded in 
preventing the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees. As expressed by the Israeli 
professor in criminology, Alina Korn: 
By means of various laws (such as the Nationality Law, the Entry into Israel Law, 
the Prevention of Infiltration Law) that denied those who would be considered a 
citizen or a legal resident, thousands of refugees that had left the country or were 
expelled, were turned into infiltrators, criminals and trespassers.92 
 As noted by Korn, Israel created another discriminatory provision in its law 
criminalizing not only the return of the refugees to their homes, but even the aid that 
these refugees receive by their family members. Of course, the policy is discriminatory, 
since a Jew would not fall under the definition of infiltrator. The legality of Israel’s policy 
of prevention from return will be examined in Chapter 4. 
2.3 The 1967 Refugees 
In 1967, another war exploded between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in which 
Israel, the victorious power in the war, occupied lands belonging to or controlled by each 
of the defeated states, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.93 Quickly after the 
occupation, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, and ruled the rest of the occupied territories 
under military rule, using military orders and courts.94 
During and immediately after this war, Israel displaced between quarter a million 
to 450,000 Palestinians from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip,95 a 
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range amounting between one quarter to one third of the Palestinian population in the 
West Bank and Gaza then.96 These displacements were both within and beyond the 
borders,97 resulting from Israeli army operations during and after the war. The goal of 
these transfers were first to generally decrease the number of Arabs in the Occupied 
Territory,98 and second to cleanse certain areas of strategic importance from Palestinian 
population to facilitate a de-facto annexation of these areas into Israel.99 
This section will show how Israel used similar measures to the ones taken in 1948 
to result in a lasting exile to those displaced by the 1967 war. As was the case in the 
former, the displacement in the latter was a result of 1) the war operations including 
forced expulsions, 2) prevention from acquiring a legal status to reside in the occupied 
territory, and 3) prevention from return through regulatory measures. 
2.3.1 The War Operations 
During and immediately after the war (which lasted only 6 days), Israel conducted 
several mass expulsions. These forced evictions concentrated on three areas: specific 
regions that are close to the de facto Israeli-West Bank border, the Jordan Valley and 
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some parts of Jerusalem.100 In explaining some of the details of the displacements of the 
war, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA) reported shortly after the war that “the inhabitants fled during the fighting 
or moved out or were moved out afterwards.”101 
During the war, Israel forcibly evicted three villages near the central Latrun area at 
the western edge of the West Bank, close to the Israeli border, resulting in the 
displacement of 10,000 civilians.102 Latroun looks on the map like a finger sticking out the 
West Bank body, which Israel failed to occupy in the 1948 war.103 The villages in the 
Latroun area continued to be populated until the 1967 war, when Israel forcibly expelled 
the whole population and demolished every single building.104 The lands that belong to 
the Latroun villages were later turned into a park called Canada Park,105  and an Israeli 
settlement was also built on part of the lands.106 In addition, Israel built part of its rail line 
on another part of the lands from which the refugees were displaced.107 
The evictions of the areas at the edge of the Israel-West Bank borders included 
more villages and towns. The villages of Bayt Marsam, Bat 'Awa, Habla, Jiftlik and Al-Burj 
were all destroyed,108 together with a significant part of the town of Qalqilyah.109 
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Similarly, as soon as Israel controlled the Jerusalem area, it evacuated the Arab residents 
of the ancient Al-Magharbeh Quarter in the old city and demolished all of their houses 
leaving them homeless.110 The residence neighbourhood houses were an endowment 
since the year 1193, and Palestinian families have resided there since then.111 Israeli 
officials saw that the opportunity of the war was one that should be taken advantage of to 
clear this area and open the space in front of the Western Wall, a holly Jewish site in 
Jerusalem.112 Similarly, 4000 Palestinians were evicted from the Jewish Quarter of 
Jerusalem, but the houses were not demolished as the displaced Palestinians were 
replaced later by Jewish inhabitants.113 
Another area of strategic importance was the Jordan Valley, which is the border 
between the West Bank and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. During the war, Israel 
displaced 88% of the population of that area.114 The first to be driven out of the area were 
refugees who had been displaced from what became Israel in the aftermath of the 1948 
war.115 The residents of three refugee camps in the area were all expelled or fled to 
Jordan, in addition to half of the native population of the area.116 
Also in the aftermath of the war, Israel managed to get rid of 200,000 Palestinians 
by organizing buses departing from Jerusalem and other parts of the West Bank to the 
borers with Jordan, and forcing those going there to sign a document declaring that they 
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are leaving the country voluntarily.117 While some of the residents left voluntarily, a 
former soldier explained that a significant part was forced deportation. He mentioned:  
Although there were those deportees who were leaving voluntarily, but there 
were also not a few people who were simply expelled. We forced them to sign. I 
will tell you how exactly this was conducted: a bus was arriving and only men were 
getting off,... We were told that these were saboteurs,... and it would be better 
that they would be outside the state. They did not want to leave, but were 
dragged from the bus while being kicked and hit by revolver butts. By the time 
they arrived to my stall, they were usually already completely blurred at this stage 
and did not care much about signing. It seemed to them part of the process. In 
many cases, the violence used against them was producing desirable results from 
our point of view. The distance between the border point and the bridge was 
about 100 meters and out of fear they were crossing to the other side running; the 
border guard men and the paratroopers were all the time in the vicinity. When 
someone refused to give me his hand [for fingerprinting] they came and beat him 
badly. then I was forcibly taking his thumb, immersing it in ink and finger printing 
him. This way the refuseniks were removed... I have no doubt that tens of 
thousands of men were removed against their will.118 
This operation, as noticed by Masalha, has not received much attention,119 
probably because it did not involve dramatic military operations and evictions like the 
case in the Latroun villages or Qalqilya. However, it actually came into public discourse 
and started to receive attention when Haim Hertzog, who organized this operation after 
the war while serving as the first military governor of the West Bank, proudly announced 
in 1991 that he managed to quietly transfer 200,000 Palestinians by using this method.120 
In conclusion, we can see that the Israeli occupation forces acted upon the desire 
to, as Masalha expresses it, “thin out”121 the Palestinian population in the occupied 
territory. This has resulted in a large number of refugees and internally displaced persons. 
After the displacement took place, Israel cemented it with some regulatory tools that 
resulted in sustaining the exile. This will be discussed in the following sections. 
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2.3.2 Denial from Legal Status 
Prior to the occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip, 
the West Bank had been annexed to Jordan, while the Gaza Strip had been administered 
by Egypt.122 Jordanian law was applicable in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and 
the Palestinians living there were Jordanian citizens.123 In Gaza, however, the Palestinians 
kept their Palestinian citizenship, and had their own legislative council and laws.124 
Following its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel took a census in the 
OPT, created its own population registry of the inhabitants therein,125 and provided those 
counted by its census with Israeli-issued ID cards.126 This new system of registry and 
identification was the beginning of a new era in the OPT, where only bearers of Israeli 
identification were allowed to reside in these areas falling under Israeli control.127 Raja 
Shehadeh explained the status given to the West Bank residents as follows:  
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Inhabitants of the West Bank are not Israeli citizens. They are holders of Jordanian 
passports and Israel recognises their nationality as Jordanian in the travel 
documents it issues to them. Yet, Israel does not recognise that the territory is 
part of Jordan and does not accord inhabitants of the territories the protection 
guaranteed under international law to protected persons. As such, they get 
neither the privileges of citizens of Israel nor those of Jordan. Their status is 
comparable to that of alien residents.128 
 
The status of the residents of Gaza was similar, except that Israel regarded them as 
stateless.129 
Unlike the rest of the West Bank, East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel in 1967, 
and the Israeli law and court jurisdiction was expanded towards it.130 The population, 
however, were not given the status of citizens of Israel upon this annexation, but were 
rather considered alien residents in Israel.131 The main difference between the status 
given to the Jerusalem residents and that given to the rest of the residents of the occupied 
territory was that Jerusalemites were considered residents of Israel itself, while the rest of 
the population were considered residents of the “administered territory.” 
After the census that Israel conducted, those who were expelled or were away for 
any other reason, including anyone who went abroad for holiday, studies, work or any 
other reason (additional 60,000) were not given the status and thus they were not 
allowed to reside in the Occupied Territory.132 
                                                     
128
 Shehadeh and Law in the Service of Man, Occupier’s Law, 106. 
129
 Esther Rosalind Cohen, Human Rights in the Israeli-occupied Territories, 1967-1982 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1985), 36. 
130
 This annexation will be explained in further details in Chapter 4. It suffices here to mention that 
this annexation took place as a result of the extension of Israel’s civil legal system to an assigned area in East 
Jerusalem, and then expanded its Jerusalem municipality to include the annexed part. See, Law to Amend 
the Legal and Judicial Jurisdiction of the State of Israel, 1967; Later in 1980 Israel introduced a Basic Law 
(which holds a constitutional value) declaring that unified Jerusalem is the Capital of Israel. Basic Law: 
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, Published in Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 980 of 5th August, 1980, P. 186, 1980. 
131
 HCJ, 282/88 - ‘Awad v Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister and Minister of Interior et al. Judgment, 9 
(HCJ 1988), Stating that the residents of East Jerusalem were given a permanent residency permit. Nahedh 
Rayyes, Quds Bayna Zayf Al-Qanoun Al-Israeli wa Ajz al-Qanoun Al-Duwali (Gaza: Al-Lajna Al-Wataniyya Al-
Ulya Lil-Quds Asimat Al-Thaqafa Al-Arabiyya 2009, 2009), 42; Leah Tsemel, “Continuing Exodus - The 
Ongoing Expulsion of Palestinians from Jerusalem,” The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 9 (1997 
1996): 42. 
132
 HaMoked and B’Tselem, Families Torn Apart: Separation of Palestinian Families in the Occupied 
Territories, 17; Human Rights Watch, Forget About Him, He’s Not Here, 5; Quigley, “Family Reunion and the 
Right to Return to Occupied Territory,” 226. 
71 
 
To conclude, we can compare between this policy and that of 1948 to easily notice 
that Israel almost duplicated its pattern. As soon as it controlled a territory, it guaranteed 
that those who had been displaced by the war, or who were simply outside the borders, 
would be excluded from any right to reside in their homes, effectively making their exile 
durable.  
In addition to the expulsion and prevention from residency rights further measures 
to prevent return. These will be studied in the next section.  
2.3.3 Prevention from Return 
Similar to the aftermath of 1948, in 1967 those who were displaced by the war also 
tried to return to their homes. To combat this expected phenomenon, Israel issued 
military orders that consider any unauthorized entry to the occupied territory illegal. The 
regulatory measures introduced by Israel for this goal have been understudied, so this 
section will depend mainly on primary material.  
The Israeli regulatory action to prevent return started as early as August and 
September 1967, when the Israeli military authorities in both the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip issued orders to prevent “infiltration” in the occupied territory. The first order, 
issued on 23 August 1967 defined the infiltrator as: “a person who entered the Area [i.e. 
West Bank] knowingly and unlawfully after having been present in the east bank of the 
Jordan [river], Syria, Egypt or Lebanon.”133 The order defined the word lawfully: “as per 
permit by the military commander or a person appointed by him,”134 and punished the 
“infiltrator” by "imprisonment of fifteen years or a fine of 10,000 Israeli Lira or both.”135 
This order was made effective retrospectively by an “effective date,” which is June 7th 
1967, i.e. two days after the beginning of the war.136 The punishment in this first order did 
not include deportation. A similar order was issued for Gaza Strip, but the effective date of 
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applicability for this order was June 6th, 1967, and it also considered entering Gaza after 
staying in the West Bank as infiltration.137 
 One month later, the army commander issued an order introducing 
deportation. Section 5 (A) of Order 125 stated:  
The commander of the Israeli Defence Forces or whoever he assigns may order, in 
writing, the deportation of an infiltrator, whether charged with an offence under 
this Oder or whether not charged and the deportation order shall serve as the 
legal source for holding such infiltrator in custody pending his deportation.138 
The new order which replaced Order 106 also introduced an additional difficulty to 
those to be deported; it laid the burden of proof on the accused of infiltration, by 
providing: 
In any judicial proceeding under this Order, a person who is present in the Area 
without a document which allows his identification as a resident of the Area bears 
the burden of proving that he did not enter the area knowingly and unlawfully 
after 7 June 1967.139 
Thus, according to this article, any person who does not hold an Israeli permit is 
considered illegally present and is eligible for deportation, with a retrospective effect from 
the second day after the war started. In December, the military commander presented an 
additional amendment to order 125, by which he considered any person who entered the 
Area “legally” but whose permit expired an “infiltrator.”140 
In 1969, the military commanders of both the West Bank and Gaza Strip issued two 
similar orders that include all the principles described above, but added that “[a] person 
who entered the Area after the effective date [i.e. 7/6/1967 for the West Bank and 
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6/6/1967 for Gaza Strip141] as per permit that was obtained on the basis of a false affidavit 
is considered an infiltrator."142  
The Israeli courts did not challenge the legality of these orders that effectively 
decreased the population of the occupied territory. For example, in a petition to the Israeli 
Supreme Court in 1984, an imprisoned Palestinian from Gaza who was also subject to a 
deportation order requested that the court annuls the deportation order.143 The 
petitioner actually proved that he participated in the census taken in September 1967,144 
but had stated to interrogators when arrested in 1967 that he returned to Gaza after the 
war had begun (after the effective date) coming back from Saudi Arabia where he had 
been studying pharmacy (although he later denied that he entered after the effective 
date).145 The court, noting that Gaza was declared a closed military zone from 8 June 
1967, and that he must have returned “illegally,” dismissed his request not to be deported 
and held: 
From the moment it was determined that the petitioner resided in Jordan and 
Syria after 6/6/1967 and then he crossed the River Jordan deliberately and 
unlawfully in order to enter Judea and Samaria [i.e. West Bank], Israel and Gaza, 
from the date he entered Judea and Samaria and then the Gaza Area he should be 
viewed as an infiltrator as defined in the security legislation on the matter. The 
authority to issue a deportation order against him derives from his act of 
infiltration.146 
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The court provided later “… the fact that a person had in the past been a resident 
of the area and willingly left before the beginning of the IDF rule, did not grant him an 
automatic right to return.”147 
Then it addressed the issue of him having not established a permanent residence 
elsewhere in the world by holding: 
even if a person left the area before the entrance of the IDF forces and did not 
establish another place of residence, but made a temporary visit to one of the 
Arab countries, which were at that time in a state of war with Israel, this would 
restrict the right of re-entry to the area and make it conditional upon the receipt 
of a legal permit.148 
Then, the court held that “participation in the census did not alter the petitioner’s 
status as an infiltrator”149 and that the mere participation in the census "does not make a 
person who participated in it a legal resident of the area."150 
What can be concluded from the analysis of this case is that any unauthorized 
entry into the West Bank or Gaza is considered an “infiltration,” which on its own is 
enough to deport the alleged “infiltrator,” regardless of whether he was counted in the 
census, or given the residency status that Israel gave to the population. As explained by 
the court, the military regime in the West Bank and Gaza did not recognize the right of 
one to reside in the West Bank only on the basis that he had been a resident before the 
occupation started. Thus, the “prevention of infiltration” military orders formed an 
additional effective tool in not only preventing the return of those displaced by the war, 
but also in deporting people who managed to participate in the census. The further 
developments of the “infiltration” military orders will be discussed in Chapter 3 in order to 
explain contemporary displacements,151 and the legality of this policy will be examined in 
Chapter 4. 
It remains essential to stress in conclusion of the last three subsections that Israel 
used military force and regulatory tools in order to create a sustainable exile for one third 
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of the population of the West Bank and Gaza.152 The problem of the displaced persons 
remains unresolved until the current day.153 
2.4 Conclusion: the Characteristics of the Displacements in both Wars 
This chapter has analyzed some aspects of Israel’s forced displacement policy 
against the Palestinian inhabitants of areas that fell under its sovereignty, as well as the 
OPT. It can be noticed from the facts presented above that Israel has used almost identical 
tools to inflict a durable displacement upon its victims. While it took advantage of the two 
wars to displace hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, the political establishment further 
innovated a number of regulatory methods to cement the displacement and inflict new 
deportations. These methods included, first, excluding the displaced persons from the 
right to return to their homes by denying them a legal status that allows them to do so. 
This took place by excluding the Palestinian refugees in 1948 from Israel’s citizenship and 
creating a new residency status in the OPT that the residents of the West Bank including 
East Jerusalem and Gaza were not entitled to. Furthermore, Israel legislated a Prevention 
of Infiltration law in 1948 and issued military orders to the same effect in 1967 that not 
only illegalized the attempted unauthorized return of the refugees, but even criminalized 
it. The Israeli political establishment’s use of its legal system to inflict and cement 
displacement means that its policy of displacement is systematic.  
Furthermore, these laws and regulations were only inflicted upon Palestinians. The 
Jewish population who resided in Israel and the OPT did not suffer from these policies. 
Hence, the systematic displacement can be also described as discriminatory.  
Finally, it should be noted that the motive behind these displacements was to 
minimize the number of Palestinians, based on an ideological motive to change the 
demographic structure of the areas that fall under Israeli jurisdiction to tilt in favour of a 
Jewish majority.  
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Chapter 3- Continuous 
Displacement: Status 
Engineering 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was explained how Israel engineered the regulations 
concerning personal legal statuses in order to guarantee that the displacement of the 
refugees who were displaced during the 1948 and 1967 wars would be irreversible. The 
tools used for this purpose were preventing those who were displaced by the war from 
receiving any legal status in Israel or the OPT and introducing the “prevention of 
infiltration” law in Israel and military orders in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to guarantee 
the prevention of the refugees’ return.  
Despite the end of the war, status revocations and limitations continued to play an 
important role in displacing Palestinians, especially after the 1967 occupation. This 
chapter aims at explaining how status limitations and revocations have resulted in the 
forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians until now, and how Israeli 
policies continue to pose a serious threat on large segments of the Palestinian population 
in Israel and the OPT. This chapter has been divided into seven subsections explaining the 
main regulatory methods used to inflict status limitations and revocations. These 
subsections will explain status revocation, family unification and child registration issues in 
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip; as well as the prohibition of address change 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the end, this chapter will discuss Israel’s recent 
expansion of the prevention of infiltration military order.  
The subdivisions in this chapter are governed by the legal distinctions set by Israel 
itself. Although the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem have the same international 
legal status as will be explained further in Chapter 4, this chapter will explain the status 
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revocation and deprivation methods employed therein in separate sections. As will be 
shown below, the legal framework that Israel has used in annexed East Jerusalem is 
fundamentally different from the one it used in the West Bank and Gaza. 
3.2 Status Revocations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Shortly after the occupation of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza 
Strip, Israel took a census in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) and then gave those 
who were present Israeli-issued Identity Documentation cards (ID cards).1 These cards 
documented one's name, date of birth and address, among other details,2 and were 
issued in three general categories and colors: blue in East Jerusalem, orange in “Judea and 
Samaria” (this is the name Israel gives to the West Bank excluding Jerusalem) and red in 
Gaza Strip.3 These three categories and colours indicated the different legal statuses that 
were given to the Palestinians.  
The military law Israel established in the OPT gave bearers of Israeli-issued ID cards 
to enter and “legally” reside in their homes, but denied this right to other Palestinians 
who were not registered in the newly established population registry and did not receive 
such ID cards.4 The Israeli-issued ID cards became the main document used by the 
Palestinians to identify themselves to the Israeli authorities. Since the beginning of the 
occupation, it has been a legal requirement to carry these cards at all times,5 and they 
were needed for movement within the occupied territories, to Israel or to travel abroad. 
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In the case of traveling abroad via Jordan or Egypt through the land crossings 
(Alenby Bridge to Jordan, and Rafah Crossing to Egypt), the Palestinians (from both the 
West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip) had to leave their ID cards at the 
border crossing and take instead an exit permit valid for a specified period of time.6 
Similarly, if the traveler left through one of the Israeli border crossings, including the Ben-
Gurion Airport, they had to hand in their ID card, and leave using their Israeli-issued 
“laissez-passer,” or travel document, which consists of a visa valid for one year.7 If the 
traveler missed the deadline stated on his permit or visa, he would be denied entry and 
consequently lose his residency status, which would be considered by the Israeli military 
authorities “ceased residency status.”8 Similarly, Al-Haq documented that residency status 
was also revoked when a Palestinian acquired a permanent residency status or a 
citizenship abroad.9 
Between 1967 and 1995, according to the Israeli army’s responses to HaMoked’s 
applications based on the Freedom of Information Act, 140,000 Palestinians from the 
West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and 108,878 Palestinians from Gaza Strip have 
lost their residency status as a result of this policy.10 
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When Israel revoked residencies according to this procedure, it did not inform the 
victims about its will to revoke their residencies. Simply, when they returned to the 
country, they discovered they were not allowed to return as their residency had been 
revoked. One woman interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how she lost her 
status:  
It turned out I was supposed to come back and renew my exit permission within 
six months. I missed the appointment and they cancelled me, but I did not know 
about the requirement. There was nothing I could do about it. Every time I came 
back to Gaza after that, I had to get a visitor’s permit beforehand.11 
Israel publicly referred to this policy for the first time in a letter to the Israeli 
human rights organization, Hamoked, only in 2011, following the latter’s litigation in the 
Israeli Supreme Court requesting information. The letter explained: 
A resident who did not return was registered as having ‘ceased residency’ status 
since he was viewed as a person who had transferred his centre of life abroad.12 
According to the same letter, Israel has re-activated the residency of 10,000 West 
Bank Palestinians who had been given the “ceased residency” status, rendering 130,000 
and their families permanently displaced due to this technical method of displacement.13 
This procedure was used at the borders for residents of the West Bank and Gaza 
until 1995, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) assumed some limited 
transitional authority in the OPT following the interim peace agreement with Israel. This 
agreement gave the newly established Palestinian authority some shared responsibility 
over the population registry, allowed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to travel 
using passports, and ended the procedure according to which Israel revoked residencies 
due to extended stays abroad.14 By sharing the PLO with responsibility over the 
Palestinian population registry, some protection (although limited) was introduced to the 
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Palestinian residency status in the OPT. This limited protection did not include East 
Jerusalem, which will be discussed in the next section.15 
However, most of those who had been displaced as a result of residency 
revocation in the West Bank and Gaza prior to the peace process were not provided with 
remedies. In the early 1990s, before the Interim Peace Agreement, Israel had established 
a committee in the military government called “latecomers committee” that received 
appeals from those whose residencies were revoked.16 This committee dealt with these 
applications according to confidential procedures and took its decisions without allowing 
the applicant or his lawyer to appear or argue his case in front of it.17 When these 
applications are refused, the last resort for the deportee and his family is to apply for 
family unification, a very problematic and usually unsuccessful application.18 The 
predicament of family unification will be discussed further in section ‎3.4.1 below.  
Then in 1995 the Interim Peace Agreement was signed. Regarding past residency 
revocations, it was agreed that 
A joint committee will be established to solve the reissuance of identity cards to 
those residents who have lost their identity cards.19 
This committee spent several years in political negotiations with no success, 
apparently due to Israeli obstacles during the negotiations.20 This left the issue of almost 
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quarter a million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and their families unresolved, 
and in need of a remedy.  
3.3  Residency Status Revocations in East Jerusalem 
Up until the Interim Peace agreement, the residency revocation policies applied in 
East Jerusalem on the one hand and the West Bank and Gaza on the other were similar in 
their effect, although the regulatory framework and instruments were different due to the 
annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967. The similarities included several details. For 
example, East Jerusalem residents also needed exit permits to travel abroad, had to leave 
their ID cards at the land crossing to Jordan, travelled through the airport using a “laissez-
passer” with a return visa stamped on it and got their residencies revoked upon returning 
later than the date stated on their permits.21 Nonetheless, there are major differences in 
the way Israel treated Jerusalemites, which need to be discussed in this separate 
subsection. 
This difference is due to Israel’s extension of the geographical jurisdiction of its 
domestic law towards the annexed part of Jerusalem.22 This practically meant that the 
military orders issued in the West Bank did not apply in Jerusalem. In addition, the status 
that the Palestinians in Jerusalem received was an Israeli status. Despite the annexation, 
however, Israel did not grant citizenships to the residents of the annexed territory, but 
considered them alien residents in Israel.23 
Residency status in Israel is regulated with the Entry into Israel Law (1952), which 
gives the Minister of the Interior, “at his discretion,” the authority to “cancel any permit of 
residence.”24 Prior to the beginning of the peace process, the general Israeli policy 
adopted by the ministry of the interior, expressed in its own regulations, was that a 
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resident would lose his residency status in a number of conditions, including if he “left 
Israel and settled in a country outside Israel.”25 The regulations clarified that this condition 
(settling outside Israel) would be fulfilled by leaving Israel for a period of 7 years; receiving 
a permanent residency permit in another country; or receiving citizenship of that country 
through naturalization.26 
Prior to the peace process, Jerusalemite Palestinians travelled abroad and returned 
to visit Jerusalem to renew their exit permits or travel documents, and the authorities 
renewed their permits regularly.27 When they resided in suburbs of Jerusalem that were 
not annexed by Israel, or in any other part of the OPT, their residencies were secure as 
they were not considered to have settled abroad.28  
Shortly after the launch of the peace process in 1995 Israel surprised Palestinian 
Jerusalemites with a new policy of residency revocations without warning. Suddenly, 
Jerusalemites who were residing in the West Bank or Gaza, as well as those who lived 
abroad, started facing residency revocations without being informed about the 
regulations used for such revocations.29  This was the beginning of a new era in the 
interpretation of Israel’s Entry into Israel Law and regulations, characterized by a sudden 
broadening of the definition of “settling outside Israel” using the stricter criterion called 
“centre of life.”30 According to the new policy, a Palestinian would be considered to have 
                                                     
25
 Entry into Israel Regulations (1974), 1974, Article 11 (C). 
26
 Ibid., Regulation 11a. An unofficial translation to English is provided by Hamoked, available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2010/regulation%2011a.pdf. 
27
 HaMoked, B’Tselem, and Stein, The Quiet Deportation: Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians, 13. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 12, citing a letter sent from the legal department in the Ministry of Interior to HaMoked in 
1994 stating that “the Minister of Interior has broad discretion in granting approvals/permits, and he is not 
required to state reasons for his decision... Because he has no duty to state reasons, there is also no cause to 
issue internal directives to assist in exercising the said discretion”; Tsemel, “Continuing Exodus - The 
Ongoing Expulsion of Palestinians from Jerusalem,” 43–5. 
30
 Tsemel, “Continuing Exodus - The Ongoing Expulsion of Palestinians from Jerusalem,” 44; 
HaMoked, B’Tselem, and Yael Stein, The Quiet Deportation Continues: Revocation of Residency and Denial of 
Social Rights of East Jerusalem Residents (B’Tselem, HaMoked, 1998), 8; John Quigley, “Jerusalem: The 
Illegality of Israel’s Encroachment,” Palestine Yearbook of International Law 9 (1997 1996): 34; The Civic 
Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, 43 Years of Occupation: The Jerusalem File (second Edition), 2nd 
ed. (Jerusalem: Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, 2011), 17, http://www.civiccoalition-
jerusalem.org/human-rights-resources/publications/reports/43-years-occupation-jerusalem-file-second-
edition. 
83 
 
“settled outside Israel” if his “centre of life” was outside Israel. This had two significant 
practical applications. First, those who moved to areas beyond Jerusalem’s municipal 
borders towards the West Bank (including Jerusalem’s suburbs) or Gaza Strip got to be 
considered to have moved their “centre of life” outside Israel.31 Secondly, those who had 
travelled abroad for extended periods of time were considered to have moved their 
“centre of life” and became liable to residency revocations.32 The burden of proving that 
one’s “centre of life” is in Israel has been laid on the Palestinians, who have been asked to 
provide documents that prove their residence.33 
The revocable residency status given to the residents of Jerusalem and the stricter 
regulations that led to thousands of residency revocations were examined, approved and 
in part developed by the Israeli Supreme Court. In 1988, the Israeli Supreme Court 
declined a petition filed by Dr. Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian academic who headed the 
Centre for the Study of Non-Violence, and vocally called for resisting the Israeli occupation 
non-violently.34 Awad, who was born in Jerusalem in 1943, was counted in the census of 
1967 and was given the residency that the rest of the population of Jerusalem was given.35 
He travelled to study in the United States in 1970 and stayed for a period of time during 
which he got a permanent residency status in the USA and later a citizenship.36 During one 
of his visits to his home, he applied to renew his ID card but the Israeli ministry of Interior 
declined his application based on the argument that he lost his residency status.37  
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Justice Aharon Barak, who wrote the judgment, declined the argument of the 
petitioner’s council, which claimed that the Entry into Israel law should not apply to the 
residents of Jerusalem and that these residents should be given a protected status such as 
a “constitutional residency” or a “quasi citizenship.”38 Justice Barak’s judgment did not 
challenge the legality of the revocable residency status given by Israel and found that the 
application of the Entry into Israel law was appropriate. Justice Barak then discussed the 
“expiry” of the permanent residency status. He wrote:  
Can a permit for permanent residency expire “of itself” without an act of 
revocation by the minister of interior? I believe the answer to this is affirmative. A 
permit for permanent residency, when granted, is based on reality and permanent 
residency. Once this reality no longer exists, the permit expires of itself.39 
Through this opinion, the Israeli Supreme Court declined to protect the population 
of East Jerusalem and their right not to be deported from their city, and insisted that 
treating them like immigrants was appropriate. The judgment added:  
Indeed, a permit for permanent residency- as opposed to the act of naturalization- 
is a hybrid. On the one hand, it has a constituting nature, creating the right to 
permanent residency; on the other hand, it is of a declarative nature, expressing 
the reality of permanent residency. Once this reality disappears, the permit no 
longer has anything to which to attach, and is, therefore, revoked of itself, without 
any need for a formal act of revocation.40 
The judgment also made a vague reference to the concept of “centre of life,” 
which was later developed into the policy explained above. The judgment stated, after 
explaining that Awad had lived in the USA and acquired an American citizenship:  
This new reality reveals that the petitioner uprooted himself from the country [i.e. 
Israel] and rooted himself in the USA. His centre of life is no longer the country, 
but the USA. [Emphasis added]41 
In 1994, another key judgment was made by Israel’s Supreme Court. The petitioner 
Fathiyya Shiqaqi, whose husband had been deported to Lebanon and then moved from 
there to Syria, followed him and stayed in Syria for 6 years.42 Unlike Mubarak Awad, she 
received neither a permanent residency status nor a citizenship abroad.43 When she 
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returned to Jerusalem, she went to the ministry of interior to register her three children, 
but her application was refused and she was told she had to leave the country.44 
Obviously, she argued that the regulations written by the ministry of the interior 
itself defined residing outside the country, in relation to terminating residencies, as 
residing in another country for 7 years and receiving a permanent residency or a 
citizenship of that country. None of these conditions was fulfilled by Mrs. Shiqaqi’s stay 
abroad, which, as her council argued, makes the revocation of her residency status illegal 
under Israeli law.45 Moreover, she never left the country as a result of her own will.46 Had 
her husband not been deported she would have not left the country.  
The court, surprisingly then, found that the three options for residency “expiry” 
enlisted by the law could be expanded, giving a much wider space for residency 
revocation. The judgment stated: 
It cannot be said that only where one of the enumerated facts apply can 
settlement in a foreign country under regulation 11(c) be proved. Settling in a 
foreign country can also be found in ways other than those enumerated in 11A of 
the aforementioned regulations. The appearance of a new reality, changing the 
reality of permanent residency in Israel, is clearly indicated by circumstances other 
than those mentioned in regulation 11A of the said regulations.47  
This case was a pivotal point in expanding Israel’s criteria for revoking Palestinians’ 
residencies in Jerusalem and expelling them. Its timing was also critical, as it was decided 
simultaneously with the beginning of Israel’s policy of mass revocation of residencies of 
those residing in the West Bank, Gaza or abroad, since their centre of life was not 
Jerusalem. Since then, it became the responsibility of the Palestinian in Jerusalem every 
time he sought to renew his documents, register a child, change his marital status, etc, to 
prove that he/ she still resides in Jerusalem.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions in this topic have been seen as a contribution in the 
regulatory engineering aiming at displacing Palestinians. Advocate Yossi Wolfson of 
HaMoked ironically comments on the Awad case:  
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There you have it, a perfect geometric structure: An abstract legal fixture – a 
permanent residency permit – with a built in self-destruct mechanism. Upon 
fulfilment of the conditions pre-programmed into the permit, it revokes itself 
without human intervention.48 
According to the numbers provided by the Israeli ministry of Interior, between 
1967 and 2011 more than 14,152 residencies were revoked from Palestinian 
Jerusalemites.49 Most of these revocations, more than 11,000 of them, took place after 
introducing the ‘centre of life’ policy in 1995.50 
More recently, a new dangerous precedent took place. In 2006, the Israeli ministry 
of interior decided to revoke the residency status of four Palestinians, three of whom had 
been elected for the Palestinian legislative council; the fourth had served as the 
Palestinian Authority’s minister for Jerusalem affairs.51 Israel’s justification for this 
revocation was their political affiliation, the “Change and Reform” party, which, as Israel 
argued, is affiliated with the militant Palestinian movement Hamas. According to the 
Israeli government, with this affiliation, the Palestinian legislative council members 
“severely violated their minimal obligation of loyalty to the state of Israel.”52 
Alarmed by the implications of this precedent, a number of human rights 
organizations petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court trying to cancel the revocations.53 
Attorney Hassan Jabareen, the General Director of Adalah, a human rights organization 
that aims at defending the rights of the Arab minority in Israel, said:  
If the Supreme Court upholds the Interior Minister's decision, it will be dangerous 
for all Palestinians in Jerusalem since Israel can easily revoke their residency based 
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on their legitimate political affiliations or activities. International law prohibits the 
occupying power from demanding loyalty from the occupied people.54 
Since 2006, this case has been pending in the Supreme Court which refused in June 
2010 to give a temporary order requested by the petitioners to prevent the expulsion of 
the parliamentarians until the case is decided.55 A few days after this decision, the 
deportees-to-be sought refuge at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
building in East Jerusalem and stayed there holding a long sit-in until the Israeli police 
arrested them in two separate incidents.56 Two of the parliamentarians have been forcibly 
transferred to the West Bank, while the others, who were arrested in January 2012, are 
facing criminal charges including illegal presence in Israel.57 Should the petition be 
rejected and the criminal charges accepted by the Israeli judicial system, the new criterion 
of “loyalty” to the state of Israel will become a new requirement for a Palestinian to keep 
his or her residency. This might in turn raise the rate of displacement in Jerusalem 
significantly. 
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3.4 Family Unification  
Simultaneously with Israel’s policy of regulating methods that lead to revoke the 
legal status that enables the Palestinians to reside in their homes, it has also restricted 
giving this status to people who should be entitled to it. In the West Bank and Gaza, there 
were only two ways new names could be added to the population registry: registration of 
a new-born child of registered parents and “family unification,” the latter being a process 
used to give residency rights to a family member who is not registered or who was 
registered as a resident but his residency status had been revoked. In Israel and East 
Jerusalem, family unification and child registration are the main ways in which new non-
Jewish citizens and residents gain a status in Israel. Throughout the years, Israel has 
introduced several restrictions on both types of procedures for Palestinians. The following 
sections will discuss family unification and child registration in the West Bank and Gaza, 
and in Israel and East Jerusalem.  
3.4.1 Family Unification in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
It was explained above that when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza it took a 
census, created new population registries for the West Bank and Gaza and issued new 
identity cards to those who were physically present in the newly occupied territories, 
given that they were not displaced during or shortly after the war.58 The refugees who 
were displaced during the war as well as those who were for any purpose abroad during 
the war (between quarter to one third of the population of the West Bank and Gaza),59 
were not counted in the census, not considered as residents and denied right to return 
and reside in the OPT.60 In the early stages of its occupation, Israel opened a small window 
known as “family unification” to add unregistered people to the population registry and 
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give them the right to reside.61 In this procedure, the military authorities in the West Bank 
and Gaza had a wide discretion on family residency and no recognition of the right of 
return and the right to unite was granted as such.62 The Israeli government in several 
occasions announced that family unification was “not a vested right, but a special 
benevolent act of the Israeli authorities,”63 and that Israel aims at accepting “the 
minimum possible number of applications.”64 In addition to being the only available 
window for the war refugees to return, this procedure was also the only way whose 
residencies had been revoked to return, as well as the way to invite a foreign spouse or 
other family members to reside in the OPT with their resident relative.65 
In the early stages of the occupation, applications were allowed to be submitted 
on behalf of first degree relatives only, as long as the requested relative was not a male 
between the ages of 16 and 60.66 Israel implemented this policy for a period of five years 
during which it reportedly rejected or refrained from processing most of the applications 
and approved some.67 
In 1973, Israel decided to further restrict family unifications by applying 
undeclared new criteria.68 The new military order was never published, but its effect was 
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noticed and documented as the number of approved applications dropped dramatically 
until 1983,69 the year in which the Israeli military authorities re-evaluated their family 
unification policy and again created new restrictions in order to limit the number of 
approved applications. Between 1983 and 1993, the numbers of approved family 
unification applications dropped dramatically, and approval of such application was very 
rare and exceptional.70 The cases that were approved for family reunification in that 
period were (1) cases of “administrative considerations,” or “governmental interest,” 
which mainly referred to allowing families of those who collaborate with the occupation 
forces to get a residency status, and a few cases of big Palestinian investors who intended 
to invest in the occupied territories; or (2) cases with “exceptional humanitarian 
considerations,” a term that was not defined and could not really be used as a basis of 
family unification.71 In addition to these restrictions, the military government created a 
new requirement in 1985 according to which those family members who were the subject 
of the family unification application could not reside in the occupied territory until a final 
decision was taken on the application.72 Several families ignored this prohibition and faced 
deportation as a result.73 
In 1995, the Palestinian Authority was established in parts of the occupied territory 
as a result of the Oslo Peace agreement which allowed the Palestinian Authority to 
assume some limited responsibility over the Palestinian Population Registry in the West 
Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza.74 In relation to family unifications, the 
agreement stated:  
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To reflect the spirit of the peace process, the Palestinian side has the right, with 
the prior approval of Israel, to grant permanent residency in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip to:  
investors, for the purpose of encouraging investment; 
spouses and children of Palestinian residents, and 
other persons, for humanitarian reasons, in order to promote and upgrade family 
reunification.75 
In practice, the Palestinian authority served as a messenger between the 
Palestinian population and Israel that had no authority to approve applications, but that 
was allowed to reject them.76 The procedure was that the family unification applications 
are filed to the PA, which sends them to the Israeli military authorities to be processed 
and informs the applicant of the answer if and when it is issued.77 Israel processed 
applications according to a quota of maximum 2,000 persons per year, which fell far 
below the needs of the Palestinian population.78 This quota rose to 3,000 in 1998 and to 
4,000 in early 2000.79 
In the year 2000, when the second Palestinian Intifada started, Israel decided 
suddenly not to process any applications related with the Palestinian population registry 
with the exception of child registration (with restrictions explained below). Israel did not 
publish any military order or other type of regulation that explains the new reality.80 In 
relation to family unification applications, this freeze meant that Israel refused to process 
any such applications.81 The only interruptions of this freeze were related to (1) undefined 
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“exceptional humanitarian cases” that Israel agreed to process; and (2) what Israel called a 
“political gesture” to the chairman of the Palestinian authority in 2008, in which it 
promised to process 50,000 applications of which 32,000 applications were approved.82 It 
was estimated in 2006 that the freeze had caused the accumulation of more than 120,000 
family unification applications, which, as the Hamoked and B'Tselem report noticed, 
would take more than 30 years to be processed if Israel decided to return to process such 
applications according to the highest quota of 4,000 applications a year.83 To make things 
even worse, Israel also stopped giving visitor permits to those invited by Palestinians to 
temporarily visit the OPT, practically making it impossible for separated families to unite in 
the OPT even temporarily.84 
Clearly, this makes the stability of many families impossible and keeps them the 
only option of living together abroad, or living separated. When Israel started to 
implement this policy, several families were already living together in the West Bank and 
Gaza waiting for their applications to be processed. Suddenly, these persons became 
illegally residing in the OPT and were unable to move around freely fearing that they 
would be deported.85 Until the time of writing this thesis, the total freeze on family 
unification for Palestinians continues. Finally, it is important to mention that all these 
restrictions are only applicable to the Palestinian population in the West Bank. The Jewish 
colonists who reside therein do not need any special permits to enter the West Bank, live 
in it or bring their family members to reside with them.86 
3.4.2 Family Unification in East Jerusalem and other areas under Israeli civil 
law jurisdiction 
As explained earlier, when Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 it differentiated 
between the residency it gave to the inhabitants of the annexed East Jerusalem and the 
one it gave to those who lived in the rest of the West Bank and Gaza. The Jerusalem status 
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was that of an Israeli resident and it allowed its bearer to reside and work in East 
Jerusalem and Israel, obliged him to be a full Israeli tax payer and a member of the social 
welfare system.87 
In the aftermath of the 1967 occupation and annexation, many Palestinian families 
ended up being divided across the new borders and all those who got West Bank or Gaza 
residencies became obliged to acquire an Israeli residency by going through family 
unification procedures, should they wish to live with their family members in occupied 
and annexed East Jerusalem or Israel.88 This application was processed by the Israeli 
Ministry of Interior (hereinafter, MoI), which opened a separate branch for East Jerusalem 
residents where treatment of Palestinians coming to process any applications was 
uniquely humiliating, compared to other branches of the Ministry.89 
From the beginning of the occupation until the year 1994, the MoI refused 
applications submitted by female Palestinians to invite their husbands to reside with them 
in East Jerusalem or Israel.90 The ministry justified this policy by saying that they perceived 
that in Arab culture "the wife follows her husband.”91 In 1994, following a petition at the 
Supreme Court against this policy, the ministry of interior changed this policy and allowed 
women to make family unification applications on behalf of their spouses.92 
Between that decision and 1997, Israel refrained from processing thousands of 
family unifications and decided that if the invited spouse was a resident of the West Bank 
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or Gaza Strip he/she would not get a permit to enter Israel until an answer is given to the 
family unification application.93 In early 1997, the MoI introduced new procedure 
replacing the older policy, according to which applicants were granted a permanent 
residency status. The new policy was called the “graduated procedure” deferring granting 
a permanent residency status five years and three months from the day the application is 
approved.94 During those years, the Israeli government did not grant an entry permit to 
the spouse invited to reside, thus forcing the families to live separately during that period, 
but more importantly preventing the family unification application from being accepted 
due to the claim that the family’s centre of life is not Israel.95 As Yael Stein puts it, the 
policy “made it impossible for couples to comply with the law and at the same time obtain 
approval of their request for family unification.”96 Of course, if the inviting spouse was 
only an Israeli resident, which is the case for most East Jerusalemites, this spouse will lose 
his/ her status in Jerusalem should they go to live with their partner in the West Bank, 
Gaza, or anywhere else outside Israel or Jerusalem.97 The Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel (ACRI) described this procedure as “bureaucratic red tape” that discriminates 
actively against Arab citizens and residents of Israel.98 According to BT’selem and 
Hamoked, the MoI frequently changed the regulations without informing the public, 
causing further obstacles for the public who were not aware of the applicable 
procedures.99 
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In 2000, Israel effectively, but without any formal declaration or decision, froze 
family unifications for Palestinians.100 In 2002, the Israeli government issued a decision to 
freeze all family unification applications where the alien spouse is a resident of the OPT or 
is of Palestinian descent, until a new policy is legislated by the parliament.101 The decision 
also stated that the status of Palestinians whose applications were being processed stay 
outside Israel until the decision is made.102 For those who got an approval on the family 
unification application under the gradual procedure, their status will not be upgraded.103  
In 2003, the Israeli parliament issued a new law that anchored the previous year’s 
government decision. According to the new law, called the “Nationality and Entry into 
Israel Law (Temporary Order), 5763-2003,”104 Israel totally froze the family unification 
procedure for Palestinians.  
 Article 2 of this law states:  
… the Minister of the Interior shall not grant citizenship to a resident of the Region 
pursuant to the Citizenship law and shall not give a resident of the region a permit 
to reside in Israel pursuant to the Entry into Israel Law, and the commander of the 
Region shall not give such resident a permit to stay in Israel pursuant to the 
security legislation in the Region.105  
The “Region” referred to the West Bank and Gaza (Article 1) and the Resident of 
the Region included those who were registered in the population registry of the Region 
and those who resided there without having been registered, with the exception of the 
residents of the Israeli settlements.106 This temporary law has been extended consistently 
since 2003 until the time of writing this thesis. It was amended twice in 2005 and 2007 
and its effect was expanded to prohibit family unification of spouses who hold the 
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citizenship or are residents of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon and any “area in which 
operations that constitute a threat to the state of Israel are being carried out.”107 
This legislative freeze blocked the way in front of lawyers and human rights 
organizations to defend individual cases of family unification in court. The legal opposition 
taken by a number of human rights organizations led by Adalah was to file petitions in the 
Supreme Court claiming that the law was unconstitutional and breaching international 
human rights law. The first case was filed in 2003 by Adalah, (The Legal Centre for Arab 
Minority Rights in Israel) and a number of families that were affected by the law.108 The 
main argument of the petitioners in this case was that the law violates the right of the 
Arab minority to equality, since most of those who marry residents of the occupied 
territory are the Arab citizens and residents of Israel.109 In addition, the petitioners argued 
that the law violated their constitutional family rights.110 But the Israeli basic law which 
has constitutional value does not expressly grant the right to equality between its citizens 
or the right to family life.111 Adalah also argued that the law violates the private life or the 
Arab citizens, the right to personal freedom, the right of a parent to have contact with his 
child and the right to build a family.112   
The Israeli respondents justified this policy by two main arguments, one official 
and another that can be described as less official. The official one, which was presented by 
the government in front of the court, is a security argument which claims that since the 
beginning of the second intifada, “twenty six residents of the territories who received 
status in Israel as a result of family reunifications were involved in real aid and assistance 
to terror attacks against Israelis.”113 In addition, the argument continues, the Israeli 
security officials have assessed that “there is a security need to prevent, at this time, the 
entry of residents of the territories, as such, into Israel, since the entry of residents of the 
                                                     
107
 Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order)( Amendment), 2005; Nationality and 
Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order)(Amendment), 2007. 
108
 Adalah vs. Minister of Interior (HCJ 2006). 
109
 Ibid., para. 9. 
110
 Ibid. 
111
 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, Translation to English is available at the Israeli 
Parliament (Knesset) Website. Available at: http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
112
 Adalah vs. Minister of Interior, 10 (HCJ 2006), para. 10. 
113
 Ibid., para. 12. 
97 
 
territories into Israel and their free movement within the state by virtue of the receipt of 
Israeli documentation is likely to endanger, in a very real way, the safety and security of 
citizens and residents of the state.”114 After thorough examination of the factual basis of 
this argument, it was later revealed that only 7 of all the 130,000 who entered Israel 
through family unification since 1996 were indicted for “security offences.”115 
The less official argument was made by several officials in official meetings and to 
the media before, during and after the legislative process of the law, but was not 
represented by the state in the Supreme Court proceedings. This argument goes to claim 
that the Jewish character of the state will be jeopardized, should the state continue to 
grant a status to non-Jews (especially Palestinians) through family unification 
procedure.116 In Israel 2005 Israel’s prime minister Ariel Sharon stated that “there is no 
need to hide behind security arguments. There is a need for the existence of a Jewish 
state.”117 Similarly, the interior minister was quoted presenting the number of Palestinian 
who gained a status in Israel through family unification, which worried the minister who 
thought that the numbers “prove that the right of return was being realized through the 
back door of the State of Israel.”118 Similarly, these opinions were raised while proposing 
and discussing the bill in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset.119 In the court case “HCJ 
7052/03 Adalah vs. The minister of Interior” an organization called “Jewish Majority in 
Israel” joined the case as a respondent and argued that indeed the law needed to be there 
to preserve such majority.120 This case was dismissed by the majority of the justices on the 
bases that the law was constitutional because the violation to the basic rights of the 
citizens of Israel was proportional to the security need the legislator was trying to meet 
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when the statute was enacted.121 Justice Chechin, who led the majority opinion in this 
case, started his judgment by writing a fictional dream in which he and Justice Barak, the 
leader of the minority opinion, land in Utopia and have a conversation with Thomas More. 
According to the fictional story he asked More whether the legal system in Utopia was 
similar to that of Israel, More answered:  
I am sorry, but there are vast differences between the two legal systems, and it 
will be a long time before Israel reaches the level of Utopia. At this time, you are 
fighting for your lives, for the existence of the state, for the ability of the Jewish 
people to have a communal and national life like all peoples. The laws of Utopia- 
in the position you find yourselves in at present- are not for you. Not yet. Take 
care f yourselves, do the best you can and live.122 
Since then, this “temporary” law has been renewed consistently and has affected 
thousands of families. Adalah and other organizations petitioned against the law again 
upon its renewal in 2007, but the petition was rejected again in January 2012.123 Justice 
Guris made the title of his opinion: “human rights are not a prescription for national 
suicide.”124 The statement made by Guris reflects a doctrine followed by the Israeli court, 
according to which respecting the lives of Palestinian families in Jerusalem to live together 
would constitute “national suicide.” This doctrine is also dominant in relation to child 
registration, as will be shown below.  
3.5 Child Registration 
In addition to its policies of residency revocation and banning family unification 
procedures, Israel also introduced several obstacles on the process of registering children 
in the population registry (hereinafter child registration). As noticed above, this 
registration is essential for exercising one's right to live in his land, work and move around 
both internally and abroad.   
As in other cases, Israel has assigned different policies in the areas it runs as 
“administered territories” and others it considers as part of its sovereign territory. Thus, 
this section is divided into these two subthemes, the first explaining the child registration 
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problem in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the second discussing the same question in 
Israel and Jerusalem. 
3.5.1 Child Registration Under the military regime in the West bank and Gaza 
Following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 and the 
installation of the military regime therein, a new-born child could be registered in the 
population registry until the age of 16, whether he was born in the OPT or abroad, 
provided that one of his parents is registered in the population registry.125 This regulation 
continued to be applicable until Israel decided to add new restrictions in 1987. The newly 
added regulation introduced the following restrictions on child registrations: a) a child 
would not be registered if his mother is not registered in the population registry, 
regardless of whether the child was born in the OPT or abroad; b) in cases where the child 
is born abroad, the child can be registered only until the age of 5; and c) in cases where 
only the mother is a registered resident, she can only register her child until the age of 
five.126 These hard restrictions were cancelled by the Israeli military authorities in January 
1995, replacing it with a new regulation that went one step forward and one backward. 
The improvement was that the new military order cancelled the restrictions of 1987 and 
advanced the age for registering children to 18 for the first time.127 The step backward 
was that the new order stated that if only one of the parents was a registered resident, 
he/she can only register his/her child once they prove they permanently reside in the 
OPT.128 According to HaMoked, the military authorities did not apply the less restrictive 
aspect of the new regulation and continued to implement the 1987 regulations.129 
Later in 1995, the Interim Peace Agreement between the PLO and Israel was 
signed and the responsibility of registering new-born Palestinian children in the areas that 
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became under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority was transferred to that 
authority. Article 28(12) of the agreement stat: 
The Palestinian side shall have the right to register in the population registry all 
persons who were born abroad or in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, if under the 
age of sixteen years and either of their parents is a resident of the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank.130  
 
According to the agreement, the Palestinian authority had the obligation of only 
informing Israel about the new registrations and no prior authorization was required.131 
Nonetheless, Israel, who continues to exercise the ultimate powers in the occupied 
territory, added a new regulation: a child has to be physically present in the occupied 
territory to be registered.132 
In 2002, Israel stopped recognizing the registration of children who were 
registered after the age of 5 if born abroad, despite the interim peace agreement.133 In 
the following year, it retreated from the ban, but kept a requirement that the child has to 
be physically present in the OPT to be registered.134 Nonetheless, Israel continued to block 
the registration of children born abroad by not giving them a permit to enter the OPT and 
be registered therein.135 Once a child has passed the age of 16, he loses his right to be 
registered in the population registry and the only way for him to be able to reside in the 
OPT “legally” would be through going through a successful family unification process, 
which has been frozen as mentioned earlier.136 In addition, those who were born and 
raised in the OPT but for some reason were not registered in the OPT were considered to 
be living illegally there and needed to file a family unification application.137 
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There has been no intervention from the Supreme Court on Israel’s decision to 
freeze the population registry, even in cases related to children. There have been cases 
when the military government decided to give an entry permit for the purpose of 
registration, following interventions from human rights organizations to prevent the issue 
from being discussed in the Court.138 Nonetheless, those who passed the age of 16 were 
not given remedies from the Supreme Court, even though it could be that the child was 
prevented from registration because of the laws and regulations Israel has enforced over 
the years. For example, in the “Qanam v. Commander of Military Forces in the West Bank” 
case the Supreme Court declined the petition of a father to register his child born in 
Jordan, because the application was made 4 months after the child turned 16.139 It was 
argued in the case that when the child was born in 1989, the military law then did not 
allow the registration of a child whose mother was not a registered resident of the OPT. 
This argument did not help either, and the court continued to accept the state’s position 
that the freeze of the Palestinian population registry was subject to the political 
relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Eventually, the court concluded:  
Indeed, as a result of the political situation in the region individuals suffer. The 
conditions of the petitioners, whose centre of life is in Jordan, might be better 
than other people’s conditions. Anyway, the suffering of the petitioner is not 
different from the suffering of others in the current political situation.  Therefore, 
we cannot assist them.140 
It can be noted that this judgment did not use any human rights standards to reach 
its conclusion and considered the registration of children a political issue. This politicising 
of a child’s right to be registered and to live in his parents’ home meant that no remedy 
can be expected from the Supreme Court until significant changes are introduced to the 
political and legal frameworks that rule the relationship between the Palestinian civilian 
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population and Israel.141 Additionally, Israel has been implementing policies to restrict 
child registration in areas on which it extends its sovereignty. 
3.5.2 Child Registration in the Israeli Civil Law Regime: Israel and the Annexed 
Territories  
Within the areas in which Israel exercises its sovereignty, the non-Jewish 
population has been facing increasing restrictions in relation to child registration. The 
most difficult restrictions target those who hold a residency status, mainly Palestinian 
residents of Jerusalem. Nonetheless, there are some restrictions on the registration of the 
children of citizens that affect non-Jews mainly. The next two sub-sections will discuss 
child registration restrictions for residents and citizens respectively. 
3.5.2.1 Child Registration Restrictions for Residents 
It was estimated in 1997 and again in 2010 that there are more than 10,000 
Palestinian children in Jerusalem who had no legal status and, as a result, no right to 
reside permanently with their parents who hold the status of permanent residents of 
Israel.142 This is the consequence of a series of policy changes that Israel took over the 
years that progressively restricted the right of many Palestinians in Jerusalem to register 
their children in the Israeli population registry in which they are registered as residents.  
Child registration for infants born to East Jerusalem Palestinians is subject to the 
regulations governing the status given to foreigners in Israel as a result of the permanent 
residency status given to the Jerusalemites after the annexation of East Jerusalem. As 
mentioned earlier, the body of laws regulating such status consists mainly of the Entry 
into Israel Law of 1952143; and the Entry into Israel Regulations (1974).144 
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While the 1952 statute did not mention the status of children born to non-citizens, 
including permanent residents, the 1974 Regulations did, but without covering all the 
potential scenarios. Article 12 of the Regulations adopted by the Ministry of Interior in 
1974 states: 
A child who was born in Israel, but to whom section 4 of the Law of Return 5710-
1950 does not apply, his Israeli status shall be the same as the status of his 
parents; should the parents not share one status the child shall receive the status 
of his father or of his guardian unless the second parent objects to this in writing; 
should the second parent object, the child shall receive the status of one of the 
parents, as shall be determined by the Minister.145 
 
In harmony with the relevant Israeli legislations, this regulation drew a clear 
distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish infants born in Israel. A Jewish child born in 
Israel to non-citizens is given the status of a Jewish immigrant automatically according to 
Section 4 of the Law of return referred to by this regulation146 and, as such, he 
automatically receives the Israeli citizenship upon birth regardless of the status of his 
parents. A non-Jewish child born in Israel, nonetheless, gets the status of his parents. 
Thus, a child born in Israel (including annexed East Jerusalem) to a couple who both have a 
permanent residency automatically becomes a permanent resident and can be registered 
in his parents ID cards, provided that his parents’ status as permanent residents is valid 
and their centre of life is in Israel.147 
The ministry of interior introduced restrictions on child registration in two cases: 
when one parent is not registered as an Israeli resident and when the child is not born in 
Israel, as will be shown below. 
According to the text of Article 12 above, if the parents did not have the same 
status the child is given the status of the father or the guardian. If the other parent objects 
in writing, the minister of interior decides the status of the child. There is no mention of 
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the status of a child of residents born abroad. The gap in legislations and regulations that 
did not cover the status of such child born abroad and the status of a child born to only 
one parent who holds the residency left these issues to be dealt with through the internal 
procedures of the ministry of interior.148 
The practice of the MoI has developed over time. Following the occupation, it 
refused to register children of Palestinian women as residents until 1994, when they 
started to perform such registration until 1998.149 In that year, Israel stopped again 
registering children if only their mother was a resident, regardless of whether they were 
born abroad or in Israel, and gave them a temporary residency instead.150 In the following 
year, Israel stopped giving these temporary residency permits and returned to giving 
permanent residency.151  
After the year 2000, big restrictions were quickly introduced. As for children of 
permanent residents born abroad, the regulations were silent, but Israel initially 
registered children of Palestinian Jerusalem residents born abroad. In 2002, a short period 
after the Israeli government decided to freeze family unification for Palestinians, the 
Israeli human rights organization, HaMoked, noticed that the ministry of interior started 
handling the registration of children born “abroad” (which includes the West Bank and 
Gaza for that matter, but excluding the Israeli settlements therein) as family unification 
cases, as opposed to child registration ones.152 This change of policy was not published 
anywhere, but its consequences were devastating: thousands of infants were liable to not 
be registered in the Israeli population registry. As a result, HaMoked filed a petition in the 
Administrative Court, which resulted in an agreement according to which Israel had to 
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make its policy public.153 The policy announced in the declarative judgment stated that the 
Ministry of Interior will treat cases of child registration for a child born abroad to a 
resident parent as cases of family unification, in which the child is given a temporary 
residency for two years followed by permanent residency.154 However, paragraph 1 (e) of 
the judgment stated that this agreement shall not “affect the regulations of the 
‘Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) 2003’.”155 This law was enacted 
by the Israeli parliament in 2003 as mentioned earlier aiming at blocking family 
unifications between Palestinians in Jerusalem or Israel and Palestinians from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.156 On the issue of children, the statute provided:  
The Minister of Interior, or the Area Commander, as the case may be, is entitled to 
grant… a licence to reside in Israel or a permit to stay in Israel in order to prevent 
the separation of a child, aged up to 12, from his parent who is staying in Israel 
legally.157 
This provision resulted in two significant consequences. First, it treated children 
above 12 as adults and provided that they would not be allowed to be registered in the 
population registry and reside in Jerusalem (or Israel) with their parents. Thus, shifting the 
category of the procedure for such children from “child registration” to “family 
unification” blocked their right to get a status. Secondly, it provided that children below 
twelve can be given either temporary permits to stay or permanent residencies. Thus, the 
law gave the option to the government to not register the child as a resident, but to give 
him a temporary permit instead. 
In 2005 the relevant provision in the “Nationality and Entry into Israel Law 
(Temporary Order)” law was amended to the following:  
…the minister of the interior may, at his discretion- 
grant a minor who is a resident of the region and under 14 years of age a permit 
to reside in Israel in order to prevent his separation from his custodial parent who 
is staying lawfully in Israel;  
approve a request that a permit to stay in Israel be granted by the regional 
commander to a minor who is a resident of the region and is over 14 years of age 
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in order to prevent his separation from his custodial parent who is staying lawfully 
in Israel, provided that the said permit shall now be extended if the minor does 
not reside permanently in Israel.158 
The term “resident of the region” is defined broadly in this law, and includes all 
persons who were registered as residents and all those who reside therein but who are 
not registered as residents, excluding those who reside in the Israeli settlements.159 
According to this amendment, children above 14 can only get military permits, which do 
not give any permanent status in Israel; in turn, it denies the bearer of such permit the 
basic rights of residents such as healthcare, education and the like, not to mention the 
right to permanently reside in his/her hometown.   
Since then until the writing this thesis, child registration entitlements have been a 
subject of constant change through the internal procedures of the MoI. Although these 
procedures are neither statutes nor regulations, they actually happen to be an important 
source of law when it comes to the issue of child registration. This is mainly because the 
Israeli statutes and regulations do not mention the status of residents’ children born 
abroad, leaving this sensitive issue to the internal procedures of the ministry of interior. 
The ministry changed these procedures frequently, initially without informing the public, 
until the Jodah case discussed above when the ministry agreed to start publishing its 
procedures. 
The development of these procedures was towards becoming more restrictive. In 
2008, the ministry published a procedure according to which a child who was born or 
registered abroad has to prove having his centre of life in Israel for two years before 
submitting an application for child registration.160 If their application is approved, the child 
will get a temporary residency for 2 years followed by a permanent residency. For children 
who Israel considers residents of the West Bank or Gaza, their status will not be upgraded 
to permanent residency if by the time they reach the age of 14 they have not finished the 
                                                     
158
 Entry into Israel Law (Amendment) 2005. 
159
 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision) Article 1. 
160
 Israeli Ministry of Interior internal procedure, Procedure on Registration and Granting of Status 
to a Child Only One of Whose Parents Is Registered as a Permanent Resident in Israel, Procedure Number 
2.2.0010, 2005, amended in 12/11/2008. 
107 
 
2 years of temporary residency, following 2 more years of residence.161 If the child was 
over 14, he can only apply for a military permit that does not give them any entitlements 
except temporary physical presence in Jerusalem and Israel.162  
In 2011, HaMoked filed an administrative petition against the Israeli ministry of 
Interior requesting the immediate registration of a child both of whose parents are 
permanent residents in Israel, but born in the West Bank. During the proceeding of the 
case, HaMoked and the government made an agreement which provided that “the mere 
fact that the child was born outside Israel does not prevent the immediate granting of 
permanent residency to the child.”163 Of course, it remains that child registration is always 
subject to proving that the child and his guardian’s centre of life is in Israel. 
3.5.2.2 Child Registration for Citizens: Discrimination 
In addition to the severe restriction of child registration for residents, Israel also 
introduced discriminatory conditions regarding the passage of its citizenship through 
birth. The restriction was introduced in an amendment to the Nationality Law of 1952164 
that was introduced in 1980.165 Prior to the amendment, Israeli citizenship was passed “by 
birth” from a parent to his/her child regardless of where the child was born.166 Then the 
1980 amendment changed this rule and gave the following groups the right to acquire 
Israel’s citizenship by birth:  
(1) a person born in Israel while his father or mother was an Israel national; 
(2) a person born outside Israel while his father or mother was an Israel national 
(a) by return; 
(b) by residence in Israel; 
(c) by naturalisation; 
(d) under paragraph (1).167 
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The effect of this amendment was that Israeli citizens who were born abroad could 
not register their children as citizens by birth anymore.168 Despite the fact that this 
amendment can, in theory, affect Israel’s Jewish and Arab citizens alike, in practice its 
negative effects are only targeting non-Jews. This is because only Jews can claim 
citizenship by return. If a Jewish child was not registered as a citizen by birth, his/her 
parents can claim his citizenship by return. The same does not apply to non-Jewish infants 
since they are not subjects to the law of return. 
3.6  Freezing the “Change of address” procedure in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip 
Following the occupation of the OPT, Israel allowed the population to change their 
addresses within the West Bank and Gaza and required that they notify the relevant 
authorities within 30 days from the change.169 In 1995, Israel and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization signed the Interim Agreements, which provided that the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip were a single territorial unit170 and that 
The Palestinian side shall inform Israel of every change in its population registry, 
including, inter alia, any change in the place of residence of any resident.171  
 
According to this provision in the agreement, Israel had no jurisdiction to reject 
address changes within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinian authority’s 
responsibility was to only “inform” Israel of address changes. Thus, a resident of the Gaza 
Strip could move to the West Bank freely and vice versa without a need to acquire any 
special permits.  
In the year 2000, Israel decided, as mentioned earlier, to freeze any changes to the 
Palestinian population registry.172 Due to this freeze, Israel stopped recognizing changes of 
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address within the OPT173 and considered the residence of a Palestinian whose registered 
address is Gaza in the West Bank illegal, except with a special permit.174 This assumption 
has given the military authorities the justification to forcibly transfer any such person who 
would be found in the West Bank to Gaza Strip.175 As reported by Gisha, the forcible 
transfer of Palestinian residents of the West Bank who hold ID cards indicating that their 
address was in Gaza has been conducted actively by the Israeli authorities in four different 
circumstances:   
following finding such resident at one of the many checkpoints run by the Israeli 
army in the West Bank, this Palestinian was arrested and then transferred;  
by conducting active searches in the West Bank including entering homes and 
arresting and transferring such residents;  
by transferring holders of such ID cards to Gaza following serving a prison term, 
regardless of the fact that they had actually been residing in the West Bank prior 
to their imprisonment;  
or when such Palestinian is caught in Israel without permit.176 
 
As a result of Israel’s control all the travel routes between the West bank and Gaza 
Strip, and within the West Bank itself, Israel managed to effectively separate the two 
areas from each other. At the beginning, this took place without Israel declaring any 
special policy or procedure, but then significant law “engineering” was introduced. 
 As noted by Israeli human rights organizations, Gaza registered residents do not 
need permits to be present in the West Bank, butIsrael itself transferred Palestinians to 
Gaza Strip with the justification that they needed a permit to stay in the West Bank, 
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although it had never introduced such permits.177 In Gisha’s words, such permits “simply 
did not exist.”178  
Then Israel started regulating the matter by introducing two regulatory 
amendments. The first was by adopting procedures for dealing with applications of 
Palestinians wanting to move between Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to human 
rights organizations, these procedures aimed at creating a one-way rout between the 
West Bank and Gaza. West Bank residents who applied for permits to travel to visit their 
family members in Gaza Strip were asked to sign for a declaration that they will never 
return to the West Bank and that they will change their address to Gaza strip.179 This was 
the precondition for allowing them to see their family members in Gaza. For movement in 
this direction, Israel was willing to bypass its population registry freeze. 
Movement in the opposite direction has been much more restricted. In 2007, 
Israel started issuing permits for Gaza registered residents to stay temporarily in the West 
Bank180 using unpublished procedures.181 The general rule was not to allow such 
movement to take place, with the exception of very tight “humanitarian” standards. These 
standards did not consider the separation of families, for example, to be on its own a 
sufficient humanitarian pretext for allowing the movement of spouses or children to the 
West bank.182 Subject to security rejections and after defining the term “family relatives” 
as “family members of the first degree (spouses, parents to minor children, minor 
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children, elderly parents above the age of 65),”183 the procedure gave discretion to the 
Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories to grant a permit in the following 
circumstances: 
A resident of Gaza who suffers from an ongoing (chronic) medical condition which 
require assistance by a family member who is a resident of the Judea and Samaria 
are, and who has no other family member (not necessarily of the first degree) who 
is a resident of Gaza and who is able to assist the patient.  
A minor resident of Gaza who is under 16 years old, where one of his parents, who 
was a resident of Gaza, passed away and the other parent is a resident of the 
Judea and Samaria area and there is no other family relative who is a resident of 
Gaza who is able to take the minor under his wings. In the event that it is 
necessary, the nature and scope of the existing relationship with the parent who is 
a resident of the Judea and Samaria Area shall be examined in relation to the 
degree, nature and scope of the relationship with other family relatives in Gaza.  
An elderly person (above the age of 65) who is a resident of Gaza and who is in a 
needy situation, which requires the handling and supervision of family relative 
who is a resident of the Judea and Samaria Area, who can assist him. In the event 
that it is necessary, the nature and scope of the existing relationship with the 
family relative who is a resident of the Judea and Samaria Area shall be examined 
in relation to the nature and scope of the relationship with other family relatives 
in Gaza.184 
 
Even under these strict conditions, only temporary permits to stay can be given, 
and these permits can only be renewed if the special humanitarian circumstances 
continue. For example, if the child whose parent in Gaza had passed away turns 16, his 
permit expires and is no longer staying legally in the West Bank. 
In 2009, Israel stepped up its regulatory engineering by issuing a military order 
which amends the 1969 prevention of infiltration military order explained in Chapter 2 
above. The amendment expanded the definition of “infiltrator” severely and somewhat 
vaguely, rendering anyone in the West Bank a potential infiltrator liable to criminal 
prosecution and deportation.185  
                                                     
183
 Procedure for Handling Applications by Gaza Strip Residents for Settlement in the Judea and 
Samaria Area. 
184
 Ibid. 
185
 Al-Haq, Al-Haq’s Legal Analysis of Israeli Military Orders 1649 & 1650: Deportation and Forcible 
Transfer as International Crimes, Legal Analysis (Ramallah, Palestine: Al-Haq, October 13, 2010), 1–2, 
http://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/topics/population-transfer-and-residency-right/299; Amnesty 
International, New Israeli Military Order Could Increase Expulsions of West Bank Palestinians, Press Release, 
April 28, 2010, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/new-israeli-military-order-could-increase-
expulsions-west-bank-palestinians-2010-04. 
112 
 
In 1969, the Prevention of Infiltration Military Order (number 329) defined the 
infiltrator as:  
A person who entered the area knowingly and unlawfully after having been 
present in the east bank of the Jordan, Syria, Egypt or Lebanon following the 
effective date.186 
 
The amendment introduced in 2009 changed this definition into:  
A person who entered the Area unlawfully following the effective date, or a 
person who is present in the Area and does not lawfully hold a permit.187 
 
As for evidence, section 5 of the year 2009 amendment states:  
In any proceeding under this Order, a person is presumed to be an infiltrator if he 
is present in the Area without a document or permit which attest to his lawful 
presence in the Area without reasonable justification.  
For the purpose of this section-  
“A lawful document or Permit” –a document or permit issued by the commander 
of the IDF forces in the Judea and Samaria area or someone acting on his behalf 
under the provisions of security legislation, or issued by the authorities of the 
state of Israel under the entry into Israel law, 5712-1952, as it is periodically valid 
inside Israel, which permit the presence of a person in the Area.188 
 
The main obvious amendment in the new version of the order is that it expands 
the definition widely. Among the amendments, the new order deleted the reference to 
the “residents of the Area” and clearly reflected that its view of legality is having a permit 
from Israel, whether from the military authorities in the OPT or from the civil Israeli 
authorities. Clearly, this guarantees that if someone is accused of infiltration he cannot 
use his Palestinian Authority issued ID to prove his legal presence. As rightly noted by 
Asem Khalil, the deletion of the term “knowingly” from the definition will render many 
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people whose status changed because of the speedy regulatory amendments, but who are 
not aware of this change, liable to be indicted as infiltrators.189 
The significance of using the “prevention of infiltration” tool is mainly that it 
transfers the illegalization of a Palestinian’s presence in the West Bank into criminal law. 
Just like following the 1948 and 1967 wars displaced returnees were criminalized, jailed 
and deported as infiltrators, the new 2010 amendment comes to criminalize new groups 
and make sure they will not be able to gain rights by staying in the West Bank without 
permit.  
This amendment alarmed almost all of the relevant human rights organizations 
acting in the OPT190 and a number of journalists.191 Those who analysed the order feared 
that while its text was vague enough to be able to indict literally anyone present in the 
West Bank, the fear was that Israel mainly targeted a number of groups, most importantly 
Palestinians whose registered address is Gaza, some of whom were actually born in the 
West Bank.192 
                                                     
189
 A. Khalil, “Impact of Israeli Military Order No. 1650: On Palestinians’ Rights to Legally Reside in 
Their Own Country,” European University Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies CARIM Analytic and 
Synthetic Note no. 2010/46 (2010): 3, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1675646. 
190
 23 Israeli and Palestinian Human Rights organizations signed a statement condemning the order. 
See, Adalah- The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel et al., Palestinian and Israeli Human Rights 
Groups Call for End to Israeli Military West Bank Deportation Policy, May 13, 2010, 
http://www.btselem.org/press_releases/20100513; Amnesty International, New Israeli Military Order Could 
Increase Expulsions of West Bank Palestinians, Press Release, April 28, 2010, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/new-israeli-military-order-could-increase-expulsions-west-
bank-palestinians-2010-04; Al-Haq, Al-Haq’s Legal Analysis of Israeli Military Orders 1649 & 1650; Al-Mezan 
Center for Human Rights, Al Mezan: Israeli Military Order Enables IOF to Expel Palestinians from the West 
Bank; International Community Must Condemn Racist Order, Press Release, April 2010, 
http://www.mezan.org/en/details.php?id=9974&ddname=Human%20Rights&id_dept=9&id2=9&p=center. 
191
 Amira Hass, “IDF Order Will Enable Mass Deportation from West Bank,” Haaretz, accessed 
October 27, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/idf-order-will-enable-mass-deportation-
from-west-bank-1.780; Dani Izenberg, “New Law Could Deport Thousands of West Bank Palestinians,” 
www.JPost.com, April 13, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=172917; Rory McCarthy, 
“Israeli Groups Fight Orders Allowing Army to Jail West Bank Residents,” The Guardian, April 11, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/11/israeli-groups-attack; AlJazeera.net, “Isra’il Tatrud 
Filastinyeen Min Al-Daffa,” News, Al-Jazeera.net, April 11, 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/edbcb03a-3fd4-410a-98ac-f45d1d1ecde2. 
192
 Adalah- The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel et al., Palestinian and Israeli Human 
Rights Groups Call for End to Israeli Military West Bank Deportation Policy; Khalil, “Impact of Israeli Military 
Order No. 1650”; A. Abu Eid, “Military Order No. 1650 and Policy of Deporting Palestinians (Arabic)” (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1764254; Al-Haq, Al-Haq’s Legal Analysis of Israeli 
Military Orders 1649 & 1650. 
114 
 
In July 2010, HaMoked received statistical information from the Israeli army’s 
“Coordinator of Activities in the Territories” about those Israel considers “illegal aliens” in 
the West Bank after filing a petition in the High Court under the Freedom of Information 
Act.193 This information indicated that around 35,000 Palestinians were considered “illegal 
aliens” by the Israeli army because their registered address was Gaza Strip, but they were 
present in the West Bank.194 Among these, 2,479 were actually born in the West Bank.195 
It should be stressed, however, that this law does not only target this population. 
The law can be used against other vulnerable groups who never managed to secure a 
status at the West Bank, most importantly foreign spouses of West Bank residents and 
other unwanted foreigners visiting the West Bank.196 
This military order was used frequently since it went into effect. It has been cited 
several times by the military authorities in the West Bank as the legal background for 
releasing prisoners whose sentence has expired to the Gaza, even if their families were in 
the West Bank.  
3.7 Conclusion 
It was evinced that Israel has been designing regulations that inflict forcible 
displacement upon the pretext of a Palestinian not having the right status that allows him/ 
her to live in their homes. This conduct of the state has been used across the OPT, as well 
as in its sovereign areas. The patterns of displacement that the regulations inflict are 
numerous, consisting of displacement from the OPT or Israel to abroad; from Jerusalem or 
Israel to the West Bank or Gaza, and from the West Bank to Gaza. The victims of this 
displacement are hundreds of thousands. 
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Very frequently, Israel does not announce the regulations that inflict 
displacements, and does not provide the public with information about how many 
persons were displaced as a result of a specific policy. In fact, in most cases Israel does not 
recognize that its goal is to displace and usually uses the security pretext to justify the 
harm of its policies. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, these forms of denial of the truth 
have never been discussed as part of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.  
As the policies that revoke persons’ statuses or prevent them from having one 
develop, the Israeli Supreme Court does not interfere to stop the government’s and, in 
some cases, the Parliament’s actions. On the contrary, it has been shown and analysed in 
more than one incident in this chapter how the court was actually part of the designing 
team. For example, it was the Supreme Court which brought forth the concept of “centre 
of life” to Jerusalem residents, a principle that has been used very frequently in order to 
displace more Palestinians in Jerusalem. Thus, no remedy has been yet given to the 
problems caused by status revocations or prevention. As will be shown in the following 
chapter, the regime designed by Israel to control the demographic balance is contrary to 
international law. There is a need for a comprehensive reparation scheme to redress the 
victims and stop these violations, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 4- The Legality of 
Forced Displacements 
in the Palestinian-
Israeli Conflict 
4.1 Introduction 
It was explained in the Chapters 2 and 3 above that most of the forced 
displacements of the non-Jewish civilians from the areas Israel controlled in 1948 and in 
1967 came as a result of three policies that were conducted simultaneously: the war 
operations, the prevention from a legal status that allows those displaced to reside legally 
in their homes, and the prevention from return through military and regulatory methods. 
With the exception of the official opinion of the state of Israel and a number of 
contributors, there is a near consensus that these displacements are illegal. This chapter 
will examine the legality of the displacements according to several legal tools that are 
binding to the state of Israel. But in order to present a sound legal analysis, the chapter 
starts by defining the international legal framework that is applicable to the displacement 
incidents and the areas in which they occurred. This will be presented by determining the 
international legal status of Israel, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza 
Strip. Then, the applicability of relevant international legal instruments will be evaluated.  
After setting this framework, this chapter will then examine Israel’s policy of 
forcibly displacing Palestinians from its territory and from the OPT against applicable 
international legal norms. Because of the width of the scope of the policies and events 
that are subject to the analysis of this thesis, the legal analysis presented from this 
chapter has used a slightly different method if compared with relevant literature. While 
most of the literature would normally focus on one specific incident and present an 
analysis to it by demonstrating how it was contrary to different bodies of international 
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law,1 this chapter has been divided into subsections relating to the wider categories under 
which Israel’s displacements can be listed. These categories have been defined as the 
following actions taken by Israel (as presented in the previous chapters): (1) forced 
displacement; (2) revocation of legal status and (3) prevention from return. While there 
are many more norms of international law that Israel violated while implementing the 
policies above, the legal analysis presented below will only consider these three 
categories, which covers the scope of this study focusing on forced displacement itself and 
its essential elements. 
4.2 The International Legal Framework in Israel and the OPT 
The factual and legal analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that 
Israel has been intentionally and consistently displacing Palestinians within or beyond the 
geographical region of mandatory Palestine, which falls under two major de facto 
statuses: the territory that became under its sovereignty in 1948 and the one it occupied 
in 1967. In both territories, these displacements took place in times of war and peace; by 
the use of force and regulatory instruments; and on non-Jewish Israeli citizens and non-
citizens. The legal framework, according to which Israel forcibly displaced the majority of 
the Palestinian population as explained Chapters 2 and 3, departed from the rules of 
international law and took the legislations of the Israeli parliament and the military orders 
of its military governors as its umbrella.  
In order to examine the legality of Israel’s forced displacement in international law, 
it is essential to first establish the applicability of relevant international legal instruments 
to Israel, the OPT, and the populations therein. This test requires a determination of the 
legal statuses of the areas under Israeli control in light of the principles of international 
law.  
                                                     
1
 See discussion in the literature review section in Chapter 1. 
118 
 
4.2.1 Relevant Historical Background 
Up until 1917, Palestine was part of the enormous Sublime Ottoman State.2 All 
Palestinians, regardless of their ethnic, national, or religious backgrounds, were Ottoman 
Citizens3 and the Ottoman Law was applicable in all of Palestine. After the defeat of the 
Ottomans in the First World War (hereinafter WWI), Palestine fell under the British 
military occupation, which was given by the League of Nations the Mandate Authority, 
under which it ruled Palestine until 1948. The post WWI mandates administered by 
France, Britain, and other victorious nations stated that they aimed to help the different 
nations under their rule for independence.4 However, in Palestine, the goal was quite 
different as the British Mandate was planning to facilitate establishing a “homeland for 
the Jews” in Palestine.5 This was a fulfilment of the Balfour declaration issued in 1917 
stating: 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews 
in any other country.6 
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 This state is also known, especially in the west, as the “Ottoman Empire.” Its name “Sublime 
Ottoman State” is its official name in Turkish and Arabic. In the rest of the chapter, it will be referred to as 
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3
 Ottoman citizenship applied on everybody residing within the borders of the Ottoman Empire 
since the establishment of the Citizenship Law of 1869. Prior to this law, citizenship was given according to 
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5
 Henry Cattan, Palestine and International Law: The Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, vol. 
Second (London: Longman, 1973), 15–9. 
6
 Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, “The Balfour Declaration,” November 2, 1917, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682961.st
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The British Mandate kept in place part of the Ottoman Legislations that had been 
applicable prior to it, and changed others.7 Of course, the laws that were applicable at 
that time extended to the whole area of Palestine. During that period, there was no 
difference between the areas we know now as Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip. The 
British re-structured the institutions of the state, including the courts and gave some 
relevant independence to two kinds of courts/ tribunals to solve local conflicts: Bedewen 
tribal courts in the Naqab/ Negev Desert, and local Jewish courts.8 
In spite of all that, it is important to stress that at that time Palestine as a political 
entity falling under a transitional British mandate had one legal system, one body of 
courts to which anybody could refer, and an administration consisting of members of the 
mandatory power and local Palestinian citizens from most if not all of the communities 
that resided in Palestine. 
In 1947, The United Kingdom informed the United Nations that it was willing to 
terminate its mandate by August 1948.9 The UN General Assembly created the United 
Nations Special Committee on Palestine (hereinafter UNSCOP) in May 1947 and requested 
that it would study the situation in Palestine and give its recommendations.10 Following 
the report submitted by this committee, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
resolution 181,11 which recommended to divide Palestine into a Jewish State and an Arab 
State, allocating nearly 54% to the Jews and 44% to the Arabs, and recommended 
Jerusalem (2% of Palestine, including Bethlehem according to their suggested plan) to be 
                                                                                                                                                                 
m The Balfour Declaration, a letter sent from Lord Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, a leader of the 
Jewish community in Britain; in November 2nd, 1917. Original document is kept at the British Library. 
7
 The Brits made more amendments on Palestinian law compared to other regions under their 
mandate. While they kept in place the Civil Law known as the “Majallah,” most of the real estate laws of 
1885, Insurance Law, and Societies Law, they introduced a lot of changes to the legal system including 
Criminal law, hundreds of legislations that regulate trade, and some amendments to the real estate laws. 
Feras Milhem, “The Origins and Evolution of the Palestinian Sources of Law” (PhD dissertation, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel, 2004). 
8
 Assaf Likhovski, Law And Identity in Mandate Palestine (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
9
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine,” November 21, 1947. 
10
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 106,” May 13, 1947. 
11
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine,” 1947 
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administered internationally.12 The population of the Jewish State would have been in this 
case 55% Jewish and 45% Arab.13 
The main stream Arab political leadership and population in Palestine refused the 
division, while the main stream Jewish leadership and population (that were at the time 
only 30% of Palestine’s population) accepted it.14 Following the UK’s termination of its 
mandate over Palestine, the Zionist leadership announced the establishment of the state 
of Israel, and immediately a war erupted. The war resulted in the Jewish military militias 
conquer of 78% of Palestine, expelling the majority of the Arab population residing in it, 
and regarding it as the sovereign area of the state of Israel.15 The rest of Palestine, 22%, 
were an area located west of the Jordan river, and became called the “West Bank;” and a 
strip of land including cities and villages surrounding Gaza city that became called “Gaza 
Strip” were separated by what became Israel after the war. Political developments led the 
West Bank to join the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and Gaza strip to be administered by 
Egypt.16 
In 1967, another war erupted between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in which 
Israel, the victorious party in the war, occupied lands belonging to or controlled by each of 
the defeated states, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.17 Quickly after the 
occupation, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, and ruled the rest of the occupied territories 
under military rule, using military orders and courts, as shown in Chapters 2 and 3. In 
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 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 
Report to the General Assembly (UN General Assembly, September 3, 1947), 48–75, A/364, Official Records 
of the Second Session of the General Assembly, 
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addition, it constructed Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and created a 
special legal system for them so that the laws that apply on the Palestinian population 
would not apply to them. It did this by issuing military orders that copy the Israeli civil law 
and apply only to settlements,18 introducing special courts that only has jurisdiction in the 
settlements,19 and giving civil courts in Israel jurisdiction for civil and criminal matters in 
which Israeli settlers are involved.20 With this framework in place, Israel governed the 
West Bank with two separate laws: one for the Jews and one for the Palestinians.  
In 1993 a peace agreement was signed between the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and Israel, creating a transitional semi-autonomous Palestinian 
authority in parts of the occupied territory “for a transitional period not exceeding five 
years, leading to a permanent settlement.”21 Despite the passage of almost 20 years since 
this agreement, the permanent settlement has not yet been reached.  
In 2005, Israel unilaterally announced a “disengagement” from Gaza, and withdrew 
its land forces from there, but kept its control over the sea, air space, most of the land 
crossings, trade, taxes, and population registry.22 At the end of the year 2012, while the 
West Bank and Gaza were still under occupation, the UN General Assembly issued a 
resolution deciding to “accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the 
United Nations.”23 
In order to examine the applicability of relevant international legal principles to 
the forced displacements explained in the previous chapters, it is essential to determine 
the legal statuses of the areas that fall under the Israeli civil and military jurisdiction. This 
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will lay the ground for understanding where each body of international law applies. The 
following subsection will discuss the two relevant international legal statuses that 
emerged from the 1948 and 1967 wars.  
4.2.2 The International Legal Statuses of Israel and the OPT and the 
Applicability of relevant International Legal Instruments 
Up until the UN General Assembly resolution 181, the legal status of Mandatory 
Palestine was, arguably, simple. It was, de jure, a strip of land cut out from the former 
Ottoman State, put under mandate, qualified to be independent as soon as the mandate 
ends.24 However, the fact was that Britain had been shaping a different future scenario for 
Palestine made a difference. The League of Nations, and later the United Nations, 
recognized Britain’s goal to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine.25 Although this goal 
can be argued illegal, because neither the United Kingdom nor the League of Nations, and 
then the United Nations, had sovereignty over any of the lands placed under mandate,26 
and because the goal of the mandate in all the other designated areas was to merely 
prepare for the independence of nations falling under it,27 the development of events has 
lead to effectively creating two nations in Palestine, one of which was a minority formed 
of new immigrants who aimed at forming their own independent state. General Assembly 
Resolution 181 came to respond to this fact, and recommended the partition of Palestine. 
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As mentioned above, the development of history has led to Israel being created 
first on 78% of mandatory Palestine, and then to it occupying the rest in 1967. Because of 
this, different parts of mandatory Palestine ended up having different statuses, and are 
now divided into Israel and the OPT (West Bank and Gaza Strip).  The next two sections 
will discuss the legal status of each of these territories. 
4.2.2.1 Israel’s International Legal Status and the applicability of international 
law 
Israel has existed as a state since its declaration of independence during the 1948 
war. It has been recognized as such by the majority of the states, and has become a 
member of the United Nations in 1949, in a resolution that noted that Israel was expected 
to implement UN General Assembly resolution 181 and accept the return of the 
Palestinian refugees.28  
However, the problem that rises is that Israel has never been recognized in specific 
borders especially that it has never defined them. More specifically, it never clarified what 
it considers to be not-Israel. To elaborate this point, there is a need to review the 
developments that ended up shaping Israel’s multiple border conceptions. Firstly, when 
the UN General Assembly took the decision to partition Palestine into two states, Israel 
was intended to be on 54% of the total area of mandatory Palestine.29 However, by the 
end of the 1948 war, Israel managed to control 78% of Palestine and then signed armistice 
agreements with the forces fighting it, mainly Jordan,30 Lebanon,31 Syria,32 and Egypt.33 In 
these agreements, ceasefire lines were drawn between the newborn state and its 
neighbours to announce the truce. It was agreed in the Rhodes Agreement between Israel 
and Jordan that these lines were agreed upon without “prejudice to future territorial 
                                                     
28
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 273 (III),” May 11, 1949. 
29
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine,”  1947. 
30
 Israel and Jordan, “Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel: General Armistice Agreement” (Rhodes, 
April 3, 1949). 
31
 Israel and Lebanon, “Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement” (Rhodes, March 23, 1949). 
32
 Israel and Syria, “Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement” (Rhodes, July 20, 1949). 
33
 Israel and Egypt, “Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement” (Rhodes, February 23, 1949). 
124 
 
settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto."34 Nonetheless, 
Israel annexed the territories that it controlled during the war by extending its civil and 
judicial jurisdiction to these lines, and treated everything on its side of the lines as part of 
its sovereign territory.35 Since then, Israeli law and judiciary have had civil domestic 
jurisdiction within these lines.  
In the aftermath of the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine 
and parts of Syria and Egypt, Israel annexed two territories: East Jerusalem and the Syrian 
Golan Heights.36 As will be discussed below, this step was never recognized, and was 
widely condemned by the UN General Assembly and Security Council alike37 and declared 
as illegal by the international court of Justice.38 This annexation and its legal implications 
will be discussed further in the next section, but it suffices here to stress that the new de 
facto borders of Israel in the aftermath of the occupation have not gained any recognition. 
In 1993, Israel and the PLO signed an interim peace agreement according to which 
borders were among the final status issues.39 Until such agreement is reached, it is not 
conceivable that any borders of Israel can be final.  
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Despite the ambiguity of Israel’s borders, Israel is bound by customary 
international law to which every other state is bound. In addition, it is legally obliged to 
implement the provisions of any treaty it signed and ratified. The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties clarifies this obligation, and expresses that every state must perform 
treaties it ratifies “in good faith,”40 and that “a treaty is binding upon each party in respect 
of its entire territory.”41  
While Israel does not dispute the applicability of treaties and conventions it 
ratified on its sovereign territory, the same is not true concerning the OPT. This will be 
discussed in the following section.  
4.2.2.2 The Status of the Areas Israel Occupied in 1967 and the Applicability of 
Relevant International Law 
The status of the areas militarily captured by Israel in the 1967 war has been 
widely considered as occupied territories. International humanitarian law (IHL), which is 
the branch of international law that specializes with regulating armed conflict and 
occupation, has provided the principles that are applicable to occupation. Article 42 of the 
1907 Hague Regulations states that “a territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army;”42 and that the occupation extends “to the 
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.”43 This article is 
the main legal reference for setting the status of the West Bank including east Jerusalem 
and Gaza since the Israeli army took control of them in 1967.44 The international 
recognition of this status will be elaborated below, but it is important first to put this into 
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context, by explaining Israel’s view on the status of the OPT, and as such, the applicability 
of relevant international legal instruments there. 
Article 2 of the Forth Geneva Convention (hereinafter: GCIV) states that “the 
Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”45  
Israel, Jordan, and Egypt had all ratified GCIV prior to the 1967 war.46 Therefore, the treaty 
applies to both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as a result of their occupation status.  
However, Israel refrained from treating that territory as occupied, and 
alternatively introduced more complex divisions and definitions that resulted in its failure 
to apply international legal principles relevant to the occupied territory. Soon after the 
occupation was complete, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and introduced a doctrine 
according to which the rest of the occupied territory was governed as “administered 
territory” as opposed to occupied, as will be explained below. 
The annexation of East Jerusalem took place by introducing legal amendments to 
the Israeli law.47 In the first amendment, Israel legalized (according to its own law) the 
extension of Israeli legal and judicial jurisdiction over any part of “Eretz-Yisrael” 
(translated as “the land of Israel” which is a concept including all of mandatory Palestine, 
including the OPT) with a single government cabinet decree.48 The following day after this 
legislation the Israeli government issued a decree that expanded the state’s legal and 
judicial jurisdiction in East Jerusalem.49 By this legal amendment and government decree, 
Israel expanded its legal and judicial jurisdiction over 72,00050 Dunams.51 Then Israel 
                                                     
45
 “Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Times of War” (Geneva, 
August 12, 1949) Article 2. 
46
 “List of State Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention,” ICRC Website, accessed January 7, 2013, 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P. 
47
 Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 18–9; Usama Halabi, “Legal Status of 
the Population of East Jerusalem Since 1967 and the Implications of Israeli Annexation on Their Civil and 
Social Rights,” in 43 Years of Occupation: Jerusalem File, ed. Civic Coalition, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Civic 
Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, 2011), 11–2; Usama Halabi, The Legal Status of Jerusalem and 
its Arab Citizens, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999), 10–2; Benvenisti, The 
International Law of Occupation, 112–3. 
48
 Law to Amend the Legal and Judicial Jurisdiction of the State of Israel, 1967. 
49
 Halabi, The Legal Status of Jerusalem and its Arab Citizens, 10. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 1 dunam in Palestine is equal to 1,000 square meters (10,764 sq ft). 
127 
 
annexed East Jerusalem to the West Jerusalem municipality, and dismantled the 
Palestinian municipal council.52 
In 1980, Israel enacted a basic law called Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel in 
which it declared in paragraph 1 that Jerusalem “complete and united is the capital of 
Israel.”53  In paragraphs 5, the basic law stated that the jurisdiction of the city includes the 
areas annexed in 1967, and in paragraph 6 it prohibited any transfer of 
“authority…stipulated in the law of the State of Israel or of the Jerusalem Municipality” to 
any “foreign body.”54 
In fact, the law enacted in 1980 did not impose any new changes to the status of 
East Jerusalem according to the Israeli law, but rather confirmed the effect of the laws 
enacted in 1967, and had more of a political declaratory purpose.55 In the words of the 
Israeli Knesset website, this law aimed, inter alia, to “secure its [Jerusalem’s] integrity and 
unity and concentrate all the instructions which were scattered in various laws.”56 The 
practical implication of this annexation is that it means that Israel does not consider or 
treat Jerusalem as occupied, but rather as an integral part of the sovereign territory of the 
state. As such, Israel considers that international humanitarian law does not apply in the 
city. The Israeli judiciary, having to work by the law of the state of Israel, follows this 
approach and applies only Israeli law to every case that comes to it, regardless of 
international law.57 Of course, any attempt to apply international humanitarian law, 
especially the rules that regulate occupation fails. In the Rabah case, the Israeli Supreme 
Court was asked to apply The Hague Regulations and GCIV to an East Jerusalem case, but 
it refused such application providing the justification that if internal Israeli law contradicts 
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with international law, internal law prevails.58 As the court noted, the annexation of East 
Jerusalem was a constitutionally stipulated principle, and the court found that it applies 
even if it was contrary to international law.59 
The rest of the territory that Israel occupied in 1967 was not officially annexed. 
However, the status of the Palestinian territories that Israel controlled in 1967 and the 
applicability of international humanitarian law has been an issue of dispute between Israel 
and the international community.60 While every international organ has referred to the 
areas Israel controlled after the war of 1948 as “occupied territory,” Israeli governments 
did not fully recognize this simple status and attempted to present a more complex 
analysis of what the status is as will be shown below.  
Soon after the occupation, Israel announced that it was bound by The Hague 
Regulations and the GCIV.61 However, it later amended its announcement by excluding 
GCIV from applicability.62 According to Kretzmer, this was due to the quickly changing 
political stance of many Israeli politicians, who preferred to refer to the territories 
occupied by Israel as '”liberated.”63 Lisa Hajjar explains that this was the case so that Israel 
would be able to annex some or all of the occupied territory.64 
In 1968, Yehuda Blum, a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem who later 
served as the Israeli Ambassador at the United Nations, brought forth an argument that 
became the basis of the official Israeli position on the status of the occupied territories. 
His main argument in this regard was based on his assumption that international 
humanitarian law rules are there to serve two goals, namely, (a) safeguarding 
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humanitarian rights of the population under occupation; and (b) protecting the 
“reversionary rights” of the legitimate sovereign.65 The argument continues that  
Since the Kingdom of Jordan never had the status of a legitimate sovereign over 
Judea and Samaria, the rules of International Law limiting the occupant’s right 
with a view to safeguarding the reversionary rights of the legitimate sovereign 
have no application as against Israel with regard these territories. This proceeds, 
of course, on the assumption that Israel control of these territories is not 
unlawful.66 
In other words, since Blum’s claim is that Jordan had no legitimate title in the West 
Bank, then Israel is only obliged to guarantee the humanitarian rights of the population, 
but has no obligation to commit to other principles of international humanitarian law. 
Following on this logic, the Israeli government’s position has been that the status 
of “Judea, Samaria, [i.e. West Bank excluding annexed Jerusalem] and Gaza” has been sui 
generis (not Israeli, nor occupied).67 Meir Shamgar, known as the architect of the legal 
system installed in the occupied territories after the occupation,68 published an article in 
1971 (when he served as Israel’s Attorney General), based on Blum's theory denying the 
de jure applicability of the Forth Geneva Convention, and explaining the Israeli 
government position regarding this convention. He wrote, 
[T]he government of Israel distinguished between the legal problem of the 
applicability of the Fourth Convention to the territories under consideration 
which… does not in my opinion apply to these territories, and decided to act de 
facto, in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Convention.69   
In other words, Shamgar denied that the GCIV was de jure applicable to the 
occupied territories, and clarified that the government accepted, de facto, to apply 
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humanitarian provisions. The official governmental position of Israel has been explained 
to be based on Article 2 of the GCIV which states:   
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the 
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, 
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no 
armed resistance.70  
The government's position argues that the convention only applies when the 
territory occupied belongs to a “High Contracting Party.” Since Israel did not recognize the 
legitimacy of Egypt's and Jordan's presence in Gaza and the West Bank, then its control 
over the territories is not occupation of a territory of a high contracting party. Therefore, 
the convention does not apply, according to the Israeli government.71  
The Israeli Supreme Court's position, on the other hand, developed over time. 
While at the beginning of the occupation it refrained from deciding whether the 
conventions were enforceable through the domestic judiciary, it later developed 
jurisprudence according to which only customary international law was enforceable 
through the court.72 The Hague regulations were considered as a whole reflecting 
customary legal principles, while the Geneva Conventions were not in their entirety 
reflective of customary law.73 According to the Supreme Court, for the GCIV to be 
enforceable by the court, it needs to be enacted by a domestic law by the legislator, an act 
that has not been done by the Israeli Knesset or by the military commander in the 
occupied territories.74 Thus, the Geneva Conventions were not enforceable in the court, 
except those provisions that were considered customary norms by the court, which are 
examined in a case by case basis. This position was explained by Justice Aharon Barak of 
the Israeli Supreme Court in a land confiscation case in the West Bank in 1982 where his 
judgment provided:  
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Although The Hague Regulations are treaty, the accepted opinion—and this 
opinion has been accepted by this court- is that The Hague regulations are 
declarative by nature and reflect customary international law which applies in 
Israel even in the absence of an Israeli legislative act. This is not the case regarding 
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of 
War 1949, which even if it applies to Israel's belligerent occupation in Judea and 
Samaria -and this question is bitterly disputed and we shall not express any 
opinion on it—indeed it is principally a constitutive treaty which does not adopt 
existing international practices, but rather creates new norms, which, in order to 
be applied to Israel, require a legislative act.75  
While judge Barack refrained from expressing any clear opinion concerning the de 
jure applicability of the Geneva Convention, he expressed that he would not build his 
decisions on the convention itself because, according to the position of the Supreme 
Court, it is not part of customary international law. The court has been consistent on this 
position until the current day. For example, after Israel built its wall in the West Bank 
which was declared as illegal by the ICJ, a case was considered in the Israeli Supreme 
Court in order to examine the rout of the wall around a Palestinian village. In its judgment, 
the court stated,  
The  law  of  belligerent occupation  is  also  laid  out  in  IV  Geneva  Convention 
 Relative  to  the  Protection  of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949 (…)  The 
 State  of  Israel  has  declared  that  it  practices  the  humanitarian  parts  of  this 
convention.  In light of that declaration on the part of the government of 
Israel, we see no need to reexamine the government's position.    We  are  aware 
 that  the  Advisory Opinion  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice  determined 
 that  The  Fourth  Geneva Convention  applies  in  the  Judea  and  Samaria  area, 
 and  that  its  application  is  not conditional  upon  the  willingness  of  the  State 
 of  Israel  to  uphold  its  provisions.    As mentioned, seeing as the government of 
Israel accepts that the humanitarian aspects of The Fourth Geneva Convention 
apply in the area, we are not of the opinion that we must  take  a  stand  on  that 
 issue  in  the  petition  before  us.76 
So, even though the judge noticed the fact that the ICJ’s advisory opinion declared 
that the GCIV applies in its entirety to the OPT, it still refrained from accepting to enforce 
it, and sustained the position that refuses to reexamine the government’s position. 
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Similarly, in the case known as the Targeted Killings case the court sustained a similar 
opinion. Judge Barack wrote, 
Alongside it stands The Fourth Geneva Convention (…) Israel is party to that 
convention.  It has not been enacted through domestic Israeli legislation. 
 However, its  customary  provisions  constitute  part  of  the  law  of  the  State  of 
 Israel  (see  the judgment of Cohen, J. in HCJ 698/80 Kawasme v. The Minister of 
Defense, 35(1) PD 617, 638, hereinafter Kawasme).  As is well known, the position 
of the Government of Israel is that, in principle, the laws of belligerent occupation 
in The Fourth Geneva Convention do not apply regarding the area. However, Israel 
honors the humanitarian provisions of that convention. That is sufficient for the 
purposes of the petition before us.77 
Again, judge Barack decided not to reexamine the applicability of the GCIV to the 
OPT, and preferred to note that Israel’s acceptance of the humanitarian provisions of the 
convention is sufficient for the case. Furthermore, in reaching his conclusion, the judge 
cited the “Kawasme case” in which the court approved the deportation of civilians on the 
basis that the article that prohibits such deportations (Article 49) is not part of customary 
international law.78 Thus, by citing this case, the Supreme Court judge has affirmed the 
court’s position of failing to enforce the GCIV.  
Al-Haq, a human rights organization based in the OPT, indicated that the practical 
result of the court’s position is that: 
the court is only authorized to examine the activities of Israeli military authorities 
in light of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention only where the state 
Attorney agrees to their application, thereby rendering the position taken by the 
court without substantial significance.79 
As the Palestinian human rights lawyer and author Raja Shehadeh argues, by the 
court’s decision to only consider The Hague regulations and not the GCIV in any case it 
allows itself to be “another instrument that lends legal validity to actions by the 
government which are in essence illegal.”80 
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In conclusion and summary of what has been explained above, Israel upon its 
occupation claimed two types of statuses in the OPT: Annexed and administered 
territories. The first was assigned to East Jerusalem, and it practically meant that the 
Israeli legal, judicial and administrative jurisdiction is fully applicable to it; and that 
international humanitarian law including the law of occupation was not enforceable there. 
The rest of the OPT was assigned the status of “administered territory” and Israel 
considered that only humanitarian provisions of IHL were applicable. The Israeli Supreme 
Court has never challenged these statuses and legal definitions. 
These assigned statuses and the policies that resulted from them have not been 
recognized by the international community. Since the early stages of Israel’s control of the 
West Bank and Gaza, different international bodies referred to it as occupied. For 
instance, in November 1967, the UN Security Council issued a resolution stating that any 
future peace “should include… withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied 
in the recent conflict.”81 [emphasis added] In 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in its advisory opinion on the wall constructed by Israel in the West Bank referred to 
Article 42 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and concluded that: 
The territories situated between the Green Line and the former eastern boundary 
of Palestine under the Mandate were occupied by Israel in 1967 during the armed 
conflict between Israel and Jordan. Under customary international law, these were 
therefore occupied territories in which Israel had the status of occupying Power… 
All these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and 
Israel has continued to have the status of occupying Power.82 
Based on the status of all the territories captured by Israel in 1967 war as 
occupied, it follows that the annexation of any such territory is illegal. This conclusion can 
be reached by reference to Article 2 paragraph 4 of the UN Charter stating that: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”83 Furthermore, IHL 
forbids the change of the local laws by the occupying power unless necessary for 
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legitimate needs linked to the security or restoring order in the occupied territory.84 This 
principle was codified in Article 43 of the Hague regulations which states that the 
occupying power shall ensure public order and safety “while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country.”85 GCIV has also stated that “the penal laws of 
the occupied territory shall remain in force.”86 
The Security Council has affirmed in several occasions that the annexation of East 
Jerusalem was illegal. In 1968, it issued a resolution that referred to the inadmissibility of 
acquisition of territory by military consequences, and determined that it: 
Considers that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by 
Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, which tend to 
change the legal status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status.87 
In 1980, after Israel adopted its basic law Jerusalem the Capital of Israel mentioned 
above, the UN Security Council determined that all these measures taken by Israel to alter 
the status of Jerusalem are “null and void.”88 Based on the considerations mentioned 
above, the ICJ confirmed this conclusion in its 2004 Advisory Opinion, deciding that 
“subsequent events in these [occupied] territories… have done nothing to alter this 
situation [i.e. their status as occupied].”89  
Since the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip have both been 
considered occupied, IHL is fully applicable to them. Article 2 of the GCIV, mentioned 
above, states that it applies to occupied territory.90 A conference of the “High Contracting 
Parties on the Geneva Conventions” declared that “[t]he participating High Contracting 
Parties reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.”91 The International Committee of the Red 
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Cross also affirmed this applicability repeatedly. It stated in 2001 that “the ICRC has 
always affirmed the de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the 
territories occupied since 1967 by the State of Israel, including East Jerusalem.”92 This 
position is also consistent with UN Security Council resolutions.93 For example, in 
Resolution 271 of 1969 it called upon Israel to “observe the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and international law governing military occupation.”94 In Resolution 446, it 
affirmed that the GCIV “is applicable to Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967 
including Jerusalem.”95 It further called upon Israel to  
abide scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, to rescind its previous 
measures and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the 
legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic 
composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.96 
Similarly, the UN General Assembly adopted the same position,97 and all relevant 
documents issued by UN agencies treated the territories captured by Israel in 1967 as 
occupied and used the GCIV as part of their legal framework.98 The majority of the world's 
states and legal scholars have not accepted Israel's position on the applicability of the 
Geneva Conventions.99 
                                                     
92
 ICRC, Implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: 
History of a Multilateral Process (1997-2001) (Geneva: ICRC), accessed January 7, 2013, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5fldpj.htm#2. 
93
 UN Security Council, “Resolution 271,” September 15, 1969; UN Security Council, “Resolution 
446,” March 22, 1979; UN Security Council, “Resolution 681,” December 20, 1990; UN Security Council, 
“Resolution 799,” December 18, 1992. 
94
 UN Security Council, “Resolution 271," of 15 September 1969.  
95
 UN Security Council, “Resolution 446," 22 March 1979.  
96
 Ibid. 
97
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 56/60,” December 10, 2001; UN General Assembly, 
“Resolution 58/97,” December 17, 2003. 
98
 Examples of such documents are numerous. For example all reports issued by the United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs discussing the occupation refer to the Fourth Geneva 
Convention as their legal reference to examine the legality of alleged human rights violations conducted by 
Israel, the occupying power, in the OPT. See, e.g., UN OCHA, East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns 
(Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2011), 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_jerusalem_report_2011_03_23_web_english.pdf. This 
report cites the GCIV as part of the legal framework in Jerusalem. 
99
 Cavanaugh, “The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza,” 203; Richard A. Falk 
and Burns H. Weston, “The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: 
In Legal Defense of the Intifada,” Harvard International Law Journal 32 (1991): 141. 
136 
 
In 2004, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion about the wall 
that Israel has been building in the West Bank, reaffirmed this conclusion. In Paragraph 
101 of its Advisory Opinion, the Court provided: 
The Court considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in any 
occupied territory in the event of an armed conflict arising between two or more 
High Contracting Parties. Israel and Jordon were parties to that Convention when 
the 1967 armed conflict broke out. The Court accordingly finds that the 
Convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay 
to the east of the Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by 
Israel, there being no need for any enquiry into the precise prior status of those 
territories.100 
The court’s opinion has helped in determining the criteria on which one can consider the 
Fourth Geneva Convention applicable. Particularly, it determined that there is no need to enquire 
into the status of the occupied territory prior to Israel’s occupation. Although this decision came to 
cover only the West Bank, a similar conclusion can be driven for Gaza Strip. The court in this case 
gave an authoritative answer to the Israeli argument, based on Blum’s and Shamgar’s work, that 
the GCIV is not applicable because of Israel’s denial of the legitimacy of Jordan’s and Egypt’s 
authorities in the West Bank and Gaza respectively.  
In conclusion, while Israel, represented by its government and judiciary, has failed in 
meeting its obligations to recognize the applicability to the GCIV and to implement its provisions in 
the areas it occupies, this position has been consistently declined by the international community. 
This means that the legal system Israel implemented in Jerusalem, and that significant parts of the 
military regime applied to the West Bank and Gaza contradict with international humanitarian law. 
It remains to examine the applicability of international human rights treaties that Israel 
ratified to the occupied territory. Israel has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR);101 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),102 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD),103 the 
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convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW);104 and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).105 However, Israel does not recognize the applicability 
of relevant human rights treaties in the OPT based on the assumption that human rights law and 
international humanitarian law are mutually exclusive; and since parts of IHL apply in the 
“administered territories” then this means that human rights conventions that it signed do not 
apply.
106
 This position has been expressed in several occasions. For example, in its second periodic 
report submitted to UN committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Israel argued: 
Israel has consistently maintained that the Covenant does not apply to areas that 
are not subject to its sovereign territory and jurisdiction. This position is based on 
the well-established distinction between human rights and humanitarian law 
under international law.107 
This position has been Israel’s consistent stance regarding all the areas that are 
beyond its sovereignty and in relation to all the human rights conventions. This position 
has been also rejected by the international community. The human rights committee, for 
example, refused Israel’s position, asserted that human rights and IHL are not mutually 
exclusive and declared:  
… in current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of 
the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by its authorities or 
agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the 
Covenant and fall within the ambit of state responsibility of Israel under the 
principles of public international law.108 
The ICJ has sustained a similar opinion. In its advisory opinion on the legality of the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons in 1996, it held that the “protection of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation 
of Article 4 of the covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time 
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of national emergency.”109 Based on the same principles the court held in the Wall 
advisory opinion that the ICCPR, ICESCR and CRC, were all applicable to the occupied 
Palestinian territory.110 In its analysis, the ICJ found that in conflict zones and times, 
international human rights law can apply simultaneously with IHL. As a general rule, the 
court considered that “the protection offered by human rights convention does not cease 
in case of armed conflict.”111 
The 2005 Israeli “disengagement” from Gaza has not affected the applicability of 
IHL, for the mere reason that the Israeli effective control over the strip has not been given 
up fully yet.112 Similarly, the UN General Assembly’s granting Palestine the status of 
observer state in the UN, has not changed anything on the ground and the Israeli effective 
control is still being exercised. It seems that the Assembly has pre-empted in the same 
resolution any misinterpretation to its decision in that regard, and stated that it 
reaffirmed “the applicability of the Geneva Convention…, to the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, including East Jerusalem.”113 
In conclusion, the Israeli position rejecting to implement the relevant human rights 
treaties has not accepted any recognition in the world. International customary law and 
treaty law are both applicable to the areas under which it exercises its sovereign 
jurisdiction as well as territories it occupies and runs under a military regime. 
Against this background, Israel’s forced displacement of Palestinians whether in 
the areas on which it exercises sovereign authority as well as the territories it occupies will 
be examined according to the relevant customary and treaty legal principles that are 
relevant for each incident. This will be discussed in the following sections.  
                                                     
109
 International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 25 (ICJ 1996). 
110
 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, 102–13 (ICJ Advisory Opinion 2004), para. 102–13. 
111
 Ibid., 106. 
112
 Bashi and Mann, Disengaged Occupiers, 9; John Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories 
Occupied by Israel Since 1967, Report to the UN Commission on Human Rights in its Sixty Second Session 
(UN Commission on Human Rights, January 17, 2006), para. 6–11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/29. 
113
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 67/19," 29 November 2012.  
139 
 
4.3 The legality of Israel’s policy of Forced Displacements in 
International Law 
The Israeli forced displacements as a result of the war and the measures that were 
analysed in Chapters 2 and 3 have violated international legal norms according to several 
bodies of international law. As will be explained in the following sections, first, forced 
displacement of civilians whether at times of war or peace is considered a war crime if it 
takes place in an occupied territory, and a crime against humanity if committed 
systematically.114 Secondly, Israel’s status revocation policy, whether committed during or 
after wars, is illegal. When committed against the laws that prevented the Palestinians 
from acquiring an Israeli citizenship following the 1948 war amounted to de-
nationalization according to the principles of the international law of state succession and 
the international law of nationality.115 Moreover, those who were deprived from the right 
to reside in the OPT following the war, and those whose Israeli regulated residency status 
was later revoked over the years, is a violation of an occupying power’s duty to refrain 
from altering the law in force in an occupied territory, especially if such change affects the 
rights of the local population and violates additional norms of international law.116 Finally, 
Israel’s policy of preventing Palestinians from return to their homes has violated 
international law in two additional ways: the first is that no other state is obliged to 
receive those refugees that Israel has produced because of its refrain from admitting them 
into their homes; and secondly, it has violated the well-established right of every person 
to enter his country, and by only implementing this violation on Palestinians, it also 
violated the principle of non-discrimination.117 The following three subsections will 
analyse Israel’s mass forced displacements in its sovereign territory as well as the OPT, in 
the framework of international legal principles that are applicable to it.  
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4.3.1 The Development of the Crime of “Forced Displacement” in International 
Law 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, forced displacement of civilians has 
been developing to be condemned as an international crime. This development was 
influenced by a number of atrocities that took place during major wars which not only 
claimed the lives of millions of innocent civilians, but also forcibly removed millions from 
their homes, usually because of their ethnic or religious background. Mass displacements 
have taken place during the course of the First World War, Second World War, as well as 
many other international and domestic conflicts that took place during the last century; 
inflicting a great amount of suffering to the victims who were frequently dispossessed and 
turned into vulnerable refugees or internally displaced in need for protection and aid. 
These events happened at the same time of an active development of universal principles 
of human rights, international humanitarian law, and international criminal law, the 
progress of which aimed at guaranteeing basic rights of humans at times of war and 
peace. 
The original prohibition of forced displacement or, “deportation and forcible 
transfer,” as a norm of customary international humanitarian law arguably stems from the 
Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907.118 In fact these conventions did not explicitly 
prohibit deportations or forcible transfers. It has been consistently reported that the 
reason behind the absence of such explicit prohibition was that there was a general 
understanding among the contracting states that at war time, “civilized nations no longer 
resorted to deportations,” as Henckaerts argues.119 This conclusion seems to have been 
put first into words at the time the commentary of the Fourth Geneva Convention was 
written. Jean Pictet, in his authoritative Commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
stated that the absence of reference to the question of deportation in the Hague 
Regulations was because “the practice of deporting persons was regarded at the 
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beginning of this century as having fallen into abeyance."120 Alfred De Zayas explains this 
notion eloquently by writing: 
Analogously, it would have seemed unnecessary to the delegates convened at The 
Hague in 1907 to draft special articles to prohibit cannibalism or human sacrifices. 
In this sense, the practice of expelling hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
civilians from their homes and deporting them hundreds of miles across the 
continent did not seem to belong to the Twentieth Century, and the thought of 
such expulsions would surely have evoked visions of the Assyrian and Roman 
campaigns to those delegates learned in ancient history.121 
In the absence of an explicit prohibition of deportation in the laws of armed 
conflict, however, it has been repeatedly argued that Article 46, common to both 
conventions (1899 and 1907), provides prohibition against forcible displacement of civilian 
population. This article states that, 
Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as 
religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be 
confiscated.122 
This article, when understood with other principles of international law that 
require a state to ensure public order in occupied territory,123 and the prohibition of 
collective punishment,124 has been seen as a prohibition of arbitrary deportation of 
civilians.125 Article 46 of Hague Convention was cited by the French assistant prosecutor 
during the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945, as the main legal reference indicating the illegality 
of the Nazi deportations that took place during the Second World War.126 
In 1919, the Report of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of 
War and on the Enforcement of Penalties, drafted by representatives of the countries that 
ended up winning the First World War, condemned 'deportation of civilians' as a breach of 
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the “laws and customs of war” and the “laws of humanity.”127 It further recommended 
that these “crimes” be prosecuted and punished,128 but this recommendation was never 
implemented.129 It was noticeable in this conference that the United States and Japan 
dissented from the opinion that violations of the “laws of humanity” be prosecuted 
because it was not part of positive international law, but was according to them “not 
certain, varying with time, place and circumstances and according, it may be, to the 
conscience of the individual judge.”130 
In 1920, the victors of the First World War signed the Treaty of Sevres with the 
Ottoman State, which included among its provisions the repatriation of all “Turkish 
subjects of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of 
Massacre or any other form of pressure since January 1, 1914.”131 Moreover, the 
agreement required that Turkey would hand two kinds of suspects of crimes to be 
prosecuted in criminal tribunals: 1) those who committed "violations of laws and customs 
of war;”132 and 2) perpetrators of “massacres committed during the continuance of the 
state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914."133 
The second element was related to the definition of ‘crimes against the laws of humanity’ 
as defined in the 1919 report mentioned above, and the term massacres here included 
deportations.134  Nonetheless, these trials never took place because the Treaty of Sevres 
was not ratified, as Turkey waged its war of independence, and signed the more recent 
Lausanne treaty which gave an amnesty to all accused of crimes connected to the war.135 
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Moreover, the treaty endorsed “compulsory exchange of population” between Greece 
and Turkey effectively weakening the prohibition of forced displacement.136 
Nonetheless, the grant of Amnesty, as Bassiouni asserts, recognized the existence 
of the categories of “war crimes” and “crimes against the laws of humanity” as described 
in the 1919 report, but the prosecution and punishment of such crimes was waived.137 It 
was not until the Second World War that 'deportation' was actually prosecuted as both a 
war crime and a crime against humanity.  
Following the Second World War, the charter of the International Military 
Tribunal’s Trial of the Major War Criminals defined “war crimes” and “crimes against 
humanity” and condemned “deportation” as a crime in both categories.138 The charter 
defined war crimes as “violations of the laws and customs of war,” and provided that such 
violations include “deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian 
population of or in occupied territory.”139 Similarly, crimes against humanity were defined 
as: 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.140  
These two categories of crime, namely, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
came to cover the whole range of crimes perpetrated by Nazi Germany during the war, 
including the ones targeting German civilians.141 While the concept of “war crimes”, i.e. 
violations of the laws and customs of the laws of war, had been long recognized by the 
international community, the addition of “crimes against humanity” which was mainly 
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designed to prosecute a state’s crimes committed in its own territory had been less 
recognized as an existing legal norm then.142 Indeed, the latter category of crimes is 
derived from the concept of “breaches of the laws of humanity” advanced first by the 
preamble of the 1899 and 1907 Hague regulations, and later the 1919 Paris conference 
recommendations mentioned above.143 This time, it was introduced into positive 
international law,144 finally allowing states to punish perpetrators of atrocities against 
their own civilians, confirming the principle, as David Luban explains it that when mass 
atrocities happen, “criminality overrides state sovereignty, turning them into international 
crimes.”145 
Pierre Mounier, assistant prosecutor for the French Republic, in opening remarks 
in the International Military Tribunal on 20 November 1945, argued that deportation had 
been contrary to international law. He stated:  
These deportations were contrary to the international conventions, in particular 
to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the 
general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized 
nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were 
committed, and to Article 6(b) of the Charter.146 
During the trials, several Nazi leaders were prosecuted for deportations of the 
civilians in occupied territories, as well as territories annexed to Germany. For example, it 
was argued on 26 February, 1946 that Germany de-populated several occupied territories, 
within a policy called “Germanization,” and replaced the deported populations with 
German nationals.147 The prosecutor pleaded:  
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Locality after locality, village after village, hamlets and cities in the incorporated 
territories were cleared of the Polish inhabitants. This began in October 1939, 
when the locality of Orlov was cleared of all Poles who lived and worked there.148 
The Germanization policy was clearly condemned in the indictments of the trials, 
also in areas that were annexed to Germany. It was seen that the policy of changing the 
demographic nature of certain territories from non-German to German was a serious war 
crime or crime against humanity. Count 3, section B of the Nuremberg indictment focused 
on deportations in occupied territory, as mentioned in the charter. Count 3, section J of 
the indictment stated:  
In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany the defendants 
methodically and pursuant to plan endeavoured to assimilate these territories 
politically, culturally, socially, and economically into the German Reich. They 
endeavoured to obliterate the former national character of these territories. In 
pursuance of these plans, the defendants forcibly deported inhabitants who were 
predominantly non-German and replaced them by thousands of German 
colonists.149  
Hence, the Nuremberg tribunal condemned deportation as an attempt to change 
the demographic structure of occupied territories in order to assimilate them.  
Following the trials, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution affirming “the 
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the 
judgment of the tribunal.”150 By this resolution, the UN General Assembly reflected that 
the international community as a whole accepts the principles of the Nuremburg 
tribunals, an action that reflects that these principles became customary. This conclusion 
was reached by the European Court of Human Rights which noted that “the universal 
validity of the principles concerning crimes against humanity was subsequently confirmed 
by, inter alia, resolution 95 of the United Nations General Assembly.”151 Similarly, Antonio 
Cassese reached this conclusion as he argued:  
Translated into law making terms, this approval and support meant that the world 
community had robustly set in motion the process for turning the principles at 
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issue into general principles of customary law binding on member states of the 
whole international community.152 
Then, in 1947 the UN General Assembly created the International Law Commission 
(hereinafter ILC) with the purpose of promoting “the progressive development of 
international law and its codification,”153 and instructed it to “formulate the principles of 
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the 
judgment of the Tribunal.”154 In its report, the ILC recognized that deportation was both a 
crime against humanity and a war crime.155 In its analysis, it considered that crimes 
against humanity can be committed regardless of connection to a war, thus recognized 
that such crimes can be committed at times of peace.156 The report states that 
In its definition of crimes against humanity, the Commission has omitted the 
phrase “before or during the war” contained in article 6(c) of the Charter of the 
Nurnberg Tribunal because this phrase referred to a particular war, the war of 
1939. The omission of the phrase does not mean that the Commission considers 
that crimes against humanity can be committed only during a war. On the 
contrary, the Commission is of the opinion that such crimes may take place also 
before a war in connexion with crimes against peace.157 
As time went by, the prohibition, and indeed the prosecution, of deportation in 
both sovereign and occupied territory became stronger. In 1949, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention was signed, codifying more rules and customs of war. It stated in article 49 
that: 
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons 
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any 
other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.158 
In the following paragraph it stated that the only exceptions for this prohibition are 
the security of the “population itself or imperative military reasons.”159 Nevertheless, the 
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occupying power should not expel the population outside the occupied territory, and has 
to allow the return of those transferred as soon as the hostilities stop.160 Henckaerts 
asserted that the prohibition of mass deportations and population transfers contained in 
Article 49(1) is “undoubtedly declaratory of customary international law;”161 as it has been 
argued above. Similarly, Alfred De Zayas argues that the articles of the Geneva Convention 
“merely codify the prohibition of deportations of civilians from occupied territories which 
in fact already existed in the laws and customs of war.”162 
Article 147 of the convention further enlists deportation as a “grave breach” that 
requires prosecution and punishment.163 Jean Pictet explained this in the authoritative 
commentary of the GCIV writing that: 
[t]he prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from those 
stipulated in paragraph 2 [of article 49]...”unlawful deportation or transfer” was 
introduced among the grave breaches, defined in article 147 of the convention as 
calling for the most severe penal sanctions.164 
In 1991, the International Law Commission drafted a “draft Code of Offences 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind” in which it included “deportation or transfer 
of the civilian population” among exceptionally serious violations of principles and rules of 
International law applicable in armed conflict.”165 
In the development of prosecutions of crimes against humanity and war crimes 
after this date, states and international tribunals have been consistent in condemning 
deportations and population transfers as punishable crime. The statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Hereinafter, ICTY) condemned 
forcible transfer and deportation as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and only 
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deportation as a crime against humanity.166 Because the statute of the tribunal did not 
enlist forcible transfer as a crime against humanity, the tribunal's jurisprudence has also 
convicted forcible transfers as “other inhuman acts” punishable as crimes against 
humanity.167 In Prosecutor v. Stakic case (2006) the Appeal Chamber judgment stated: 
The protected interests underlying the prohibition against deportation include the 
right of the victim to stay in his or her home and community and the right not to 
be deprived of his or her property by being forcibly displaced to another location. 
The same protected interests underlie the criminalization of acts of forcible 
transfer, an “other inhuman act” pursuant to Article 5(i) of the statute.168 
What can be concluded from this judgment is that the ICTY has not only 
condemned deportations across national borders as a crime, but it has also found the 
transfer of civilians within the national borders of a country equally criminal. As clarified 
by the judgment quoted above, the interest that international law is protecting by 
criminalizing deportation is the same as the one it is protecting by condemning forcible 
transfer. It reflects the right of every person to reside in his/her home and be protected 
from forced displacement. When the ICTY found that there is no explicit statutory 
condemnation of forcible transfer as a crime, it included this crime under “other inhuman 
acts” so that the criminals would not be exempted from accountability for such squally 
criminal act.  
The ICTY has been consistent in condemning forcible transfer as “other inhuman 
acts.” In the more recent case of Prosecutor v. Dordevic (2011), the Trial Chamber 
judgment stated: 
In the present case the acts of forcible transfer have been charged as “other 
inhuman acts” under article 5(i) of the statute. The Chamber is satisfied that the 
acts of forcible transfer established in the present case… are of a similar 
seriousness to other enumerated crimes against humanity. The acts of forcible 
transfer were of similar gravity as the acts of deportation. They involved a forced 
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departure from the people's homes and communities, often gave physical and 
emotional disruption and uncertain prospects for their return.169 
Hence, the ICTY has equally condemned deportation and population transfers as a 
crime. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) and the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) also enlisted deportation as a crime against humanity.170 The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also extended its jurisdiction over both 
deportations and forcible transfer of populations, and defines them as part of both crimes 
against humanity and war crimes.171 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a study in 2005 that 
aimed at codifying the customary international humanitarian law norms. It found that the 
prohibition of deportations and population transfers was a customary international legal 
norm applicable to both international and non-international armed conflicts. The study 
states:  
A. Parties to an international armed conflict may not deport or forcibly transfer 
the civilian population of an occupied territory, in whole or in part, unless the 
security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. 
B. Parties to a non-international armed conflict may not order the displacement of 
the civilian population, in whole or in part, for reasons related to the conflict, 
unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so 
demand.172 
In conclusion, it seems fair to conclude that the illegality of deportations and 
forcible transfers in international criminal law has gained momentum from the beginning 
of the twentieth century until now, and is part of customary international law.173 It got to 
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be considered and officially declared as a customary rule in international law in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, but then gained further acceptance as a war crime 
and a crime against humanity with the passage of time between then and the current 
time. Every international judicial institution since Nuremburg has incorporated the crime 
of “deportation or forcible transfer” into its statute. There is no doubt, thus, that 
international law has not tolerant, since the Second World War, of forced displacement of 
civilian population.  
4.3.1.1 Elements of the Crime of Forced Displacement 
The general elements of deportation or forcible population transfer have 
undergone great development, especially in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. As noted by a 
number of authors, the jurisprudence of the ICTY was the major venue through which the 
crime of forced displacement was developed, as a result of the fact that ethnic cleansing 
was one of the main crimes committed in the Yugoslavian conflict.174 This tribunal, basing 
itself on the norms of customary international law has defined the elements of 
deportation as:  
there is a forcible displacement of individuals;  
those individuals are lawfully present in the area from which they are displaced;  
there is an absence of grounds under international law permitting the 
displacement;  
the forcible displacement must be across boundaries; and  
the forcible displacement must be carried out intentionally.175 
Forcible population transfer shares nearly identical elements with deportation, the 
only difference being element 4. When the population is forcibly displaced within the 
borders of the state or territory, the crime would be defined as transfer of population.176 
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On the meaning of the term “forcible displacement,” the jurisprudence of ICTY has 
provided that it means:  
…carried out by expulsion or other forms of coercion such that the displacement is 
involuntary in nature, and the relevant persons had no genuine choice in their 
displacement.177 
The court added that “it is the absence of genuine choice that makes the 
displacement unlawful.”178 It also clarified that the displacement would be forceful even if 
other methods were used, including "fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power or taking advantage of a coercive environment."179 
As for the third element, the ICTY has determined that the grounds that permit 
displacement in international law are the same as the ones set by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, namely, the security of the civilians or imperative military reasons; as long as 
the displaced persons are “transferred back… as soon as the hostilities in that area have 
ceased.”180 
Deportation or forcible transfer is considered a war crime when conducted in an 
occupied territory or with nexus to an armed conflict and a crime against humanity when 
the object of this crime is any civilian population including the jurisdiction of a state's 
sovereign areas and its own citizens.181 Hence, a crime against humanity can also be 
committed in an occupied territory because such crime can be committed on any civilian 
population. War crimes and crimes against humanity are not mutually exclusive, and can 
be prosecuted simultaneously.182 Practically, if an occupying power forcibly displaces one 
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individual or a number of individuals without having a systematic policy or a widespread 
implementation, then these displacements are war crimes. However, if these 
displacements are widespread or systematic, they amount to both war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. 
The elements of deportation or forcible transfer differ also in the case of it being a 
war crime or a crime against humanity. In the case of war crime, first, a single deportation 
is condemned as a war crime as was expressed explicitly by Article 49 of GCIV when it 
stated that “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportation” are prohibited.183 
The scale of the forcible displacement does not change it being condemned as such. 
Secondly, the destination of the displacement does not affect its condemnation as a 
crime. Article 49 of GCIV stated that deportation or transfer “to the territory of the 
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not” is prohibited.184 The 
ICC statute has stipulated in Article 8(2)(b)(viii) that “deportation or transfer of all or parts 
of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory”[emphasis 
added] is a war crime.185 Thirdly, only forcible displacements are war crimes, as explained 
above. This was confirmed by Jean Pictet’s commentary on the GCIV, noting that this issue 
was discussed in the conference, and that contracting states expressed that they only 
want forcible displacements to be considered illegal.186 A voluntary departure is, 
therefore, not a war crime. What distinguishes voluntary from forced displacement is the 
lack of “genuine choice” as held by the ICTY as shown above.187 
The elements of forcible displacement as a crime against humanity are similar with 
one major exception: the scope. Forcible displacement of a civilian population needs to be 
either widespread, or part of a systematic policy, in order to be considered a crime against 
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humanity.188 This corresponds more with its contemporary application,189 especially 
because the IMT charter did not include such condition.190 A violation of human rights is 
regarded “widespread” when it is committed against a large number of people, and 
systematic when regarded as part of a policy designed to inflict such violation.191 In its 
“Draft Codes of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,” the ILC defined a 
crime against humanity as committing a list of defined acts (including deportation or 
forcible transfer of population) “when committed in a systematic manner or on a large 
scale and instigated or directed by a government or by any organization or group.”192 In its 
commentary, it explained these notions by stating that the terms “in a systematic manner 
or on a large scale” mean one of two alternatives:  
The first alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed “in a 
systematic manner” meaning pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The 
implementation of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous 
commission of inhuman acts. The thrust for this requirement is to exclude random 
act which was not committed as part of a broader plan or policy… 
The second alternative requires that the inhumane acts be committed “on a large 
scale” meaning that the acts are directed against multiplicity of victims. This 
requirement excludes an isolated inhumane act committed by a perpetrator 
acting on his own initiative and directed against a single victim…193 
Hence, as the ILC explained, a crime against humanity cannot be regarded as such 
if it was only an isolated act. However, if a state or an organization is systematically 
designing policies to persecute a civilian population, then this amounts to a crime against 
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humanity. Furthermore, if the number of victims is large, even in the absence of a policy, 
any act contributing to the persecution would be regarded a crime against humanity. In 
the Tadec case, the ICTY further decided that a single violation that forms part of a bigger 
systematic or widespread attack is also a crime against humanity.194 
At the time of the IMT, a major criterion was the nexus of the crimes against 
humanity to the war.195 The report of the ILC clarified, as shown earlier, that this limitation 
is merely jurisdictional, and does not mean that a crime against humanity takes place only 
at the time of war or armed conflict.196 Similarly, in its development as discussed above, 
this nexus was not required as an element, although in some cases like the ICTY the 
statute of the tribunal limited its jurisdiction over crimes that took place during the armed 
conflict that it targeted.197 Still, crimes against humanity can be conducted at times of war 
or peace as recognized by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY itself in Tadic case, noting that 
“customary international law no longer requires any nexus between crimes against 
humanity and armed conflict;”198 and that the inclusion of this condition in ICTY and IMT 
charters is jurisdictional.199 Indeed, this is a fair interpretation in the context of 
international criminal law. It is inconceivable why a state’s systematic crimes against a 
civilian population during peace times would not be condemned as such unless linked to 
an armed conflict. The IMT and the ICTY were ad hoc tribunals that were linked to specific 
conflicts, and the authors of the statues of these two tribunals wanted to limit the 
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jurisdiction of their work. Nonetheless, these jurisdictional clauses have no implication on 
the condemnation of the crimes at times of war and peace alike.  
Another element in controversy is that of discrimination. Prosecution on 
discriminatory grounds was part of the jurisdiction of the London Charter,200 and similarly, 
the ICTR Statute also included discrimination as an element to the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
over the cases.201 The ICC, on the other hand, as well as the other international tribunals 
did not require discrimination as an element.202 
A final element in question is whether the act needs to be part of a policy of a 
state or organization. Article 6 of the London Charter gave the IMT the jurisdiction to try 
all perpetrators of international crimes “acting in the interests of the European Axis 
countries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations.”203 The ICC statute 
follow these steps,204 while ICTY and ICTR do not have any reference to state or 
organizational involvement as an element of crimes against humanity. The ILC included 
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this element in its definition of crimes against humanity.205 According to Bassiouni, this 
element is a necessary one to define crimes against humanity because “by virtue of their 
nature, and scale require the use of governmental institutions, structures, resources, and 
personnel acting in reliance upon arbitrary power uncontrolled by the law.”206 
4.3.1.2 Application to the Israeli Displacements 
As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, Israel has forcibly displaced the majority of the 
Palestinian population between 1948 and the current day by using several methods.207 
First, in its war operations in both its 1948 and 1967 wars it designed military operations 
that specifically aimed at cleansing whole communities from their towns and villages.208 
Most of those displaced were pushed outside the de facto lines of each of the wars, while 
some managed to stay in but turned into internally displaced. Both exoduses were 
widespread. As established above, the term “widespread” as an element of a crime 
against humanity refers to a large number of people.209 Israel’s forced displacements 
included 80% of the non-Jewish population in the territory on which Israeli claimed its 
sovereignty after the 1948 war;210 and more than one third of the population of the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1967.211 It cannot be argued that these incidents were isolated 
individual incidents in light of the displacement of such a large portion of the whole 
Palestinian population. In addition, many of the displacements were “systematic,” or in 
other words “pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy.”212  As explained in Chapter 2, the 
displacements were designed in the official war plan of 1948, and were done according to 
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clear orders in 1967. Hence, these mass displacements were intentional. Furthermore, 
when the hostilities ended, Israel did not allow the displaced persons to return to their 
homes, by virtue of physical and regulatory barriers, as explained in Chapter 2. The 
prevention of infiltration laws and military orders, as well as the deprivation from the right 
to reside in Israel and the OPT reflect an intention to make the displacement of the victims 
durable. There is no basis to argue that the civilian population living in their homes was 
living therein illegally and such argument has never been made. Both mass displacements 
took place in the context of an armed conflict. Hence, it is safe to conclude that the forced 
displacements of both wars amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
As for the continuous displacements analysed in Chapter 3, they were a direct 
result of a long process of regulatory engineering that resulted in the displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians by the operation of the regime’s legal system. In 
these deportations and transfers, the mere fact that the Israeli civil and military legal 
systems have been designed to inflict the displacements reveals the systematic nature of 
the displacements. In addition, those displacements that are taking place in the occupied 
territory are war crimes as well because of them being “grave breaches” of the Geneva 
Convention. Let us examine one case study of a displacement that took place as a result of 
regulatory engineering to make the current argument more concrete.  
In Chapter 3, it was explained that Israel developed a policy of revoking the 
residency of Jerusalemites whose “centre of life” ceased to be within the borders that 
Israel defined as part of sovereign territory.213 One of the victims of this policy was Dr. 
Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian Jerusalemite who studied in the United States and later 
acquired its citizenship.214 In one of his visits to his home in Jerusalem, he discovered that 
his residency had been revoked by the Israeli Ministry of Interior for the sole reason that 
he had acquired an American citizenship and moved his centre of life therein.215 This 
revocation of residency was based on the Entry into Israel Regulations, which stipulated 
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that a permanent residency would be lost by its bearer if he leaves Israel for a period of 7 
years; receives a permanent residency permit in another country; or receives citizenship 
of that country through naturalization.216 When Awad petitioned the Israeli Supreme 
Court, it rejected his petition based on the fact that he “uprooted himself from the 
country and rooted himself in the USA,” blaming him for his own plight.217 As explained 
earlier, Israel had illegally annexed East Jerusalem, and applied its own laws therein 
granting its residents an easily revocable residency status.  
The revocation of Awad’s right to reside in Jerusalem amounts to a war crime and 
crime against humanity. First, his displacement is forced. Obviously, his petition to Israeli 
Supreme Court to regain his right to reside in Jerusalem is a clear expression that no 
genuine choice was expressed by him in wanting to leave Jerusalem permanently. 
Secondly, as a protected person in an occupied territory according to the GCIV, he is 
lawfully present in his hometown Jerusalem. The “illegality” of his presence is only a result 
of an Israeli discriminatory legal system which would not have applied to him had he been 
Jewish or had Israel recognized and respected the applicability of the GCIV in the OPT. 
Furthermore, the Israeli law according to which his residency was revoked is contrary to 
international humanitarian law as it forbids an occupying power from changing the laws in 
the occupied territory, even in the case of an illegal annexation, in a way that would harm 
the civilian population.218 Thirdly, there is no ground in international law permitting his 
displacement. His deportation was not linked to any military considerations and was not 
to protect him from any hostilities. Fourth, he was deported across the boundaries of the 
OPT. Fifth, the forced displacement has been carried out intentionally by an act of the 
Ministry of Interior that was supported by the Supreme Court.  
Since East Jerusalem is an occupied territory as explained earlier, the deportation 
of Awad is a war crime. Moreover, it amounts to a crime against humanity because it is 
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part of a systematic and widespread policy of residency revocations in the OPT, as 
explained in Chapter 3. In Tadic case, the ICTY judged that “clearly, a single act by a 
perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual perpetrator 
need not commit numerous offences to be held liable.”219 Awad’s deportation is not a 
single isolated violation of his right, but rather part of a policy that is stipulated by the 
Israeli legal regime affecting hundreds of thousands of victims. Hence, the deportation of 
Awad amounts to a war crime and a crime against humanity. 
Awad’s case is representative of many others who were referred to in Chapter 3. 
Each one of the deportations and transfers resulting from the Israeli discriminatory 
policies is a crime.  
Finally, it is important to stress that victims rarely find remedies in the Israeli 
Supreme Court due to the low standards of human rights that the court refers to. As 
explained earlier, Israel does not recognize the applicability of international human rights 
law and the GCIV in the OPT. More specifically, Article 49 of the GCIV has been rejected 
explicitly by the court. In a deportation case known as the Kawasme (also spelled as 
Qawasmi) case, the court stated:  
All of Article 49, and the Fourth Geneva Convention in general, does not form part 
of customary international law, and therefore the deportation orders do not 
contravene the domestic law of the state of Israel or of the Judea and Samaria 
Region, according to which an Israeli court reaches its decisions.220 
The court was consistent in its refusal to apply article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, and there were instances when it was annoyed by lawyers' continuous 
request to apply it. The Israeli attorney, Felicia Langer, who advocated several deportation 
cases, once withdrew a case protesting this position. She wrote explaining that:  
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After I explained to the Court that I was going to base my claims on international 
Law, the president of the court, Judge Dov Levin, told me clearly that I would not 
be allowed to argue that the deportation is prohibited, because this claim had 
already been made and decided. When I tried to convince him that at least one 
judge, Judge Haim Cohen, had ruled otherwise [in the past] and that perhaps the 
present panel of the court (Judges Shoshanna Natanyahu and Eliezer Goldberg) 
might change the ruling, the answer was an absolute no. I asked if this meant that 
the Supreme Court was opposed to the Geneva Convention, and [Judge Levin] 
answered that if it is a question of prohibiting deportation as I claimed in the past, 
according to Article 49 of the Convention, this is so indeed.221 
Therefore, victims of forced displacement in the OPT could not find the right 
remedy in the court because it does not recognize the applicability of the GCIV and 
especially Article 49. In light of this framework, the crime of forced displacement has 
nothing to stop it.  
However, the displacements conducted by Israel are not only contrary to 
international criminal law, but other bodies of international law. This will be discussed in 
the following sections.  
4.3.2 Deprivation from Legal Status 
It was mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3 above that Israel's policies deprived those 
displaced beyond its borders in 1948 and beyond the lines of the occupied territory in 
1967, from acquiring a legal status, and further deprived additional hundreds of 
thousands from enjoying such status. In the first instance, the refugees were excluded 
from citizenship, and in the second they were excluded from the residency status that 
Israel gave to the population under occupation. This section will examine the legality of 
this practice in light of the principles of state succession, law of nationality, and the IHL.  
4.3.2.1 Denationalization of the 1948 Palestine Refugees 
As mentioned in the introductory section in Chapter 1, Palestine was part of the 
Ottoman State between 1516 and 1917. It then did not have a special status. It was similar 
to other areas that were turned later into independent states such as Syria, Iraq, and 
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Jordan. Ottoman law applied in Palestine and all Palestinians, regardless of their religious 
or ethnic background, were citizens of the Ottoman state.222 
In 1917, Palestine was occupied by the United Kingdom. The victors of the First 
World War drew borders in the areas they occupied from the Ottoman State, and 
established a number of mandates that aimed at qualifying these areas to become 
independent countries. Britain, the mandatory power in Palestine, regulated Palestinian 
citizenship first by issuing a nationality certificate to Ottoman citizens who resided in 
Palestine and intended to reside permanently therein.223 Then, in 1922, it introduced a 
law for elections called "Palestine Legislative Council Election order in Council,"224 which 
introduced what Qafisheh called a “provisional citizenship” which defined Palestinian 
citizens as "Turkish subjects habitually resident in the territory of Palestine at the date of 
commencement of this order.”225 
Later, in 1924, Britain signed the Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey in which the 
Ottoman State seized to exist and was succeeded by smaller states. The nationality of its 
subjects was regulated by Article 30 of the treaty which stated:  
Turkish subjects habitually resident in territory which in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey will become ipso facto, in 
the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State to which such 
territory is transferred.226  
This provision of the Lausanne agreement meant that the residents of every 
territorial unit cut out of the Ottoman state will automatically enjoy the citizenship of the 
state that will be established in that territory. 
Following the principle of ipso facto citizenship for habitual residents in the case of 
succession of states, Britain enacted the “Palestinian Citizenship Order 1925” on July 
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1925.227 The first article of the order stated: “Turkish subjects resident in the territory of 
Palestine... shall become Palestinian citizens.”228 
With the treaty of Lausanne, Palestine's status as a separate entity was legalized. 
Turkey no longer had claims over Palestine and the connection between the inhabitants 
and their previous state was finished. Now, Palestine became an entity and its inhabitants 
became the citizens of this entity.  
Nothing interrupted the legal link between the inhabitants of Palestine and their 
state until the 1952 Israeli Nationality Law229 was enacted.230 But what is the legality of 
this procedure? Can an emerging state legalize a denial of the link between a people and 
their ancestral land based on its municipal law?  
Nationality regulations and laws are “in principle” within the sole jurisdiction of 
any given state.231 In 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that while 
international relations and law are developing, the issue of Nationality is “in principle” a 
domestic issue.232 However, this jurisdiction is not absolute.233 One of the cases in which a 
state is expected in international law to grant its citizenship is in cases of state succession.  
State succession happens when sovereignty changes within certain territory.234 For 
example, when Palestine was made a separate entity and was bound to become an 
independent state after being cut out of the Ottoman State, a succession took place. The 
issue of Nationality of the inhabitants of a territory upon state succession has been an 
issue that international law had to deal with, especially given that after the end of the First 
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World War the victors dismantled territories of the Ottoman State and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and had to regulate the citizenships of the newly established states. 
In 1927, C. Luella Gettys traced the international practice which had been stated in 
several peace treaties.235 A broadly used principle before and after the First World War 
was the automatic change of citizenship in cases of change of sovereignty,236  with a few 
exceptions such as giving an option to the individual to opt for another citizenship.237 For 
example, in the treaty of Lausanne mentioned above, Article 30 gave an automatic 
citizenship to the “habitual residents” of the states that used to be part of the Ottoman 
Empire in the state to which their territory was transferred. The British conduct in 
Palestine followed this principle as shown above.  
Also in the late 1920s, the Assembly of States in the League of Nations adopted 
articles relating to the laws of Nationality. Article 18 stated:  
(a)  When the entire territory of a state is acquired by another state, those 
persons who were nationals of the first state become nationals of the successor 
state, unless in accordance with the provisions of its law they decline the 
nationality of the successor state.  
(b)  When a part of the territory of a state is acquired by another state or becomes 
the territory of a new state, the nationals of the first state who continue their 
habitual residence in such territory lose the nationality of that state and become 
nationals of the successor state, in the absence of treaty provisions to the 
contrary, unless in accordance with the law of the successor state they decline the 
nationality thereof.238 
Although the rule of automatic citizenship upon state succession was not codified 
in treaties, it has been argued that this principle has become a customary international 
rule.239 The United Nations General Assembly instructed the International Law 
Commission to codify the principles followed in international law, and then adopted these 
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principles in a resolution in the year 2000.240 Article 5 of the “Articles on Nationality of 
Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States” makes the following presumption: 
Subject to the provisions of the present articles, persons concerned having their 
habitual residence in the territory affected by the succession of states are 
presumed to acquire the nationality of the successor state on the date of such 
succession.241 
This provision follows the same custom that was followed after the First World 
War, referred to above. Article 15 follows another custom that has developed over time in 
international law, the prohibition of discrimination. It states:  
States concerned shall not deny persons concerned the right to retain or acquire a 
nationality or the right of option upon the succession of States by discriminating 
on any ground.242 
Article 16 codifies the prohibition of denial of citizenship arbitrarily. It provides:  
Persons concerned shall not be arbitrarily deprived of the nationality of the 
predecessor State, or arbitrarily denied the right to acquire the nationality of the 
successor State or any right of option, to which they are entitled in relation to the 
succession of States.243 
Jeffrey Blackman explained in 1998 that the principles of state succession derive 
from human rights principles, as well as other international law principles.244 Among these 
rights are the right to a nationality, the duty to avoid statelessness, and the norm of non-
discrimination. He later explains:  
The view is increasingly expressed in international fora that states involved in a 
succession have the positive obligation to confer nationality on the individuals 
who possess genuine effective links to the territory in question.245 
Applying the rules above, one can see that Israel has violated them in its 
nationality legislation in 1952. First, it denied the citizenship of “habitual residents” of 
Palestine who not only resided in Palestine, but also held a Palestinian Nationality. The 
implementation of the principles above meant that the Palestinian citizens who resided in 
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the areas that became Israel in 1948 were ipso facto Israeli citizens upon Israel's 
establishment. Therefore, their exclusion from Israel’s citizenship baring them stateless is 
seen as de-nationalization. 
Secondly, Israel made two separate laws of Nationality, one for Jews and one for 
non-Jews, which effectively deprived most of the non-Jewish population from its 
citizenship. This clearly violates the principle of non-discrimination on bases of race and 
religion.  
Finally, the deprivation of nationality was arbitrary. There was on process 
according to which the individual can decide on whether to live under Israeli sovereignty 
and acquire its nationality, or otherwise. The Israeli Nationality law as shown above simply 
decides that only Palestinian citizens who were physically in Israel and succeeded to 
register themselves were to become citizens, while the rest of the population who was 
driven out or fled during the war and was not allowed to return after it had no such 
option.  
It is worth mentioning, though, that in one case prior to the enactment of the 
nationality law an Israeli court decided a case based on the principles of international law 
shown above. In 1951 the Tel Aviv District Court, concluding from an international law 
perspective that habitual residents in what became Israel after the war were entitled to its 
citizenship held: 
So long as no law has been enacted providing otherwise my view is that every 
individual who, on the date of the establishment of the state of Israel was resident 
in the territory which today constitute the state of Israel is also a National of 
Israel. Any other view must lead to the absurd result of a state without 
nationals.246 
Unfortunately, when Israel enacted the law of Nationality it decided not to follow 
this rule, but rather to select its citizens based on their ethnic and religious background. Its 
nationality law has violated the principles of nationality upon state succession, and has 
done so on discriminatory grounds. Hence, the de-nationalization of the majority of 
Palestinians has been contrary to international law.  
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4.3.2.2 Revocation of resident status from OPT refugees 
As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, it 
conducted a census in the whole area of the occupied territory, and later gave the 
residents who were physically present in the OPT and who had not been displaced by the 
war Israeli-issued ID cards and created its own population registries for the Palestinian 
population residing in the OPT.247 Those who did not receive Israeli-issued ID cards were 
not allowed to reside in their homes and were considered mere aliens to the occupied 
territory. In addition, a quarter million of those who remained but failed to comply with 
the complicated, unpublished and quickly changing residency regulations were also 
stripped from their status as residents in the OPT. All of these policies served to displace 
more Palestinians, and to make the return of those already displaced illegal and 
impossible.  
It has already been argued above that forced displacements, regardless of whether 
they were meant to be durable or temporary, are illegal and amount to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.248 However, there are further grounds of illegality for Israel’s 
status revocation policies. An important one of these grounds, which is understudied in 
the Palestinian-Israeli context, is a well-established customary doctrine in IHL that an 
occupying power’s authority to alter laws in an occupied territory is extremely limited. 
This principle has been adopted in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations stating: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and 
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.249 
This article has set one of the basic principles of the law of occupation. It is well 
recognized that an occupying power is not a sovereign in the territory it occupies, but 
rather a temporary administrator; which leads to the rule that the occupier is not entitled 
to change the laws in force, except for the narrow cases when the security of its forces or 
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the needs of the local population make it necessary.250 This principle was also confirmed 
by the GCIV, which stated:  
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case 
or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any 
change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the 
institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded 
between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor 
by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.251 
According to the authoritative commentary of the GCIV, this article “amplifies” the 
provisions of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.252 It is considered as an “uncontested 
principle of international law,” as Dinstein asserts.253 It is based on the principle which 
obliges the occupying power not to change the laws in force in the occupied territory, 
except in narrow necessary cases as shown above. The GCIV commentary further explains 
that the Geneva conventions were adopted in the aftermath of all the atrocities of the 
Second World War, during which the rights of populations of occupied territories were 
severely derogated as a result of the occupying powers’ change of institutions in the 
occupied states, as well as their illegal annexation of occupied territories.254 Against this 
background, the convention set a clear rule: the rights of the civilian population of the 
occupied territory shall not be affected by any measures taken by the occupying power.255 
To further elaborate on this point, the occupying power is not entitled to make severe 
changes to the laws and institutions of the occupied territory, and is certainly not allowed 
to annex such territory. If this happens, nonetheless, then the protection of civilians and 
their rights shall not be affected.256 Arai explains that the occupying power’s authority to 
legislate in an occupied territory must be bound by its obligations according to 
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international law applicable in an occupied territory, namely, relevant international 
human rights law and IHL.257 
If we examine Israel’s conduct in the OPT against the provisions of the Hague 
Regulations and GCIV, a clear violation can be detected. When Israel in 1967 prevented 
those who were displaced from return; enacted special “infiltration” orders to criminalize 
any attempt to return; and created a new system of residency that gives only those who 
are registered in Israel’s population registry the right to reside in the OPT, it violated the 
rights of the inhabitants of the OPT who were excluded from the right to reside therein.258 
There is no provision in international law that allows an occupying power to create new 
rules of residency in the occupied territory. On the contrary, the occupying state must 
respect the legal system in the occupied territory and allow normal civilian life to 
proceed,259 and only introduce legal amendments for security purposes or for the benefit 
of the civilians of the occupied territory.260 
Prior to the Israeli occupation, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and 
Gaza were free to leave for prolonged periods of time and return without any restrictions. 
There were no reported restrictions on child registration or family unification. Movement 
between Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank was also not restricted and a Palestinian 
could chose to reside anywhere in the West Bank.261 
The annexation of Jerusalem and the treatment of its native population as mere 
residents clearly violate the obligation of the occupying power not to affect the rights of 
the local population. By making their status so vulnerable for revocation, the regime 
imposed by Israel institutionalized a continuous violation of the right to reside and 
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naturally give this right to one’s children. The annexation and the applied regime 
represent a doubled violation. First, the annexation itself is illegal and violates the 
principle that prohibits territorial acquisition by force, as argued above.262 Secondly, while 
the annexation took place anyway, the rights of the civilian population must not have 
been affected by such annexation, as clearly expressed by Article 47 of GCIV.  
In the rest of the occupied territory, an annexation did not take place. However, 
the severe changes Israel introduced to the system of residency changed fundamentally 
the rights that the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza enjoyed.263 These military 
orders that have been applicable since 1967 have cemented the continued displacement 
for those who had to leave or were already abroad when the war took place, and further 
inflicted many more displacements.  
Accordingly, the regimes designed by Israel in West Bank and Gaza as well as 
annexed East Jerusalem are illegal in international humanitarian law. Their illegality stems 
from two principles in IHL. First, a state is expected refrain from changing the laws and 
regulations in an occupied territory, and to only introduce amendments for the security of 
its forces or the welfare of the local population. Secondly, if the occupying power does 
introduce legal and institutional amendments to the legal system in the occupied territory, 
these amendments must not affect the rights of the population.  
4.3.3 Prevention from Return and International Law 
Another way in which Israel violated international law is by preventing the 
Palestinian refugees and displaced persons from return as explained in Chapters 2 and 3. 
This policy was in violation of Israel’s obligations toward other states, and toward its own 
citizens’ human rights in 1948, and the human rights of the residents of the occupied 
territory in 1967. This section will briefly examine prevention of return as a violation of 
international law in two international legal bodies: the law of Nationality, and 
International Human Rights Law. It should be noted that the right of the Palestinian 
refugees and IDPs to return as a remedy to forced displacement will be analysed in 
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Chapter 5, which will discuss this right and its relationship with other remedies within a 
transitional justice framework. This section’s scope is limited to presenting an analysis of 
how the prevention from return, itself, has been in violation of international law. 
The first ground regarding the illegality of the prevention of one’s right to enter his 
own country is the international norms regulating nationality, which developed to be 
known as the “Law of Nationality.”264 A violation toward the state to which this person is 
forced to go, which “according to accepted principles of international law” has no 
obligation to admit him.265 States have no obligation to allow aliens to reside in their 
territory.266 Thus, any state is under an obligation vis-à-vis other states to admit its 
nationals, that is, to allow them to return to its territory.267 While this obligation toward 
other nations is not provided in positive law, it is considered to be part of customary 
international law.268 Weis explains the logic behind this as being based on the “conception 
of nationality:” 
If states were to expel their nationals to the territory of other states without the 
consent of those states or were to refuse readmission, thus forcing states to retain 
on their soil aliens whom they have the right to expel under international law, 
such action would constitute a violation of the territorial supremacy of these 
states. It would cast a burden on them which, according to international law, they 
are not bound to undertake, and which, if persistently exercised, would 
necessarily lead to a disruption of orderly, peaceful relations between states 
within the community of nations.269 
Following on the same logic, a country may not revoke a citizen’s nationality in 
order to expel him or deny him readmission to his own country. Similarly, in cases when 
the state has actually denationalized a citizen, this state has an obligation to readmit him 
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in its territory.270 Hannum argues that while denationalization per se might be admissible, 
it is prohibited if it is done in violation of the principle of non-discrimination, or if its 
intention was to expel or prevent the return of a citizen.271  In 1927, Sir John Fischer 
Williams wrote: 
There  will be general  agreement that a  state cannot, whether by banishment or 
by putting an end to the status of nationality, compel any other state  to receive  
one  of its  own nationals  whom  it wishes  to expel from  its own  territory.272 
In 1924, the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations instructed the codification of 
international legal principles on several issues, including the international law concerning 
nationality.273 The School of Law at Harvard University organized the research, and in 
collaboration with international legal scholars, took the responsibility to present a draft of 
the international law of nationality to the Assembly of Nations. Article 20 of this document 
stated:    
A state may not refuse to receive into its territory a person, upon his expulsion by 
or exclusion from the territory of another state, if such person is a national of the 
first state or if such person was formerly its national and lost its nationality 
without having or acquiring the nationality of any other state.274 
In its commentary, the drafters of the articles gave several examples of how this 
article applies. In one of the examples, the commentary explains that even if a citizen 
takes an oath of allegiance to another country and fights in the armed forces of his own, 
his country, even if it had a law withdrawing nationality for taking an oath of allegiance to 
a foreign state, has the obligation to allow him the right to return to it.275  
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This duty to admit, which Goodwin-Gill argues is a basic obligation and is “beyond 
dispute,”276 and exists in an additional basis in international law, namely the right to 
return as guaranteed by international human rights law. Such right has been repeatedly 
confirmed by human rights instruments as will be shown below. 
In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states in Article 9 that: 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile,”277 and in Article 13 (2) 
expresses that: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to 
return to his country.”278 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
states: "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country."279 The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
prohibited the prevention of the “right of return to one’s country” on discriminatory 
grounds based on, among other criteria, race and religion.280 Regional human rights 
treaties also incorporate the right of one to enter his country.281 This wide adoption of the 
“right to return” to or “right to enter” one’s country has been adopted by so many human 
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rights instruments that it became widely considered as a norm of customary international 
law.282 
The use of the term “arbitrarily” in both the UDHR and ICCPR, the established 
understanding is that the only exception to the right to enter would be for the cases 
where exile is a recognized penalty in the law itself, which has almost disappeared.283 
When these instruments were introduced, a number of countries still had exile as a 
recognized punishment in their penal laws. Beyond this exception, human rights law has 
not accepted any other ground for the prevention from return. 
 The UN Human Rights Committee, which has the official responsibility to interpret 
the ICCPR, has provided some useful guidance to understanding the term “arbitrarily” and 
how widely or narrowly it can be interpreted. Their 1999 “General Comment No. 27” 
provided:  
In no case may a person be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his or her own 
country. The reference to the concept of arbitrariness in this context is intended 
to emphasize that it applies to all State action, legislative, administrative and 
judicial; it guarantees that even interference provided for by law should be in 
accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant and should 
be, in any event, reasonable in the particular circumstances. The Committee 
considers that there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the 
right to enter one's own country could be reasonable. A State party must not, by 
stripping a person of nationality or by expelling an individual to a third country, 
arbitrarily prevent this person from returning to his or her own country.284 
Hannum, commented providing useful insight to interpreting the concepts 
explained above. He argues that while there are limited cases under international law 
where the prevention from return is lawful, this is not applicable when such prevention is 
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discriminatory, and as such, in violation of the well-established principle in international 
law preventing racial discrimination, even if it is based on a legal and judicial system.285 
This right to return or enter is guaranteed to every person in relation to “his own 
country.” The meaning of this expression (i.e. “own country”) could be interpreted widely 
to include not only the country to which one is a citizen, but also other types of links with 
the country including permanent residency; but it can also be interpreted narrowly to 
include only citizens.286 This has also been articulated by the UN Human Rights Committee 
in its “General Comment No. 27,” where it first explained that the term “his own country” 
does not only mean the country of his citizenship. In addition to citizens, it also 
embraces, at the very least, an individual who, because of his or her special ties to 
or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. 
This would be the case, for example, of nationals of a country who have there 
been stripped of their nationality in violation of international law, and of 
individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated in or transferred 
to another national entity, whose nationality is being denied them. The language 
of article 12, paragraph 4, moreover, permits a broader interpretation that might 
embrace other categories of long-term residents, including but not limited to 
stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the 
country of such residence.287 
Hence, according to this interpretation, the right of return is not only for citizens, 
but also for those who never managed to gain the citizenship of a country but at the same 
time cannot be considered aliens. It then includes several categories of persons including 
stateless persons and permanent residents.  
It should be noted that this right has appeared in the form of “right to return” in 
the UDHR, and “right to enter” in the ICCPR. The reason for the use of the wording “enter” 
rather that “return” in the ICCPR was in order to include those who might have never 
been in their country but were still entitled to be admitted therein, such as children of 
nationals or residents born abroad. This has also been addressed by the UN Human Rights 
Committee. It interpreted “enter” as follows:  
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The right of a person to enter his or her own country recognizes the special 
relationship of a person to that country. The right has various facets. It implies the 
right to remain in one's own country. It includes not only the right to return after 
having left one's own country; it may also entitle a person to come to the country 
for the first time if he or she was born outside the country (for example, if that 
country is the person's State of nationality). The right to return is of the utmost 
importance for refugees seeking voluntary repatriation. It also implies prohibition 
of enforced population transfers or mass expulsions to other countries.288 
The UN Human Rights Committee’s interpretation indicates that those who were 
born outside their own country have the same right to enter as those who exited their 
country. 
In addition to the right to enter one’s country being protected as such, it has also 
been frequently rightly given special significance because of its relation to other rights 
that can only be enjoyed by one if he was allowed to enter his country. In 1963, the 
United Nations published a study prepared by Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination, Jose Ingles discussing discrimination in relation to the 
right to leave and enter one’s own country.289 He stressed in his study that discrimination 
in respect to the right to return needs to be understood in the context of the ability to 
fulfil other rights. He argued:  
A national normally has considerable interests and ties in his own country and 
there are many rights which he can enjoy fully only in his own country. These 
include the right to social security and other cultural life and government of one’s 
own country. In the case of naturalized citizens, denial of the right to return to 
their country could have the effect of arbitrarily depriving them of their 
nationality.290 
Indeed, it is inconceivable how one can enjoy his basic rights without being 
allowed to live in his own country. Alfred De Zayas has agreed with the approach of 
explaining the right to enter one’s country as an essential one to the exercise of other 
rights. He argued that one can derive from several principles of international human rights 
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law what he describes as a “right to a homeland,” that prevents the expulsion from one’s 
homeland, and gives him the right to return therein.291 
Implementing these principles on the Israeli conduct in both, its sovereign territory 
and the OPT will reveal that Israel has violated the internationally recognized right of 
return. As argued above, Israel is bound by customary international law as well as human 
rights conventions that it ratified which include the ICCPR and the ICERD.292 Accordingly, it 
can be argued that by preventing its own nationals and the inhabitants of the OPT from 
return or entry; Israel has violated international law on a number of grounds. Firstly, it 
breached the right of all its neighbouring countries as well as others who were obliged to 
receive the majority of the Palestinian population on their lands, and to settle many of 
them in poorly built refugee camps. As discussed above, no state has the obligation to 
receive aliens. Secondly, Israel has violated human rights law by not allowing those who 
had been displaced to exercise their right to return to Israel or the OPT. As shown above, 
the bearers of this right are not only the nationals of a country, but also those who were 
deprived from their nationality, permanent residents and children of nationals (or persons 
who were illegally deprived of nationality) born aboard. 
What can be concluded by the discussion in the present section is that the bearers 
of the right to return or enter and as such the victims of Israel’s denial of this right include 
all those who were displaced by Israel’s consistent policies of displacement, citizenship 
revocation, and residency revocation. Furthermore, the children of these three categories 
are also victims of Israel’s policy and would be entitled to remedies as will be shown in 
Chapter 5. 
4.4 Conclusion 
After examining the legal statuses of the areas from which Palestinians have been 
forcibly displaced since 1948, this chapter has argued that Israel’s long, widespread and 
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systematic policy to forcibly displace the majority of the Palestinian population has been 
contrary to international law on several grounds. First, while forced displacement was 
condemned since the beginning of the twentieth century, it has actually been consistently 
prosecuted in international tribunals and courts as a war crime and a crime against 
humanity since the end of the Second World War. This meant that it was considered a 
crime before 1948, which leads to the conclusion that when the 1948 exodus was 
perpetrated, international law had already developed to condemn the crime of forced 
displacement. The statutes of the ICC and every ad hoc tribunal that came to prosecute 
international crimes after that was consistent in condemning the crime. 
In addition, Israel breached additional international legal obligations with its forced 
displacement policy. First, by preventing those who were to become its citizens upon its 
establishment as a state from acquiring its citizenship, Israel failed to fulfil its duty to 
recognize the effect of the international law of state succession and the international law 
of nationality on automatically passing its citizenship to those habitually living on its 
territory at the time of the change of sovereignty. In addition, when it introduced new 
complicated residency regimes in the OPT it breached its obligation as an occupying 
power to refrain from fundamentally changing the legal system of the occupied territory 
and to protect the rights of the civilian population when legal amendments take place. 
Not only did the regime exclude those who were displaced by the war from their right to 
reside therein, but also produced additional hundreds of thousands of new displaced 
persons who were stripped from that right. Finally, by preventing millions of Palestinians 
who are entitled to exercise their right to return to their homes, Israel has breached its 
obligation in front of other states that should not be forced to receive and keep aliens; as 
well as its obligations under international human rights law which guarantees a right of 
each person to enter his country. The discriminatory character of Israel’s policy adds 
another dimension of illegality as well established in international human rights law.  
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Chapter 5- The Parameters of a 
Transitional Justice 
Approach to Addressing 
Israel’s Forced 
Displacement Policy 
Introduction 
As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, Israel’s goal of changing the demographic balance in 
Israel and parts of the OPT has been expressed by a number of policies that resulted in the 
mass forced displacements of Palestinians. The fact that these displacements are contrary 
to international law, as shown in Chapter 4, has consequences in international law. These 
consequences are twofold: first, an unlawful conduct in international law results in a 
responsibility to provide remedies to the victims;1 and second, when a breach of 
international law is an international crime an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators 
emerges.2 Unfortunately, until today no remedies have been given to the displacement 
victims.  
The transitional justice framework has been used in several countries around the 
world to redress victims of human rights violations through a number of measures that 
articulate the types of injustice that they went through. This chapter will present an 
analysis of how transitional justice can meaningfully and comprehensively address the 
problem of displacement and determine the principles that govern this framework in an 
endeavour to redress the victims.  
Before making the transitional justice analysis, this chapter will start by reviewing the 
status of the victims of Israel’s displacement in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process 
framework. The failure of this framework to redress the victims will be examined in an 
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endeavour to clarify the reasons behind it. After that, the international legal framework 
for articulating human rights violations will be discussed, focusing on the appropriate legal 
remedies that are expected to be delivered following a wrongful act, according to the laws 
of state responsibility and the principles of individual criminal responsibility.  
Then, the chapter will turn into defining the parameters that govern a transitional 
justice approach to redressing displacement problems. This will be done by examining the 
main features of transitional justice as a theoretical framework and then analysing each of 
the remedies affiliated with it focusing on their implications on displacement issues. Each 
of the remedies will be studied theoretically by learning from the transitional justice 
literature, and practically by referring to examples where countries sought to redress their 
victims by using transitional justice processes.  
5.1 Displacement within the Framework of the Current “Peace Process”  
The framework for Israel’s “peace process” with its neighbours and the Palestinian 
People can be traced back to 1978, when Israel signed its peace treaty with Egypt, known 
as “The Camp David Accords,” ending the state of war and conflict between the two 
states. The treaty consisted of two agreements, the first regulating bilateral Israeli-
Egyptian relations.3 The second which was called “The Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East,” outlined a framework and the terms of reference for further peace agreements 
between Israel and parties it is in conflict with, and invited “other parties to the Arab-
Israeli conflict to adhere to it.”4 The framework dictated that Egypt, Jordan and 
“representatives of the Palestinian people” shall agree on establishing a self-government 
in the West Bank and Gaza.5  
Indeed, in 1993 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel launched a 
bilateral “peace process” by signing an interim peace agreement famous with its unofficial 
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name, the “Oslo Accords,” and known officially as the Declaration of Principles on Interim 
Self Government (hereinafter DOP).6 According to this agreement, the PLO and Israel were 
to enter a five-year interim period (as laid out in Camp David) during which a transitional 
Palestinian self-government would be established with limited authorities and jurisdiction 
while “permanent status negotiations” commence.7 In 1995, the “Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (hereinafter the Interim Agreement) 
was signed, detailing the arrangements of the transitional period and deferring the same 
“permanent status” issues to the negotiations that will commence once the Palestinian 
Authority is installed in parts of the West Bank and Gaza.8 In addition, Israel and Jordan 
signed a peace treaty in 1994 ending the state of conflict between the two states.9 
It can be noticed that within the three bilateral peace tracks the displacement 
problem was dealt with in the same way. In fact, the three agreements follow the same 
framework that was laid out in the Camp David Accords. This framework has divided the 
issue of displacement into several separate problems; only some of which were tackled in 
the process and each of which would be dealt with in a separate process and according to 
a different rule. Reference was made to the refugees of 1948 war,10 the “displaced 
persons” of 1967 war11 and those whose residencies were revoked in the West Bank 
(excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip between 1967 and 1994 as will be shown 
below.12 The rest of the internal displacement and deportations explained in Chapter 3 
were not mentioned. The following sub sections will examine the principles laid out for 
tackling the plight of those displaced in each of the displacement waves.  
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5.1.1 The 1948 Exodus and the “Peace Process” 
Those who were forcibly displaced outside the borders of the new-born Israel back 
in 1948 were the only group that was referred to as “refugees.”13 Reference to them came 
to include them as part of the deferred issues that will be tackled in the “permanent 
status negotiations” which were defined in the DOP as: “Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, 
security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and 
other issues of common interest.”14 This has been the case in the three bilateral 
agreements. In the 1978 Camp David Accords, the reference to the refugees came as 
follows:  
Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to 
establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of 
the resolution of the refugee problem.15 
Similarly, Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel mentioned that the refugees issue will 
be resolved in a multilateral forum, but in this treaty it was provided that the solution of 
the issue should be “in accordance with international law.”16  
Until today, there has not been an agreed solution to the plight of the victims of 
this wave of displacement and it seems that it is the most difficult to resolve within the 
current framework. The difficulty is due to Israel’s position which is based on two pillars: 
denial of responsibility and rejection of consequences.17 The main reason for this position 
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is the very same reason that has been behind all the displacement waves and methods 
explained in this thesis: demography. Preserving a Jewish majority is not a hidden goal in 
Israel and the main reason behind Israel’s position regarding the refugees is to keep this 
majority.18 
In fact, the Israeli strict position on this front has influenced international actors 
and even the Palestinian leadership. For example, in 2003 the “Quartet for the Middle 
East,” which is a mediation body formed by the United States, the European Union, Russia 
and the United Nations, suggested a peace plan known as the “Road Map” to peace which 
called for reaching a final status agreement in 2005 that includes “an agreed, just, fair and 
realistic solution to the refugee issue.”19 The use of the word “realistic” connotes a waiver 
of the Palestinian claim on the right of return. As Lynn Welchman noticed, the Road Map 
contained “no reference to international law or indeed to any framework external to 
terms agreed bilaterally or proposed by particular third parties.”20 
Israel did not find this sufficient and ended up accepting the Road Map with 14 
reservations, one of which was: 
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… declared references must be made to Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and 
to the waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel.21 
With this reservation, Israel introduced a new element to its relationship with the 
Palestinians that became a consistent demand from the Palestinian leadership and got to 
be conveyed through every possible forum. The PLO’s recognition of Israel as a state is not 
sufficient anymore, but this recognition needs to be combined with a strange recognition 
that Israel is a Jewish state. As the Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh eloquently 
describes it, this new “mantra” means 
before final status negotiations have even started, that Palestinians would have 
then given up the rights of about 7 million Palestinians in the diaspora to 
repatriation or compensation.22 
In 2011, Al-Jazeera News Network and the Guardian published an enormous leak 
of 1700 documents on the negotiations between the PLO and Israel.23 These leaks showed 
that, under pressure from the Israeli negotiators and American and French mediators, 
Palestinian negotiators were ready to agree on a “symbolic” return of the refugees as 
opposed to receiving all the remedies.24 The documents reflect that the PLO was ready to 
accept an offer that entails the return of 10,000 out of five million Palestinian refugees 
within a period of 10 years.25 Nonetheless, in later negotiations Israel withdrew this offer. 
Tsipi Livni, while negotiating with the PLO in her capacity as Israel’s minister of foreign 
affairs, has been quoted explaining the rationale behind her full refusal to accept any 
responsibility for the refugees:  
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The basis for the creation of the state of Israel is that it was created for the Jewish 
people. Your state will be the answer to all Palestinians including refugees. Putting 
an end to claims means fulfilling national rights for all.26 
In conclusion, one can clearly see how the ideological motive of having a Jewish 
majority has imposed its imperatives on the peace process within the Oslo framework. 
While this position has been maintained by Israel regarding the 1948 refugees, a different 
position has been expressed by Israel regarding the 1967 refugees, at least in theory. The 
following section will discuss the principles regarding the future of the victims of this wave 
of displacement in the Oslo framework.  
5.1.2 1967 Refugees in the framework of the “Peace Process” 
The framework of the current “peace process” refers to refugees who were 
displaced outside the borders of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip 
during the 1967 war as “displaced persons.”27 The plight of the victims of this wave of 
displacement was addressed in the Peace Process framework. The 1978 Camp David 
Accords between Egypt and Israel dictated that after the establishment of a Palestinian 
“self-government,” the 1967 displacements will be solved in the following way: 
During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the self-
governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by 
agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption 
and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this 
committee.28 
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The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty provided that the plight of the “displaced 
persons” shall be negotiated “in a quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the 
Palestinians” in accordance with international law.29 The DOP, under the title “Liaison and 
Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt,” provided:  
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in 
establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and 
the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation 
between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing 
Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of 
persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with 
necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common 
concern will be dealt with by this Committee.30 
“Displaced persons” came to be mentioned another time in the same agreement, 
within the section that regulates Palestinian elections. After providing some of the 
principles related to the elections that will be held in the West Bank including East 
Jerusalem and Gaza Strip, Annex I provided:  
The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 
will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election 
process due to practical reasons.31 
This text was negotiated upon request from the Palestinian negotiators, who 
originally wanted to give the 1967 refugees and those who were displaced from the West 
Bank and Gaza as a result of Israel’s residency revocation policy the right to participate in 
the elections even before their return is facilitated.32 The negotiations resulted in not 
allowing them to participate in the elections until their return, but this provision came to 
protect their right of return.33 
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From all the texts presented above based on the Israeli Egyptian, Jordanian, and 
Palestinian agreements, it is clear that Israel implicitly recognized the 1967 refugees’ right 
to return to their homes.34 By providing that the role of the “Continuing Committee” is to 
agree on the “modalities of admission” of the refugees, and by stating that their status 
should not be prejudiced as a result of their inability to participate in the elections, the 
current peace framework has, in principle, considered that those displaced outside the 
borders of Palestine during the 1967 war were entitled to return.35 Their mention in the 
context of elections is an additional sign that it is expected that they will be fully 
repatriated; that is, they will receive a status that will allow them to participate in political 
elections. Despite this recognition, there is no mention of any other remedies that would 
be offered to the victims. 
In practice, once the actual transitional period started and the “Continuing 
Committee” was formed, several years were wasted in negotiations about who can be 
considered a displaced person and who would be “admitted” according to this provision. 
The Palestinians demanded that this includes  
Palestinians who were living outside the Occupied Territories at the time of the 
Six-Day War; Palestinians who left the Occupied Territories during or immediately 
after the war; Palestinians whose residency in the Occupied Territories had been 
revoked by Israel; and Palestinians whom Israel deported.36 
In contrast, the Israeli initial position was that only those who were directly 
displaced by the war were to be defined as “displaced persons.”37 While the Arab 
negotiators were demanding the return of over one million “displaced persons,” the 
Israeli negotiators spoke of only 200,000.38 
The Continuing Committee met several times between 1995 and 2000, but it never 
succeeded in solving this problem which seemed to be agreed on theoretically from the 
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text of the treaties. Rex Brynen argues that the failure of the negotiations to reach a 
solution was due to Israel’s unwillingness to “use the meetings to reach agreement on the 
issue of displaced persons, preferring to address this in the context of eventual 
negotiations on the broader refugee issue.”39 After the last meeting of this committee in 
2000, the idea of simply implementing the “admission” of the “displaced persons” 
disappeared from the agenda and became part of the major negotiations and as frozen as 
the whole permanent status issues in the peace process.40 
5.1.3 Victims of status revocation in the current peace process framework 
As explained in Chapter 3, Israel has forcibly displaced a quarter million 
Palestinians who had not been displaced during or directly after the 1967 war and who 
were actually counted in the 1967 census and managed to receive an Israeli-issued ID 
card. This displacement took place as a result of the status revocation policy that Israel 
has been implementing since its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967.41 
This policy is known among the Palestinian population mainly as “Sahb Al-Hawiyyat,”42 
which can be literally translated to “ID Card withdrawal” or to get it to make better sense 
in English, “ID Card revocation.” 
The Oslo framework addressed this issue by stating: 
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A joint committee will be established to solve the reissuance of identity cards to 
those residents who have lost their identity cards.43 
Two significant observations must be highlighted here in terms of the text and 
content of this provision. First, this article is an implicit recognition of the right of those 
displaced by residency revocation in the West Bank and Gaza to be repatriated. By not 
deferring the issue to the final status negotiations and by using the wording “the 
reissuance of identity cards,” the text confirms that Israel does not have, in principle, an 
objection to their return. However, the text did not specifically, neither explicitly nor 
implicitly, recognize the wrongdoing of forcible revocation through residency revocation. 
Indeed, the verb used in this text is “lost” and it was the residents who lost their “identity 
cards,” not that their whole status was actively revoked by Israel, contrary to the victims’ 
basic human rights that were protected by several international legal instruments as 
explained in Chapter 4.44 Moreover, this article does not offer refugees displaced by this 
method any other remedies. One cannot find any mention of restitution of property, 
compensation or any other remedies that would be combined with human rights 
violations.  
 Secondly, despite the implicit recognition of the victims’ right to return, the 
interim agreement deferred this action to a “joint committee” that will be “established to 
solve” this problem. This meant that no immediate remedy was given to this group of 
victims. When the joint committee met and tried to solve the problem, its fate was similar 
to that of the “Continuing Committee” that was assigned to deal with the 1967 refugees’ 
problem. It spent several years negotiating, starting first by reaching a common 
understanding of what the article means. The initial Israeli point of view was that the goal 
of this article was “the printing of new identity cards to replace those that Palestinian 
residents of the Occupied Territories had physically lost.”45 When the Palestinian 
negotiators managed to convince their Israeli counterparts that the purpose was to 
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restore residency status, the negotiators turned to negotiate other questions until Israel 
froze the population registry in 2000 and stopped accepting to negotiate these 
questions.46 
Finally, it is important to notice that this provision excluded the Jerusalem 
Palestinians’ residency revocation problem. This is because the Oslo framework included 
Jerusalem in the issues of final status negotiations47 and thus excluded the Palestinian 
population of Jerusalem from most of the provisions of the interim agreement, with the 
explicit exception of their right to participate in the Palestinian Authority’s elections.48 
Having Jerusalem as one of the final status issues meant that Israel’s treatment of the 
annexed city and the implementation of Israel’s civil law were not altered. The Palestinian 
Authority had no jurisdiction on Jerusalem and its people.49 
5.1.4 Conclusions on the tackling of displacement in the framework of the 
“peace process” 
The focus of the framework followed in Camp David and the subsequent peace 
agreements with the PLO and Jordan has, thus far, failed to address the injustices inflicted 
upon the refugees who were forcibly displaced during the wars of 1948 and 1967, as well 
as those who were displaced through residency revocation throughout the years of the 
occupation. Despite the clear theoretical distinction between the 1948 refugees, the 1967 
refugees (or as the framework refers to them the “displaced persons”) and those whose 
status had been revoked (referred to as “those who lost their ID cards”), the peace 
process has not given remedies to most of these victims until now.50 
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In fact, as explained in Chapter 3, displacement became much more active in some 
of its forms after the peace process started. For example, in Jerusalem more than 13,000 
Jerusalem residencies have been revoked between 1967 and 2011, 11,000 of which were 
actually revoked after the peace process started.51 Similarly, the laws regulating child 
registration and family unification in Jerusalem, and the whole policy of “freezing the 
population registry” came with the peace process. It was noted by several observers and 
analysts that Israel’s policy towards the peace process was to use it to buy time, not to 
actually reach peace.52 Former Israeli Member of Knesset (parliament), Minister of 
Education and Minister of Environment Yossi Sarid ironically commented on this pattern:  
Each one loves to take but hates to give, becomes addicted to talks on condition 
that there won't be any results, plants the trees of life yet loathes the fruit of 
knowledge. This is how it goes. We set a table with the Palestinian side - Palestine 
first - because the Palestinian problem is "the heart of the conflict," as we all 
know. On the path to an agreement, we turn over every stone. This too is 
common knowledge.53 
Also, Israeli sociologist Jessica Nevo more critically commenting on the role of the 
peace process wrote: 
A more critical approach might argue that hidden real agenda of all peace 
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, from the Oslo agreements of the 
1990s to the 2003 Road Map, is to set up an apartheid system in the West Bank 
based on the creation of territorial Bantustans, the relocation of the Palestinian 
population, land confiscation and a segregated economy.54 
Indeed, Nevo’s observation is accurate. The accelerated Israeli colonization of the 
Occupied Territory combined with further innovation in displacement methods show that 
Israel is using the Palestinian “self-government” as a method to concentrate the 
Palestinian population and colonize the rest of the land. 
                                                     
51
 B’Tselem, “Statistics on Revocation of Residency in East Jerusalem,” B’Tselem, December 3, 2012, 
http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_statistics. 
52
 Yossi Sarid, “They’ve All Been Yitzhak Shamir,” Haaretz.com, November 28, 2008, 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/they-ve-all-been-yitzhak-shamir-1.258428; Daniel Levy, 
“What Netanyahu Learned from Shamir (and Others Didn’t),” Foreign Policy Blogs, July 9, 2012, 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/06/what_netanyahu_learned_from_shamir. 
53
 Sarid, “They’ve All Been Yitzhak Shamir.” 
54
 Jessica Nevo, “Transitional Justice and Its Application to the Zionist/ Palestinian Conflict and the 
Palestinian Refugee Issue,” in Rights in Principle- Rights in Practice: Revisiting the Role of Internationa Law in 
Crafting Durable Solutions for Palestinian Refugees, ed. Terry Rempel (Beithlehem: Badil, 2009), 330. 
191 
 
While this was the practical implication of the process, it is important to stress that 
there is a serious problem even within the theoretical aspects of the peace process 
framework. First, it did not make any reference to many other types of victims of 
displacement. For example, no mention of those who were internally displaced in Israel, 
the West Bank or Gaza strip throughout the conflict can be found, creating a high level of 
frustration among the victims of these displacements.55 Secondly, even with the types of 
displacement that the peace process tackled (i.e. 1967 refugees and West Bank and Gaza 
status revocation victims), there is no mention of a comprehensive remedy program that 
can redress the injustice that those displaced endured for many years. The use of neutral 
terms like the “admission” of “displaced persons” and the “reissuance of ID cards” for 
those who “lost” them is consistent with Israel´s general policy of denial. Finally, in 
relation to the Nakba of 1948, the peace process seems to be leading to a denial of the 
most important remedy that has become part of the identity of the refugees: the right to 
return. In addition, no special representation of the refugees has been appointed to 
advance their cause in the negotiations, leaving their rights and interests even more 
vulnerable.56 Furthermore, within the peace process framework, issues like truth, 
accountability of the perpetrators of gross human rights violations, and reparations for 
the victims have not been addressed.  
The Palestinians’ frustration with the “peace process” is well known and is well 
reported.57 It was expressed with anger by the Palestinian hip-hop band DAM in their song 
“Who is the terrorist” where they chant:   
You have taken everything I own in my land, 
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Why am I a terrorist? Because I'm not indifferent? 
I'm hot-headed because I walk with my head up high 
Trying to defend my land? They killed my loved ones 
Now I'm alone, my family was dispersed 
But I'll keep on crying out loud 
I'm not against peace, peace is against me 
It wants to eliminate me, to erase my heritage.58 
DAM’s feeling that peace is against the Palestinians stems from the consequences of 
the peace process that creates a fear that “peace” is going to eliminate Palestinians and 
erase their heritage. Not only has the peace process failed to redress the victims of the 
past violations, but Israel has used it to accelerate displacement and create new injustices. 
Against this background, a reassessment of the appropriate remedies that should be 
combined with the transition to peace is needed. While this chapter is designed to 
conduct this assessment in accordance with the transitional justice framework, it is 
essential to explain first the general international legal framework for providing remedies 
in international law. This will be briefly examined in the following section. 
5.2 The Consequences of Failure to meet International Legal Obligations 
in International Law 
It was argued in Chapter 4 that the policy of forced displacement that Israel has 
methodologically followed since 1948 until the current day was contrary to international 
law. By implementing this policy, Israel failed to meet its international legal obligations 
according to several branches of international law. First of all, Israel’s acts of forced 
displacement of Palestinians are considered war crimes or crimes against humanity, 
depending on the circumstances of each incident. Secondly, Israel’s failure to recognize 
the right of those it displaced from acquiring its citizenship was contrary to the customary 
law of state succession, and the law of nationality. Similarly, when Israel refrained from 
recognizing the right of the inhabitants of the OPT to reside therein it violated the rights 
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under IHL. Finally, when Israel prevented refugees from entering their own country it 
violated their human rights, as well as the rights of the states that were affected by having 
to host those displaced from their homes.  
As will be explained in the following sections, any failure of a state to meet its 
international legal obligations has consequences in international law. The basic level of 
these consequences is an obligation upon the state which violated any obligation in 
international law to provide remedies to mend the harm it caused by its breach. These 
remedies are organized by the law of state responsibility. Simultaneously, if the violation 
is an international crime, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, an additional 
level of consequences is invoked, namely, individual criminal responsibility. Since, as 
argued above, Israel’s forced displacements of the Palestinian population are war crimes 
and/or crimes against humanity as well as violations of other bodies of international law, 
the two types of responsibility are applicable.  
This section will define the international legal framework for redressing Israel’s forced 
displacement of Palestinians since 1948. It will do so by first examining the law of state 
responsibility as well as individual criminal responsibility and their meaning in relation to 
displacement.  
5.2.1 State Responsibility  
Any failure of a state to meet an international legal obligation results in a duty to 
repair the harm caused by this obligation according to the law of state responsibility. This 
law is an old and traditional part of international law59 which has been finally codified in 
2001 by the International Law Commission (ILC) expressing long standing principles and 
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developing some further.60 Indeed, as will be shown below, this law has gained 
recognition since the first half of the twentieth century.  
As early as 1928, an important and widely cited judgment of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice known as the Chorzow factory case was decided, ruling in favour of 
Germany in its claims for reparations resulting from Poland’s expropriation of a German 
factory.61 The court applied the principle of state responsibility that it saw was the direct 
result of a state’s failure to meet its international legal obligations. The court in its 
judgment expressed that it was using an existing international legal principle. It stated: 
It is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law, that any 
breach of an engagement invokes an obligation to make reparation… [R]eparation 
is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.62 
The court further explained that when a wrongful act has been conducted by a 
state, the expected outcome of the reparations is to reverse the harm caused by the 
illegal act. It stated:  
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act- a principle 
which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals- is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out 
all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, 
in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.63 
The court clarified the types of reparation that need to be provided upon failure to 
abide by international legal obligations and further provided that there is a hierarchy of 
remedies, whereas restitution is higher than other forms of reparation. It provided 
explaining this hierarchy that the remedies should include: 
Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to 
the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of 
damages for loss sustained which would not have covered by restitution in kind or 
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payment in place of it- such are the principles which would serve to determine the 
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.64 
The term “reparation” used in this judgment does not only mean monetary 
compensation. The concept of reparation here means to “wipe out all consequences of 
the illegal act” which, as explained by Dinah Shelton, “refers to the entire range of 
remedies available for a breach of an international obligation.”65 
One important aspect of this judgment was its reference to repairing harm caused 
by failure to adhere with an international legal principle was as a “general conception of 
law.”66 Indeed, it is a well-established principle in domestic laws that reparation is an 
obligation that follows any violation of the law that causes harm. In Shelton’s words, this 
type of obligation in international law “mirrors that of national remedies: to make good 
the injury caused to persons or property by a wrongful act.”67 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) clarified that reparations in their meaning in 
the Chorzow factory case also apply to individuals, not only to states.68 It stated, while 
advising on the legal parameters of the tribunal’s judgment on reparations to an individual 
that:  
… the Tribunal possesses a wide margin of discretion within the broad principle 
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the 
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed. 69 
These principles are implementable not only in a state’s wrongdoing towards alien 
citizens of other states, but also towards its own citizens and other people under its 
jurisdiction especially if this wrongdoing is a violation of human rights law or IHL. Most of 
the instruments of human rights law and IHL provide that a state has a legal obligation to 
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provide remedies70 for the victims of human rights violations. The Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights stated in 1948 that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by 
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the constitution or by law.”71 Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights demanded from each state party to the covenant to ensure providing “effective 
remedies”72 to the victims, and to develop a system of state institutions to provide these 
remedies.73 The same obligation was required by the International Covenant on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which required from each state party to 
the convention to guarantee “effective protection and remedies.”74 It further provided 
that parties to the convention should establish institutions and tribunals that give 
“adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such 
discrimination.”75 The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment provided a similar obligation to redress the victims of torture 
through compensation to them or to their dependants if they died as a result of torture.76 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child stated in Article 35 that “States Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social 
reintegration” for victims.77 
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In addition, the responsibility of a state to repair the harm caused by its failure to 
abide by IHL obligations was codified as early as 1907. The Hague Regulations of 1907 
stated that: 
 A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if 
the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all 
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.78 
The first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions stated the same 
provision.79 In addition, the Rome Statute gave the ICC a jurisdiction to provide 
“reparations” to the victims including “restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”80 
These provisions in global instruments have their equivalent in regional human 
rights treaties.81 What can be concluded from the consistent provision for an obligation to 
redress victims of human rights violation is that this “right to a remedy” is an integral part 
of human rights law and IHL.82 In 2005, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution, 
following recommendation from the UN Commission on Human Rights83 and the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),84 which adopted basic principles and guidelines on 
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the right to a remedy following gross violations of human rights law and IHL.85 The 
principles adopted by these three UN institutions reaffirmed that the domestic legal 
systems of states should abide by international law through adopting a number of 
measures which includes: “Making available adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate 
remedies, including reparation.”86 
Moreover, Not only has international law provided a right to a remedy for human 
rights violations, but it even considered providing these remedies as an interest to the 
whole international community. This was confirmed in the Barcelona Traction judgment 
by the ICJ.87 The court stated:  
…an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State 
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another state in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former 
are the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all 
states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations 
erga omnes.88 
With this judgment, the court emphasised that certain types of international law 
obligations are the concern of the whole international community. The court went further 
in explaining which types of obligations have the status of “erga omnes,” by stating: 
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the 
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination.89 
Thus, the ICJ confirmed a special protection for human rights by declaring that the 
whole international community has an interest that a state would not breach the “rules 
concerning the basic rights of the human person.”90  
All the principles presented above were confirmed again when the International 
Law Commission (ILC) finalized its process of codifying the law of state responsibility in 
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2001,91 which was commended “to the attention of Governments” in a resolution by the 
UN General Assembly “without prejudice to their [i.e. the articles’] future adoption or 
other appropriate action.”92 Article 1 of the Articles states: 
Every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility 
of that state.93 
The criteria for deciding whether an act is lawful or not is dependent on 
international law; and as a result, a state cannot benefit from an argument that its failure 
to meet an international legal obligation is due to the fact that an act is lawful in its own 
laws.94 When it has been established that a state has failed to meet one of its 
international legal obligations, the first and most important remedy is “to cease the act” 
and “offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.”95 Then, a state is 
under an obligation to offer “reparation” for both material and moral harm.96 Due to the 
same historical hierarchy mentioned above, such reparation must take the form of (1) 
Restitution,97 defined as the state’s obligation to “re-establish the situation which existed 
before the wrongful act was committed”98 unless impossible or involves a “burden out of 
                                                     
91
 International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts.” 
92
 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 56/83," 12 December 2001, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83. 
93
 International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts,” Article 1. 
94
 Ibid., Article 3 & 32. 
95
 Ibid., Article 30. 
96
 Ibid., Article 31. 
97
 Regarding the question of prioritizing Restitution over compensation, the International Law 
Commission and the International Law Association (non-governmental body that researches certain 
questions of international law and advises certain bodies of the UN) wrote that some level of flexibility 
should be taken into consideration while considering restitution as the preferred remedy. This flexibility can 
be translated to giving a choice to the injured state to choose a preferred reparation modality. However, as 
a matter of principle, restitution is the preferred form of “wiping out” the injury caused by the breach of 
international law. See, International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries,” 96; International Law Association (ILA) and Peter 
Malanczuk, First Report of the International Law Association (ILA) Study Group on the Law of State 
Responsibility (The Hague: ILA, June 8, 2000), para. 20–1. 
98
 The commentary of the Articles explains that the ILC adopted the narrower definition of 
restitution, which is re-establishing the status quo ante. Any additional claims would be considered under 
the second reparation, namely compensation. International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries,” 96. 
200 
 
all proportion;”99 (2) compensation for damages “not made good by restitution,”100 which 
includes the loss of profits;101 and (3) satisfaction which “may consist in an 
acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another 
appropriate modality.”102 
According to the ILC Articles, state responsibility can be invoked against a state 
when it fails to meet its international legal obligations;103 and a similar provision is also 
included in human rights and IHL instruments, which stress the need for a remedy once 
the obligation to protect a right is breached.104 In the case of human rights violations, any 
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state in the world is entitled to invoke state responsibility, because of the nature of this 
breach of international law. Article 48 of the ILC Articles states:  
Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
another state… if …(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international 
community as a whole.105 
 In explaining this provision, the official commentary on the ILC draft articles 
refers to the Barcelona Traction case saying that this provision “intends to give effect to 
the statement by the ICJ” quoted above.106 The commentary further explains:  
All states are by definition members of the international community as a whole, 
and the obligations in question are by definition collective obligations protecting 
interests of the international community as such.107 
Not only does any state have the right to invoke such responsibility, but also the 
international community has an obligation to “cooperate to bring to an end through 
lawful means”108 serious breaches of obligation “under peremptory norms of general 
international law.”109 A breach is seen as serious if it involves a “gross or systematic failure 
by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.”110 Furthermore, any situation created by 
such breach shall not be recognized or assisted by other states.111 The commentary gave 
the following examples to “gross violations:” aggression, slavery, slave trade, genocide, 
racial discrimination, apartheid, torture and degrading treatment and non-respect to the 
right to self-determination.112 A “systematic” violation is one that is “carried out in an 
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organized and deliberate way,” which can be known through the “intent to violate the 
norm; the scope and the number of individual violations; and the gravity of their 
consequences for the victims.”113 Of course, a violation can be both gross and systematic, 
as both are not mutually exclusive. 
The obligation of other states to refrain from recognizing gross or systematic 
violations of human rights was confirmed by the ICJ in its advisory opinion about the 
legality of the wall which Israel constructed in the West Bank.114 After the court arrived to 
the conclusion that the wall was illegal115 and demonstrated that Israel was under an 
obligation to reverse this unlawful conduct,116  it stated that the international community 
has an obligation in relation to Israel’s violation of certain erga omnes obligations.117 
These obligations included the right to self-determination118 and Israel’s duty to abide by 
the principles of IHL, especially the GCIV.119 In conclusion, the court declared that Israel’s 
breach of erga omnes obligations must be faced by a duty “not to recognize the illegal 
situation resulting from the construction of the wall,”120 and “not to render aid or 
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction.”121 Furthermore, the 
court stated that all states have an obligation to “see to it that any impediment, resulting 
from the construction of the wall, to the exercise of the Palestinian people of its right to 
self-determination is brought to an end.”122 In addition, it further stressed that all states 
parties to the GCIV are “under the obligation,... to ensure compliance by Israel with 
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international humanitarian law as embodied in that convention.”123 Finally, the court saw 
that the UN General Assembly and Security Council should “consider what further action is 
required to bring an end to the illegal situation...”124 These provisions in the advisory 
opinion confirmed that international law provided special protection to human rights by 
considering the whole international community not only entitled to invoke state 
responsibility when a state breaches its duties, but also obliged not to recognize the 
unlawful consequences of the illegal conduct. 
Finally, state responsibility does not prejudice individual criminal responsibility for 
perpetrators of international crimes but rather complements it.125 This was explicitly 
mentioned by the ILC Articles in Article 58 which stated: 
These Articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual 
responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a state.126 
In explaining this article, the ILC commentary refers to such responsibility that is 
invoked in the aftermath of committing a war crime or a crime against humanity.127 This 
type of responsibility will be explained in the following section. However, it might be 
important to end this section by stressing the conclusion that when it comes to grave and 
systematic violations of human rights, or violations of IHL, international law has given a 
special protection by allowing the whole international community to invoke state 
responsibility. The other special protection that developed in international law is the 
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obligation to punish those who are responsible for these violations, as will be shown 
below.128 
5.2.2 Individual Criminal Responsibility 
While any wrongful act invokes state responsibility to repair the harm caused by the 
breach of international law, a much more limited number of wrongful acts result in 
individual criminal responsibility, and as a result an obligation to prosecute persons who 
are responsible of the breach. This section will briefly discuss this potential consequence. 
The modern concept of individual criminal responsibility rose as a principle in the 
aftermath of the First World War, when the victorious powers of the war sought to 
prosecute persons serving the defeated powers accused of starting the war or committing 
“war crimes” or “crimes against the law of humanity.”129 Nonetheless, political 
                                                     
128
 In the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy adopted in 2005 by the UN 
General Assembly, the UN Economic and Social Council and the UN Commission on Human Rights both it 
was recognized that criminal responsibility and state responsibility should be invoked in the case of gross 
violations of human rights. Article 4 of the principles made reference to the obligation to prosecute 
perpetrators, and articles 11-25 discuss the obligation to provide remedies to victims. See. UN General 
Assembly, “Resolution 60/147," 16 December 2005; UN Commission on Human Rights, “Resolution 
2005/35," 19 April 2005; UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), “UN Economic and Social Council 
Resolution 2005/30: Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law.” 
129
 The contemporary principle of individual criminal responsibility started developing in the 
aftermath of the First World War. In 1919, the victorious powers set up a special commission which 
recommended the punishment of those responsible for “outrages against the laws and customs of war and 
the laws of humanity.” This report argued that also heads of state must be brought to trial and punishment, 
regardless of their immunity status. See, Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties, “Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference,” The American Journal of 
International Law (1920) 14, no. 1/2 (March 29, 1919): 116; Based on these recommendations, the peace 
treaties that ended the war included provisions on criminal prosecution of those accused of crimes linked to 
the war. Articles 227-230 of the Treaty of Versailles between Germany and the Allied forces provided for the 
prosecution of the German Emperor for “supreme offences against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties.” Moreover, Article 228 gave the Allies the right to prosecute “persons accused of having committed 
acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.” See, “Treaty of Versailles: Treaty of Peace Between the 
Allied and Associated Powers and Germany” (Versailles, June 28, 1919), Articles 227-230. Similarly, 
according to the Treaty of Sevres between Turkey and the Allies, the Allies were entitled prosecute “persons 
accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.” See, “Treaty of Peace 
Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Sevres),” August 10, 1920, reprinted in 15 Am. J. Int’l L., 
(1921), pp. 179-181, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2212728, Article 226. This treaty was never ratified by 
Turkey, and it was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in which there was no reference to prosecutions. ; 
See, “Lausanne Peace Treaty,” July 24, 1923, published at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty.en.mfa. 
205 
 
developments then prevented the practical implementation of this idea.130 The first 
practice of such prosecutions was shaped by the International Military Tribunals in 
Nuremburg131 and Tokyo132 in the aftermath of the atrocities committed during the 
Second World War.133 These tribunals introduced significant developments to existing 
legal concepts and principles and defined for the first time the parameters of individual 
criminal responsibility for war crimes, “crimes against humanity,”134 and the “crimes 
against peace.”135 By bringing the principles that were introduced in 1919 into practice in 
the late 1940s, as Bassiouni asserts, the two tribunals demonstrated that these principles 
were “ripe” as customary international legal principles.136 After Nuremburg and Tokyo, it 
became clear that any person responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity was 
not immune to prosecution, including heads of states.137 
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The charter of the Nuremburg Tribunals explicitly expressed that those who were 
responsible for specific crimes were individually responsible for their crimes. It stated:  
The Tribunal established… for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals 
of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons 
who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals 
or as members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes. The 
following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility… 138 
The London Charter laid out some additional important principles. First, no one 
was to be exempted from prosecution because of his position, including heads of states 
and officials in government departments.139 In addition, one cannot be exempted from 
responsibility for the sole reason that he was instructed to commit a criminal act from a 
superior.140 Indeed, the principles on individual criminal responsibility laid down in the 
London Charter were followed in all the ad hoc tribunals, as well as the charter of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).141 Since the Second World War, international law has 
progressively developed toward including a duty to prosecute those accused of gross 
human rights violations amounting to crimes.142 
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In the same way that the law of state responsibility does not prejudice any 
individual responsibility for international crimes, the opposite is also true. The ICC statute 
explicitly confirms by stating that individual criminal responsibility shall not “affect the 
responsibility of states under international law.”143 This principle was clarified through an 
ICJ decision related to the question of whether Serbia and Montenegro as a state bore any 
responsibility for the crime of genocide that was committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.144 
In explaining its decision and answering one of the arguments of the defendants, the court 
stated:   
The court is mindful of the fact that the famous sentence in the Nuremberg 
Judgment that ‘[c]rimes against international law are committee by men, not by 
abstract entities…’ might be invoked in support of the proposition that only 
individuals can breach the obligations set out in Article III. But the Court notes that 
that tribunal was answering the argument that ‘international law is concerned 
with the actions of sovereign states, and provides no punishment for 
individuals’…, and that thus States also were responsible under international law. 
The Tribunal rejects that argument in the following terms: ‘[t]hat international law 
imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been 
recognized’… The Court observes that that duality of responsibility continues to be 
a constant feature of international law. This feature is reflected in Article 25, 
paragraph 4, of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, now 
accepted by 104 States: ‘No provision in this statute relating to individual criminal 
responsibility shall affect the responsibility of states under international law.’145 
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Thus, it is a well-established principle in international law that state responsibility 
and individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive and that they apply simultaneously 
if an international crime was committed and caused harm.146 
5.3 The Parameters of a Transitional Justice Framework in Addressing 
Displacement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
The mass displacements that Israel has been systematically conducting since the 
Nakba has not only been a violation of international law,147 but also one of the core issues 
of the conflict. Because the peace process has not succeeded with solving the 
displacement problem yet,148 the space for theoretical debates is open for suggesting 
solutions.  
As shown in the literature review presented in Chapter 1, the debate on tackling the 
displacement problem is relatively new.149 Until now, there has been no attempt to define 
the parameters of the policies following a transitional justice approach. This section will 
attempt to define these parameters in accordance with the general theories of 
transitional justice and the international experiences. It will do so by defining transitional 
justice, and then examining how its measures tackled displacement in other contexts, and 
applying these concepts on the Palestinian-Israeli context.  
5.3.1 Defining Transitional Justice as a Conception and a Practice 
Transitional justice refers to the framework of a wide range of measures that are 
used in a transitional period following a suppressive regime or a conflict to redress rights 
violations that had taken place prior to the transition.150 Contributors to transitional 
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justice literature have given it several definitions, stressing different aspects of its 
elements. A review of these definitions is useful to understanding transitional justice. The 
transitional justice theorist Ruti Teitel has defined it as: 
[T]he conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront with wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes.151 
Further to this, the International Centre for Transitional Justice (hereinafter ICTJ) 
adopts the following definition: 
[T]he set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by 
different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights 
abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, 
reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.152 
 In addition to these definitions, a report of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to the Security Council described transitional justice as:  
The full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts 
to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.153 
A combination of elements from all of these definitions provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of what transitional justice is and should entail, both in 
theoretical and practical terms. First of all, transitional justice is a “conception,” as Teitel 
defines it, or in other words, a theoretical framework, characterized and composed by a 
number of goals and assumptions. The main goal of this framework is to address the 
injustices that took place during a conflict or a suppressive regime through “legal 
responses” and to advance peace through methods that focus on the promotion of a 
comprehensive conception of justice.154 The major assumption is that societies going 
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through a transition from conflict or suppression to peace or democracy must pursue 
peace and justice simultaneously because peace is not durable without justice.155 
Although transitional justice scholars normally refer its practical beginning to the tribunals 
that took place after the atrocities of the Second World War,156 this framework as an 
independent branch of scholarship has been developing as recently as the 1990s, 
exploring the relationship between peace and justice and debating the justice standards 
that need to be maintained when pursuing peace.157 
At the same time, the practical understanding of transitional justice is well 
represented in the ICTJ and UN definitions. It is a number of “measures” or “processes and 
mechanisms” that were advanced throughout the years by the practice of a large number 
of countries in an endeavour to address the injustices of the past.158 These measures are 
either officially adopted by states and/or international organizations159 or in some cases 
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are unofficial and are carried out by the civil society.160 The official form of these 
measures has a legal “transformation” character and is ideally adopted by the state in 
transition with an intention to move towards the future through addressing the past 
violations.161 Furthermore, transitional justice mechanisms can also be enforced by 
international organs. For example, the International Criminal Court and international 
tribunals like the ICTY or the ICTR are all established by the UN,162 and are charged with 
prosecuting persons charged of committing war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
genocide.163 At the same time, other states can invoke some transitional justice measures. 
This is usually seen in situations where a state’s criminal procedures law allows its courts 
to assume a “universal jurisdiction” for certain crimes, usually war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide and prosecute the perpetrators even when the crime is not 
related to their own societies.164  
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Transitional justice mechanisms are usually listed in the four categories that 
appear in the ICTJ definition above: the first is criminal prosecutions against persons in 
power who were responsible for significant international crimes; the second is truth 
seeking initiatives that aim at finding out unknown information concerning violations 
and/or expressing acknowledgment of injustices; the third is reparations programs, which 
include restitution of property, compensation and other types of reparations; and the 
fourth is various kinds of institutional reforms for those state institutions, such as the 
judiciary, army, police and others that conducted the violations. 165 
It has become a widely accepted notion that the implementation of the 
transitional justice framework should be carried out by endorsing a holistic approach that 
employs all the appropriate measures for the violation.166 While pursuing this approach 
special attention is given to the context of the violation and the results that are sought 
after the measures are implemented. Moreover, the transitional justice framework is 
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victim-centric, seeking to guarantee that the transition takes into consideration the needs 
of the victim.167 
In 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s report on “The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies” confirmed these notions and stressed the 
importance of using a holistic/ comprehensive approach when dealing with the injustices 
of the past. It stated: 
Our experience confirms that a piecemeal approach to the rule of law and 
transitional justice will not bring satisfactory results in a war-torn or atrocity-
scarred nation. Effective rule of law and justice strategies must be comprehensive, 
engaging all institutions of the justice sector, both official and non-governmental, 
in the development and implementation of a single nationally owned and led 
strategic plan for the sector. Such strategies must include attention to the 
standards of justice, the laws that codify them, the institutions that implement 
them, the mechanisms that monitor them and the people that must have access 
to them.168 
This statement in the Secretary General’s report is representative of the transitional 
justice theory. Not only does it stress comprehensiveness and standards of justice, but it 
further demonstrates that a transitional justice process is expected to reform the legal 
system and state institutions in order to guarantee a continued access to justice.  
Hence, given all these definitions, one may argue that transitional justice as a 
theoretical framework can be understood as a field that studies peace promotion through 
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remedies for massive human rights violations. Indeed, its measures are consistent with 
the general principles of international law and seek to implement them. A quick look at 
the four categories of measures will show that they echo the remedies required by 
international law for an internationally wrongful act. Prosecutions of persons who 
conducted mass human rights violations answer a state’s obligation to hold such persons 
accountable in accordance with the individual criminal responsibility principles.169 
Similarly, truth seeking initiatives, reparations and legal and institutional reforms are 
aimed at guaranteeing non-repetition,170 and reparation171 with its three components: 
restitution,172 compensation173 and satisfaction174 as required by the law of state 
responsibility.175 
In other words, the relationship between international law remedies and 
transitional justice is similar to that between food ingredients and cooking recipes. In 
order to make a good meal, one needs to bring the ingredients together in meaningful 
ways and add the spices at the right time and in the right quantities. It is needless to say 
that different meals have different recipes. Transitional justice is international law 
remedies brought to action. 
Based on this theoretical framework, we can now turn to the practical implications 
of applying a transitional justice approach in response to the displacement issue in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The next section will present an analysis of the potential 
remedies to the displacement issue in accordance with a transitional justice framework.  
5.3.2 Transitional Justice and Displacement: What are the Meaningful 
Remedies to Israel’s Systematic Policy? 
In a video interview conducted and published by the Guardian newspaper, an old 
man called Yacoub Odeh walked around the ruins of his de-populated and partly-
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destroyed village Lifta, and spoke about his memories in the village before being displaced 
during the 1948 war.176 The interview happened at a time when Israel was planning to 
erase the remaining ruins of the village and build a luxurious residential colony.177 
Standing in front of his house, Odeh complained: 
You can’t imagine how I feel when I look [at] our grandfathers’ houses. And I can’t 
come, and I can’t sit in [them].178 These [are] our fathers’ and grandfathers’ 
houses. Now they want to destroy [them] so as to build luxury villas for rich 
people [who] came from USA or anywhere. They want to destroy our history, our 
heritage [and] our memories to build [a] colonial resort in Lifta [...] Lifta is [an] 
eyewitness on the Nakba. It should remain [an] eyewitness for the history. What 
happened in this place [is] people kicked out [and] houses destroyed.179 
With his statement, Odeh is expressing his deep feeling of injustice. Not only is he 
unable to return to reside in his village, but Israel wants to even “destroy” his history, 
heritage and memories. His appearance in this and many other videos and reports180 was 
part of the village community’s activism to stop the potential destruction of the village 
ruins.  
In another documentary film, Itzik Shaweky, the secretary of “Society for 
Preservation of Israel Heritage Sites”181 was asked by the interviewer whether it would be 
a good idea to keep Lifta or develop it as an historical site as a symbolic gesture. Shaweky 
strongly disagreed and added: 
[...] If I turn it into a monument and say: “On this site there was an Arab village,” 
that will only lead to hatred and painful memories because we would then be 
causing conflict. And then they are going to say: “this is how we once lived and 
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then the Jews threw us out.” No. I’m not going to do that. We are the state of 
Israel. We are Jews. We don’t have to save the Palestinian heritage. They will 
know that it was Lifta but we are a new nation that has to progress.182 
Shaweky’s emphasis on the notion that as a Jewish state, Israel should not save the 
Palestinian heritage is representative of the state’s continued denial of the history and 
present. Shweky is aware of the history, but he is afraid it will be used against Israel. He 
does not want Lifta to become a Palestinian monument that reminds people of the 
injustices that took place, which leads him to prefer to “develop” the site into luxurious 
villas for Israelis and start a new chapter. Notably, he expressed a fear that the revival of 
the “painful memories” will “only lead to hatred” and conflict. Indeed, the contrast 
between Shaweky’s and Odeh’s views represents an important aspect of the conflict and 
the solutions discourse.  
As shown in previous chapters, forced displacement has been a constant feature of 
the conflict since its early stages. Moreover, while displacement continues until the 
current day, the consequences of past and present waves of transfer and deportations 
have been among the unresolved issues in the conflict.183 
In light of this background, the transitional justice framework might have a lot to 
offer to both Palestinians and Israelis. The potential advantage of this approach is 
essentially that it endeavours to balance Odeh’s need to preserve his rights, as well as his 
“history, heritage and memory;” and Shaweky’s fear that an acknowledgment would lead 
to further “hatred” and “conflict.”  
The dilemma found here is not unique to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Indeed, 
the world has witnessed similar atrocities of ethnic cleansing during the last few decades. 
Recent research has indicated an increased incorporation of transitional justice measures 
into the responses to displacement.184 In 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s report on 
transitional justice argued:  
                                                     
182
 Menachem Daum and Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), Lifta, Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly, 
2011, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/april-22-2011/lifta/8667/. 
183
 See, sec. ‎5.1 above. 
184
 See generally, Duthie, “Transitional Justice and Displacement,” July 1, 2011; Megan Bradley, 
Displacement, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Assumptions, Challenges and Lessons, Policy Breifing, 
Forced Migration Policy Briefings (Oxford: Refugees Studies Centre, Oxford Department of International 
217 
 
The challenges  of  post-conflict  environments  necessitate  an  approach  that  
balances  a variety  of  goals,  including  the  pursuit  of  accountability,  truth  and  
reparation,  the preservation  of  peace  and the  building  of  democracy  and  the  
rule  of  law.  A comprehensive  strategy  should  also  pay  special  attention  to  
abuses  committed against  groups  most  affected  by  conflict,  such as ... 
displaced persons and refugees, and establish particular measures for their 
protection and redress in judicial and reconciliation processes.185 
Displacement is a phenomenon that takes place during conflicts or under 
suppressive regimes. During any transition to peace or democracy remedies have to be 
provided to those who were displaced from their homes. But especially in cases where 
displacement is forced, most notably in ethnic cleansing attempts that aim at changing the 
demographic composition of a territory by force and regulation, redressing the 
consequences of displacement becomes a core issue in the transition. Universal 
experience offers numerous examples of using the transitional justice framework in 
remedying the consequences of displacement. In South Africa, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, East 
Timor, Liberia and Colombia displacement was a key issue in their conflicts and 
transitions. The overarching principle while implementing transitional justice measures for 
displacement can be summarized by the promotion of human rights standards. This has 
been described eloquently by Roger Duthie  who explains that transitional justice aims at 
redressing the legacies of massive human rights abuses, whereby “’redressing the 
legacies’ means, primarily, giving force to human rights norms that were systematically 
violated.”186 The UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council asserts that 
“justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually 
reinforcing imperatives.”187 
In the transitional justice framework, force is given to human rights norms through 
the implementation of comprehensive measures that aim at remedying the past’s harm 
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and guaranteeing non-repetition in the future by implementing just durable solutions, 
restitution of property, compensation, reforming the legal system and state institutions 
and revealing the truth.  
This section will examine the way transitional justice measures could tackle 
displacement and its consequences. It will do so by drawing from the experiences of other 
countries with displacement problems and applying the concepts on the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. The first sub-section will discuss truth-seeking initiatives in theory and practice, 
and assess the potential contribution that a truth commission can provide in light of 
Israel’s continuous denial of responsibility for the plight of the Palestinian refugees and 
displaced persons.  After that, the second sub-section will examine the question of 
accountability for the perpetrators of the crime of displacement in light of the 
international legal principles, as well as international experiences in prosecuting the 
perpetrators of the crime of forced displacement. This sub-section will shed light on the 
admission of Palestine as a non-member observer state at the UN, and the potential that 
this might provide in relation to the question of accountability and international criminal 
justice. Finally, the third sub-section will discuss the reparations that should be provided 
to the victims of forced displacement, coupled with legal and institutional reforms. As will 
be shown in this section, the appropriate reparations that meaningfully redress the 
victims of displacement are return, restitution of property and compensation. However, 
such remedies cannot be provided while a discriminatory and suppressive political legal 
system is still in place.  
5.3.2.1 Truth and Acknowledgment 
5.3.2.1.1 The Need for Truth in Relation to Displacement in the Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict 
The question of truth in relation to Israel’s systematic displacement is one of the 
important issues that have not been formally addressed in the context of the Palestinian-
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Israeli conflict and peace process.188 Israel maintains a position according to which it 
denies any responsibility on the mass displacements of Palestinians. It exercises this denial 
in several ways. The major obvious form is that the Zionist historical narrative, until the 
current day, continues to maintain a position that Israel had no responsibility in relation to 
the mass exoduses of 1948 and 1967.189 To cement this narrative, Israel continues to 
change the physical features of several areas from which Palestinians were displaced in a 
way that erases any trace of past Palestinian presence.190 For example, after the 1967 
occupation of the West Bank, Israel demolished three Palestinian villages in the Latroun 
area, forcibly displaced their population and constructed a recreational park known as 
Canada Park in their place.191 In a documentary film produced by the Palestinian human 
rights organization Al-Haq, the Israeli historian Ilan Pappe commented on how 
constructing this park aimed at erasing the Palestinian history of the village with the 
following statement:  
A very important part of the ethnic cleansing policy is re-writing the history of the 
country. You don't just erase the Palestinian villages but you also try to erase the 
Palestinians out of memory. These recreation parks, like the Canada Park, play a 
very important role in this exercise because they are planted on a destroyed 
village and by that they fulfil a very important role. Then they are educational 
recreational parks, I mean many high school children and elementary school 
children are going there by invitation and if you follow the signs in the park, like in 
the other parks that were built on destroyed Palestinian villages, you can easily 
see how these signs tell a narrative which totally erases the Palestinian Arab parts 
of the country.192 
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Similarly, the Palestinian intellectual and former member of the Israeli parliament 
Azmi Bishara argued in relation to the whole policy of erasing the Palestinian villages from 
memory: 
The villages that no longer exist were forced out of the [Israeli] public awareness, 
away from the signposts of memory. They received new names –of Jewish 
settlements- but traces [of their past] were left behind, like the sabr [i.e. cactus] 
bushes, or the stones from fences or bricks from the demolished houses.193 
This method of systematic denial as explained by Pappe and Bishara aims at 
erasing Israel’s “original sin” (as Morris calls the creation of the Palestine refugee issue)194 
from memory. However, Israel has used additional methods to resist the remembrance of 
the Nakba. In 2011, the Israeli parliament enacted a legislation known unofficially as the 
“Nakba Law”195 according to which public funds deprivation would be enforced upon any 
“entity” in Israel that commemorates Israel’s “Independence Day or the day of the 
establishment of the state as a day of mourning,” or rejects “the existence of the state of 
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.”196 This law is expected to affect all publicly 
funded institutions including local councils, schools, cultural centres and many others.197 
Human rights organizations petitioned against the law claiming that it was discriminatory 
and that it violates freedom of speech, but the Israeli Supreme Court rejected the 
petition.198 
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Another form of denial, which has not been noticed or reported as such, is the 
secrecy with which Israel treats several details concerning the displacement methods and 
victims. Although Chapters 2 and 3 have referred to several forms of such conduct, it is 
useful to give a number of examples for the sake of the current discussion. For example, 
when Israel started revoking the residencies from Palestinian Jerusalemites with the 
beginning of the peace process, it did so without introducing any legal changes or making 
any announcements that would allow people to organize their lives to prevent this 
revocation.199 This pattern of secretly changing the laws and regulations is even more 
frequent in the areas which are run by the military government in the occupied territory. 
For example, in 1973, the military government restricted family unification severely 
through an unpublished military order, the effect of which was documented by human 
rights organizations.200 Similarly, Israeli governments have been secretive about the 
details of the victims of displacement. For example, the number of those displaced by 
residency revocation in the West Bank and Gaza has been kept secret until it was revealed 
recently following petitions in the Supreme Court.201  
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Moreover, because the displacement is legalized by the regime, the blame is 
usually pointed toward the victim himself. For example, in the Shaheen vs. IDF 
Commander in the Gaza Strip case (discussed in Chapter 2)202, the victim of deportation 
was convicted with the crime of “infiltration” and blamed for his own fate.203 Despite the 
fact that the victim had been a resident of the Gaza Strip, the court found his deportation 
lawful and stated: “The authority to issue a deportation order against him derives from his 
act of infiltration.”204 This example shows how the regime presents the deportation of 
those who are entitled to live in their homes as merely rule of law. According to this 
rationale, since Israel’s laws do not give the displaced person the right to reside in his 
home, then deportation is an appropriate legal measure. 
Unfortunately, as explained earlier, the peace process framework was designed in 
a way that builds on Israel’s constant denial. Notably, it does not include a declaration of 
responsibility in relation to any of the waves of displacement. While the 1948 “refugees” 
issue was postponed to the final status negotiations,205 the reference to the conditional 
return of the “displaced persons” used the neutral wording “admission,” instead of 
“return.”206 Furthermore, victims of forced residency revocations were called “those who 
lost their ID cards,” and the solution was also a conditional negotiated “reissuance” of 
their ID cards.207 As explained earlier, no progress has been made yet in addressing the 
displacement problem.208 On the contrary, forced displacement was introduced in new 
                                                     
202
 See, Chapter 2, sec. ‎2.3.3 above.  
203
 HCJ 159/84, Abdul Aziz Ali Shaheen vs. the IDF Commander in the Gaza Strip Area, Piskei Din 
(Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel), vol.39, part1, at 309-336 (1985), Translated to English and 
published in 3 Pal. Y.B. Int’l L. 114, 1986 (Israeli Supreme Court 1985). 
204
 Ibid., para. 4. 
205
 Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel, “The Camp David Framework Agreement,” sec. A(1)(F); Israel 
and Jordan, “Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan”; Israel and 
Palestine Liberation Organization, “Declaration Of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements,” 
Article V(3); Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip,” Article XXXI. 
206
 Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel, “The Camp David Framework Agreement,” Article A(e); Israel 
and Jordan, “Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” Article 
8(2); Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Declaration Of Principles On Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements,” Article XII. 
207
 Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip,” Appendix III, Article 28(3). 
208
 See, sec. ‎5.1 above. 
223 
 
ways after the peace process started.209 Obviously, this methodology of addressing the 
plight of displacement has proven to fail. One of the aspects of its failure is that truth was 
concealed in the peace process. This section will argue that truth seeking initiatives within 
the transitional justice framework have the potential of adequately addressing this 
problem. This argument will be presented based on transitional justice theory as well as 
its practice in a number of transitional societies. 
5.3.2.1.2 Truth-Seeking Initiatives in Theory and Practice in Displacement Problems 
The forms of denial discussed above are not unique to the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. In most of the cases of conflict and suppressive regimes there is a need to reveal 
the truth and get the state to reveal and/or acknowledge injustices that took place during 
the conflict or repressive regime.210 In fact, revealing the truth about violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law has been argued to be a right vested in individuals and 
collectives alike.211 To address this right, truth revealing initiatives as a remedy to past 
mass human rights violations were used in several contexts.212 In particular, “truth 
commissions” were introduced as an innovation affiliated with the rise of the concept of 
transitional justice, creatively dealing with questions of truth and acknowledgment that 
rose during conflicts and repressive regimes.213 What might be especially creative about 
                                                     
209
 See generally Chapter 3. 
210
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of Law Tools for Post-
Conflict States: Truth Commissions, Rule of Law Tools for Post Conflict States (Geneva and New York: UN 
OCHA, 2006), 1, UN. Doc. HR/PUB/06/1. 
211
 Diane Orentlicher, “Independent Study on Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to Assist 
States in Strengthening Their Domestic Capacity to Combat All Aspects of Impunity” (UN Commission on 
Human Rights, February 27, 2004), UN. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88; Diane Orentlicher, “Report of the 
Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity: Updated Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity” (UN Commission on 
Human Rights, February 8, 2005), Principle 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G0510900.pdf?OpenElement; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 
23–4; ICTJ, “Truth and Memory,” ICTJ Website, accessed March 6, 2013, http://www.ictj.org/our-
work/transitional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory; Truth Seeking: Elements of Creating an Effective Truth 
Commission (Brasilia and New York: Amnesty Commission of the Ministry of Justice of Brazil and 
International Center for Transitional Justice, 2013), 3–4, http://ictj.org/publication/truth-seeking-elements-
creating-effective-truth-commission. 
212
 In her book on truth commissions, Hayner documented and discussed the work of forty truth 
commissions that were functioning between 1979 and 2009. See, Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, XIV. 
213
 The first truth commission was established in Argentina in 1983. It was mainly charged with 
knowing the whereabouts and the destiny of those who were forcibly disappeared by the previous regime. 
224 
 
these commissions is the special attention that was given to the victims’ narrative to be 
told and recognized as part of the transition and reparation process.214 In the traditional 
approach to justice which was followed during the Nuremberg trials period, the major 
focus was on the state’s right to punish perpetrators of atrocities and the victim was not 
the focus of such process.215 Transitional justice framework has changed this approach 
and shifted the position of the victim in the transition into a much more central one and 
his role into an active one.216  
Truth commissions are non-judicial bodies formally established by the state, with 
the aim of finding the truth about past human rights violations and recommending further 
measures to advance justice in the transitional period.217 The most commonly cited 
definition of truth commissions was advanced by Hayner in her book that studied forty 
truth commissions where she defined a truth commission as a body that is:  
(1) Focused on the past, rather than on-going events; (2) investigates a pattern of 
events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages directly and broadly with 
the affected population gathering information on their experiences; (4) is a 
temporary body with the aim of concluding with a final report; and (5) is officially 
authorized or empowered by the state under review.218 
A truth seeking initiative as a remedy has several goals. The first and most 
important one is to establish a credible account on the history as far as it is related to 
human rights abuses and end the patterns of denial that were dominant before the 
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transition.219 Truth commissions are designed to deal with different types of denial. Most 
significantly, one can distinguish between cases where the facts are not known and need 
to be revealed, such as the whereabouts of those forcibly disappeared; and situations 
where the facts are commonly known but are denied by the state and part of the 
society.220 The revealing of truth based on a methodological examination of the facts 
makes a significant contribution to start a new era based on the exclusion of conflicting 
parties’ and repressive regimes’ propagandas. By establishing a more “comprehensive and 
holistic account” of the past events, truth commissions make the injustices undeniable.221 
Second, truth commissions give a platform for victims to play an active role in the 
transition by allowing them to actively participate by explaining the injustices that they 
endured.222 This participation in turn helps the victims to heal and restores some of their 
abused dignity.223 Third, the information collected by truth commissions is usually utilized 
for designing additional remedies, including reparations and institutional reforms.224 
Fourth, truth commissions usually expose the perpetrators of human rights violations and 
present recommendations on how to prevent impunity.225 These four categories of goals 
that truth commissions usually attempt to foster non-repetition of human rights abuses 
and push the society to open a new page. 
Truth Commissions have investigated various types of human rights violations 
including the crime of forced displacement. While the early experiences of truth 
commissions did not include deportation or forcible transfer in their mandates,226 the 
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investigation of displacement is increasing in states where this crime was conducted.227 In 
fact, international frameworks have made references to questions of truth in relation to 
displacement. For example, in 1998, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted 
“Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” which declared that internally displaced 
persons “have the right to know the fate and whereabouts of missing relatives,” and laid 
the burden of finding out this information on “the authorities concerned.”228 In 2010, 
Walter Kalin, the “Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of 
internally displaced persons” issued a report laying out a “Framework on Durable 
Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons.”229 This framework stated that internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) “must be consulted and participate extensively in the planning 
and management of the processes supporting a durable solution,” without discrimination 
based on age, sex or other criteria.230 In addition, the framework provided that: 
IDPs who have been victims of violations of international human rights or 
humanitarian law, including arbitrary displacement must have full and non-
discriminatory access to effective remedies and access to justice, including, where 
appropriate, access to existing transitional justice mechanisms, reparations and 
information on the causes of violations. 231 
Indeed, the incorporation of the plight of displaced persons is an essential 
development in the transitional justice framework. As Megan Bradley asserts: 
It is important to include forced migration in investigatory mandates of truth 
commissions and to ensure that displaced persons themselves are able to 
participate in truth commissions and benefit from any other forms of redress, such 
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as compensation, that may emerge as a result of commissions’ 
recommendations.232 
Indeed, the displaced persons’ participation in truth commissions helps the 
authorities to take their experiences and needs into account when planning additional 
remedy programs. While displacement is a by-product of most conflicts, it is the main 
result of conflicts in which one or more of the conflicting parties intentionally inflict such 
displacement and of situations where human rights violations are practiced systematically 
and widely. In such cases, a transition becomes meaningful when it addresses not only the 
consequences of displacement, but also its causes.233 Examples of where this remedy has 
been practiced are Sierra Leone, Liberia and Timor-Leste. In order to form a picture of the 
relationship between truth-telling initiatives and displacement in practice, let us examine 
these examples. 
Sierra Leone, a country in western Africa, was devastated by a war between the 
years 1991 and 2002, during which 50,000 people were killed and more than 2 million 
persons were displaced.234 Following the end of the war, a peace agreement between the 
Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone was 
signed.235 This agreement dealt with the war atrocities by first granting a full 
unconditional “pardon and amnesty” in relation to anything done during the war;236 and 
second establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.237 This commission was 
established to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the 
victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of 
the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.”238 The TRC’s mandate 
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was designed to include the years of the civil war and the commission was charged with 
recommending “measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights 
violations.”239  
The TRC report in Sierra Leone has provided a narrative telling how forced 
displacement took place.240 It reported that forced displacements were “among the most 
common violations,”241 and that they accounted for 19.8% of all reported violations where 
the pattern was that the victims would “flee from their homes in fear recurring of their 
lives, leaving attackers in their wake. These attackers would often systematically loot and 
destroy whatever property had been left behind.”242 The report also gave details about 
the responsibility of parties to the conflict in inflicting such “systematic forced 
displacements.”243 It further showed that especially displaced women were among the 
most negatively affected by the displacement and dispossession that even “girls as young 
as 12 were forced to pay for aid with sex in order to gain assistance for their families.”244 
The report called upon the local communities to accept displaced to return to their 
townships “with compassion.”245 Finally, the report recommended the government to 
assist the most vulnerable in the state, the victims of displacement being among them,246 
and to focus on giving remedies like skills training, micro credit, and other types to 
displaced women.247 
Another African experience took place in Liberia, which was torn in civil war 
between the years 1989 and 2003 during which half of the population was displaced 
internally and externally.248 A peace agreement was signed between the conflicting parties 
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in the year 2003, officially ending the state of war.249 This agreement provided that a TRC 
will be established “to provide a forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an 
opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share this 
experience...”250 Furthermore, the peace agreement instructed that the TRC “shall deal 
with the root causes of the crisis in Liberia, including human rights violations.”251 The 
mandate of the Liberian TRC was further explained by a special statute known as the “Act 
to Establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 12 May 2005.”252 This act charged 
the TRC with the task of “investigating gross human rights violations and violations of 
international humanitarian law...; determining whether these were isolated incidents or 
part of a systematic pattern; establishing the antecedents, circumstances, factors and 
context of such violations and abuses; and determining those responsible for the 
commission of the violations and abuses and their motives as well as their impact on 
victims.”253 In addition, the commission was expected to present recommendations on 
methods to redress the victims of human rights abuses “in the spirit of national 
reconciliation and healing.”254 
The Liberian TRC conducted its investigations at home as well as with refugees in 
the Diaspora.255 In its report, the commission found that forcible displacement accounted 
to 36% of the total reported violations,256 as the displaced persons were around half of 
the total population of Liberia,257 which resulted in displacement being a heavy “social 
cost of war.”258 It further reported that in refugee camps, children were recruited for 
joining armed militias and sexual exploitation by aid workers was frequent.259 Liberians 
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abroad actively participated in collecting testimonies for the TRC,260 which eventually 
helped the report also made reference to those who are in the Diaspora and mentioned 
the whereabouts of some of them,261 and acknowledged their suffering as ones who 
“share the same experiences of horror, death, loss of family members, hunger, disease as 
did Liberians in the home land.”262 It further recommended, based on the Liberian 
Diaspora input263 that those who acquired a foreign nationality abroad should be allowed 
to have dual citizenship.264 Finally, the report recommended the implementation of a 
special traditional type of justice called “Palava Hut” which would “foster national healing 
and reconciliation at the community and grass root levels creating the opportunity for 
dialogue and peace building.”265 In addition, this measure would “afford anyone who has 
committed a wrong or crime, whether knowingly or unknowingly, against an individual or 
the state, to admit wrongful act and seek pardon from the people of Liberia through the 
Palava Hut.”266 The TRC recommended that  
the government of Liberia assumes its full responsibility under international law 
principles and regimes and pursuant to its moral, legal, social, political, cultural, 
economic and security obligations to its citizens to provide reparations for all 
those individuals and communities victimized by the years of instability and war.267 
Moreover, the TRC recommended that the state should provide reparations to 
general public (as opposed to individuals), but at the same time give special attention to 
rehabilitating those whose health has been harmed by the conflict and to very poor 
victims who need little cash to get them going.268 In addition, it asked the government to 
give special attention in the reparation program to the displaced, especially women.269 
Truth telling initiatives also took place in the aftermath of occupation. Timor-Leste, 
an Asian country was under the Indonesian occupation between the years 1975 and 1999 
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and got its independence after a popular consultation conducted by the UN in 1999.270 
The UN then administered Timor-Leste in the transitional period leading to its 
independence,271 and introduced a regulation that created a “Commission for Reception, 
Truth, and Reconciliation” (Abbreviated as CAVR, derived from the Portuguese official 
name: Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste) as an 
“independent authority.”272 This commission was charged with investigating and reporting 
human rights violations, as well as establishing the truth about them.273 In addition, the 
regulation determined that the CAVR would identify “practices and policies” which need 
to be addressed to ensure non-repetition,274 and to recommend prosecutions where 
appropriate.275 Furthermore, the commission was charged with promoting reconciliation 
and human rights, and “supporting the reception and reintegration of individuals who 
have caused harm to their communities through the commission of minor criminal 
offences and other harmful acts through the facilitation of community based mechanisms 
of reconciliation.”276 
The CAVR considered the types of human rights violations when it assessed its 
activities according to its mandate, and listed displacement as one of the issues on which 
it would focus.277 As a result of its documentation, final report of the commission included 
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a special separate volume for displacement and famine.278 The report documented that 
deportation has been indeed widespread that almost “every East Timorese person... 
suffered some form of displacement” during the conflict, and that displacement still 
continued even during the commission’s mandate.279 Then the report documented the 
causes of the displacement and the living conditions which the victims had to tolerate.280 
Moreover, the report explained methods of coercion applied on the East-Timorese 
refugees to prevent them from returning.281 In relation to responsibility, the CAVR found 
that the Indonesian civilian and military authorities were 
responsible for the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of East 
Timorese civilians during the late 1970s and early 1980s and are therefore 
accountable for the consequences of these actions which were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time.282 
 Finally, the recommendations of the CAVR included meaningful remedies for the 
displaced persons. The first significant recommendation was that the government of 
Timor-Leste should implement “UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998)”283 when it deals with the displacement 
problem. These UN Principles were comprehensive, and included various remedies such 
as return, compensation, and many others.284 Notably, the report made special 
recommendations regarding reconciliation between Timor-Leste and its previous 
occupying power Indonesia, endorsing a forward-looking approach aiming at peace and 
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reconciliation.285 Aiming at supporting this goal, the CAVR report stressed the importance 
of truth and accountability. It stated: 
The Commission believes that for this new friendship to flourish the principles of 
acknowledging the truth of the past, accountability for violence, and a spirit of 
generosity in assisting those who have been harmed by that violence, are vital.286 
More specifically, the report demanded that the Indonesian government 
declassifies the records of a number of alleged massacres and other events that resulted 
in mass killings and/or displacement available to the government of Timor-Leste and the 
international community.287 
These three examples examined above of truth commission work on displacement 
share several elements that are consistent with the theoretical framework of truth 
commissions. They all served as tools for finding and declaring the truth about 
displacement as a human rights violation. In other words, they ended all forms of denial in 
relation to displacement, and acknowledged the plight of the victims. Furthermore, they 
were stepping stones to further redress of the victims. On the one hand, they 
recommended appropriate measures to redress displacement, and on the other hand, 
they gave their recommendations in relation to the question of accountability, either 
favouring amnesty as in the case of Liberia, or demanding prosecutions as was the case in 
Timor-Leste. But in all cases, the truth commissions were not seen as the only remedy for 
the plight of displacement, and it was always seen as a step toward meaningful redress.  
5.3.2.1.3 Acknowledgment of Displacement through Truth in the Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict  
Israel’s consistent denial of responsibility for the displacement and the approach of 
the peace process that prevented acknowledgment have been seen as an obstacle to 
peace by a number of observers. For example, the Palestinian intellectual Edward Said 
wrote in 1999 criticizing the Oslo peace process:  
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Oslo required us to forget and renounce our history of loss, dispossessed by the 
very people who have taught everyone the importance of not forgetting the past. 
Thus we are the victims of the victims, the refugees of the refugees.288 
As noticed by Said, the demand to simply forget the past without any process of 
addressing its consequences is a continuation of victimization. Moreover, these types of 
human rights violations continued and increased throughout the peace process. This was 
pointed out as early as 1995 by Stanley Cohen, when the peace process was in its early 
stages and many people were hopeful that it would succeed. He wrote in his article 
exploring the potential of a transitional justice process:  
[A]ll of the human rights violations from the “old days” continue in the West Bank 
and the edges of the autonomous areas: torture and ill treatment of detainees..., 
house demolitions, restrictions of movement (more severe than ever before) and, 
above all, extra judicial killings by IDF undercover units.289 
Against this background, a number of authors examined the possibility of designing 
a truth commission in an endeavour to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Probably 
because of the symbolic significance of the Nakba and the polarized debate on its history, 
most of these authors discussed utilizing truth commissions to find the truth about the 
1948 displacement and foster reconciliation. For example, Ron Dudai wrote that while the 
Palestinian-Israeli debate about the refugees issue is focused on legal “arguments and 
counter-arguments regarding the Palestinian right of return,” and other technical issues,  
It seems that without addressing the historical cause of the creation of the 
refugee problem, and measures of recognition, acknowledgment and apology by 
Israel (as well as addressing the role of Arab leaders in contributing and sustaining 
the suffering of the refugees), these legal and technical debates may not suffice to 
resolve the problem.290 
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In another publication, Dudai added that a transitional justice process related to 
the refugee issue should include reparations which should “not only include monetary 
compensation, but acts such as public apologies and commemoration.”291  
Similarly, Zinadia Miller considered the Palestinian refugees problem to be an 
appropriate topic for the investigation of a truth commission. She rightly argued that the 
polarized points of view about the mass displacement that took place during Israel’s birth 
in 1948 were mirrored in a legal discussion about the refugees’ right of return in 
international law.292 Then she argued: 
Yet, international law cannot encompass the full claims of the refugees, even if the 
right of return were to be recognized. The legal argument stands in for a host of 
psychological, historical, and narrative demands about acknowledgement and 
apology. A mechanism must be found that will circumvent the exclusively legalistic 
language of rights discourse and encompass the requirement of narrative, history, 
reparations and repair.293 
In Miller’s view, a “commission of inquiry” is the right mechanism to address this 
problem. She argued that this commission would ideally “harmonize the varying accounts 
of 1948 and stimulate an Israeli apology for complicity in the experience of 
Palestinians.”294 
Indeed, as noted by all these authors, the denial of the Nakba needs to stop, and 
transitional justice offers solutions. However, it must be stressed that Israel’s denial of 
responsibility over the Nakba is not the only form of denial in relation to displacement. As 
identified above, Israel exercises other important forms of denial. First, it conceals vital 
information such as numbers of victims or even the very laws that it uses to inflict 
displacement. Second, it blames the victim for his own misery which resulted from a 
discriminatory legal system.  
Despite these forms of denial, it is important to mention that even under the 
current regimes that Israel runs, knowledge has been increasingly available, partly as a 
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result of mechanisms within the regime itself. First, Israel declassified part of its archives 
which allowed for historians access to important sources of information related to 1948 
war.295 As argued earlier,296 this declassification has resulted in a new stream of 
historiography in Israel which tells a different narrative from that of the state.297 Another 
important step that Israel took was enacting and enforcing its Freedom of Information Act 
which allowed human rights organizations to demand the knowledge of information that 
had been concealed for long.298 
Despite these positive steps, however, Israel has still failed to acknowledge that 
these acts violated the rights of those who were harmed by them. Furthermore, it 
continues to dispute the historical narrative that argues that it intentionally displaced 
Palestinians during the 1948 war, despite the evidence in its own declassified archives. A 
truth seeking initiative can remedy this problem. Truth commissions are useful even in 
cases when the truth is known but not acknowledged. As Mohammad Bamyeh expressed:  
Truth means not uncovering hidden secrets, but making audible (and thus part of 
the fabric of a common narrative) that which has been well-known for some time 
but could not be disclosed because of the restrictions imposed by the needs and 
inclinations of diplomatic language.299 
Building on this notion, it could be argued that a potential truth commission in 
Israel/Palestine needs to seek a genuine acknowledgment. The lessons learnt from the 
case studies can inform what the role of a truth commission is and what contribution to 
justice it can make. First, the international experiences of truth seeking initiatives 
demonstrate how a transitional justice process not only cares about the content, but also 
about the context. Truth commissions tend to take into account a large number of 
individual incidents in order to look at the macro picture. A look at the macro picture has 
the benefit of allowing the community to draw conclusions not only about whether 
something happened, but also about why it happened. In this regard, the truth 
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commissions’ style attempts to conceptualize a deeper look into the history in order to be 
able to recommend measures for the future. This macro picture usually establishes the 
links between the different events that might be looked at as independent problems in 
other approaches. This “truth” comes with the state’s acknowledgment not only of the 
suffering of the victims, but also of its responsibility for this suffering and its duty to 
redress. All the examples of truth commissions above demonstrate how the state 
acknowledged the responsibility of the actions committed by the repressive regime. This 
acknowledgment can be expressed in the constitution, laws, declarations, as well as 
speeches.  
The macro picture in the plight of those who were victims of displacement in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not the 1948 or 1967 exoduses alone, and not the continuous 
forcible displacements alone, but all the experiences and patterns of displacement 
combined. It is in all the laws, military orders, regulations and procedures that have 
forcibly displaced civilians, separated families, or prevented return whether by military 
force, status revocation based on discriminatory law or by failure to register a new-born 
child who was entitled to be registered. In addition, a holistic approach to knowing the 
truth would seek it on both sides of the green line that separates the territory on which 
Israel was established in the aftermath of the 1948 war and the OPT. Displacement has 
taken place in both sides of the green line and with similar tools. For example, as Chapter 
2 explained, the Prevention of Infiltration Law that Israel enacted to prevent the return of 
the refugees who were displaced during the 1948 war300 was almost copied into the 
Prevention of Infiltration Military Orders that were enacted in the West Bank and Gaza 
after the 1967 war301 to prevent those displaced by it from return. Similarly, the 
                                                     
300
 The Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954, Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 
16, of the 27th Av, 5714 (26th August, 1954), P. 160, 1954. 
301
 Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai) (No. 82) for 
5727, 1967; Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (West Bank) (No. 106), of 5727, 1967; 
Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai) (No. 290) for 5729, 1969; 
Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (West Bank) (Amendment No. 1) (No. 190) of 5782, 1967; 
Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (West Bank) (No. 125), of 5727, 1967; Military 
Commander for the Judea and Samaria, Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (Judea and 
Samaria)(No.329), 5729, 1969, English Translation is presented by HaMoked, available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2010/112300_eng.pdf; Commander of IDF forces in the Judea and Samaria 
238 
 
denationalization of all non-Jews who were displaced by the 1948 war302 was echoed by 
the denial of residency status to those who were displaced in the 1967 war.303 
Once this truth is established, the transitional justice framework suggests that an 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing must be declared. It is important to establish who was 
responsible of the wrongdoing and who will carry the burden of responsibility afterwards. 
When acknowledgment is established redress is expected. Such redress needs to be as 
comprehensive as possible, and needs to cover the injustices that were articulated by 
truth commissions. Thus, once a recognition that displacement has been an intentional 
policy that aimed at altering the demographic balance in Israel and the OPT, policies to 
stop and repair the harm need to be put in place to announce a genuine end of an era of 
human rights violations coupled with denial. The following sections will discuss the other 
remedies that can be used to redress displacement.  
5.3.2.2 The Question of Criminal Accountability 
The factual analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3, which included the different 
methods used by Israel to inflict forcible displacement upon the non-Jewish population in 
Palestine/ Israel has shown that these measures included war operations and regulatory 
engineering that started with the 1948 war and continued until today.304 The continuous 
displacement and the prevention of all those displaced from return is being possible by 
the combined efforts of a large number of persons in public offices, including government 
ministers, army and police officials as well as judges in military and civilian courts.305 
Chapter 4 examined the crime of forced displacement and concluded that such crime 
exists as a war crime or a crime against humanity.306 It is a war crime when committed in 
an occupied territory and a crime against humanity if committed against any civilian 
population, but only if it was part of a widespread or systematic policy, regardless of 
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whether this displacement took place in time of war or peace.307 When such crime is 
perpetrated, relevant authorities are expected to invoke individual criminal responsibility 
against the perpetrators and prosecute them.308 
In the context of the theoretical and practical development of transitional justice 
the question of the accountability of perpetrators of human rights violations underwent 
polarized debates and practices. In a nutshell, there were two competing theories of 
justice that emerged in this discussion. The first is known as the “retributive justice” 
theory which argues that justice can be achieved only when criminals are punished.309 The 
second preferred “restorative justice,” stressing that justice is advanced by repairing the 
harm caused by human rights violations, and even involving the perpetrator in the 
restoration process.310 To further understand this discussion in the context of the 
transitional justice framework, it is essential to review the historical incidences that 
utilized each of the two theories. 
Although the practice of transitional justice is usually traced back to the post 
Second World War tribunals, its emergence as a field of study and practice is usually cited 
as the late 1980s and the 1990s when the world witnessed a number of regime changes in 
Latin America, Africa and Europe.311 The end of the dictatorship in Argentina is frequently 
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marked as a shifting point towards framing the field of transitional justice.312 The military 
dictatorship that ruled the country prior to the transition in Argentina committed a 
number of wide-scale systematic human rights violations including forced 
disappearance.313 To address these violations, the new government sought a number of 
measures, including the prosecution of a number of leaders in the dictatorship junta and 
establishing special commissions of inquiry to find out information about the 
disappeared.314 This truth was a needed remedy for the families of those who disappeared 
and the community as a whole, all of whom sought closure. 
Another famous example is the widely cited transitional justice experience of 
South Africa. This country had suffered for decades from the Apartheid regime, which 
systematically applied racial discrimination, torture and many other policies that can be 
characterized as crimes against humanity.315 In South Africa, the regime change took place 
in a negotiated agreement, rather than a clear victory of the anti-apartheid powers over 
the regime.316 After this, free elections were held and the new post-apartheid South 
African government started to implement policies to address the wide range of injustices 
committed by the apartheid regime. One of these measures was the famous Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (hereinafter TRC), which adopted and practiced a pragmatic 
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principle: amnesty for perpetrators of human rights violations in return of full truth.317 
This principle was enshrined in the law legislated during the transitional period which 
states that the goal of the TRC was first to “establish as complete picture as possible of the 
causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights…,”318 and to “facilitate 
the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts 
relating to acts associated with a political objective and comply with the requirements of 
this act.”319 
The South African approach represents the pragmatism that characterised a 
number of transitional justice experiences when it comes to criminal prosecutions.320 This 
pragmatism was a result of decisions made by negotiators who preferred the transition 
over prosecution.321 This was expressed by the South African judge Richard Goldstone 
who stated:  
The decision to opt for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was an important 
compromise. If the ANC [African National Congress, which led the resistance 
against apartheid and the negotiations to end it] had insisted on Nuremberg-style 
trials for the leaders of the former apartheid government, there would have been 
no peaceful transition to democracy, and if the former government had insisted 
on a blanket amnesty then, similarly, the negotiations would have broken down. A 
bloody revolution sooner rather than later would have been inevitable. The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission is a bridge from the old to the new.322 
The dilemma that Judge Goldstone has expressed here is one that almost every 
transitional society faces. Insisting on prosecuting perpetrators of human rights violations 
might hinder the transition to democracy and peace, and might cost more lives. Thus, in 
South Africa restorative justice was prioritized over retributive justice. The South African 
experience represented a phase in the development of transitional justice in which 
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prosecutions were avoided by transitional states. Teitel explains that this phase of the 
development of transitional justice  
reflected that the relevant values in the balance were hardly those of the ideal 
rule of law. Where the aim was to advance legitimacy, pragmatic principles guided 
the justice policy and the sense of adherence to the rule of law. Transitional 
jurisprudence was linked to a conception of justice that was imperfect and partial. 
What is fair and just in extraordinary political circumstances was to be determined 
from the transitional period itself.323 
 Hence, the South African experience represented the frequent inclination 
in that historical period not to be strict about the rule of law and criminal justice, in return 
for a more stable transition, and a hope for peaceful coexistence in the future. 
Nevertheless, the development of the concept and practice of transitional justice 
did not stop at the South African experience. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the world 
witnessed the rise of international ad hoc tribunals in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and 
a special court in Sierra Leone that prosecuted alleged perpetrators of genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.324 Furthermore, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) was established to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes.325 These events 
certainly were a force that pulled the experiences of transitional justice back towards the 
general rule of law principles that govern individual criminal responsibility.326 In addition, 
the United Nations has played a major role in pushing transitional states towards not 
incorporating a blanket amnesty to everything that happened in the past and, as such, 
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providing impunity for perpetrators of international crimes.327 In a number of cases, the 
United Nations representatives incorporated a disclaimer into peace agreements that 
provided amnesties stating: “The United Nations does not recognize amnesty for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”328 
Hence, the relationship between the transitional justice framework and traditional 
international law is dialectical in relation to criminal justice. For the better or worse, this 
provides transitional societies with a diversity of policy options to choose from, depending 
on their circumstances.  
This contrast between transitional societies seeking retributive justice and others 
preferring to peruse reparative justice was also reflected on addressing forced 
displacement. As explained in Chapter 4, the crime of forced displacement was 
condemned as a war crime and a crime against humanity by every international judicial 
body that was created since the Second World War. Furthermore, a number of countries 
like Colombia and Estonia, for example, prosecuted alleged perpetrators of forced 
displacement in their domestic legal systems. In the following sub-sections, we will 
examine, first, the International Tribunal in former Yugoslavia, and its role on the 
transition in Bosnia as an example of international prosecution of forced displacement. 
Secondly, Colombia and Estonia will be examined as examples of prosecuting deportation 
within the domestic legal system.  
5.3.2.2.1 An example of international tribunal prosecuting forced displacement: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
The conflict in former Yugoslavia, a European federation which ended up being 
divided into several states, was characterized by ethnic and religious divisions, which were 
translated into ugly massacres, forced displacement and genocide.329 Forced displacement 
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was an important element of the conflict which, as expressed by Jonna Korner, involved 
the objective of “creating ethnically pure territories.”330 The transition out of this conflict 
took place after the spread of great violence and atrocities, followed by international 
military intervention.331 The end of the Cold War that restricted the work of the UN for 
almost half a century helped the UN Security Council to intervene militarily and change 
the balance of power in the conflict.332 This has been reflected by the options taken for 
transitional justice. 
The international community was shocked by what came to be known as “ethnic 
cleansing” activities that took place during the conflict, aiming at changing the 
demographic composition of several areas as the federation was breaking into several 
independent republics.333 In addition, Europe felt burdened by the number of refugees 
who flooded into the continent, which formed an additional incentive for them to 
encourage the implementation of the right of all refugees to return to their homes and 
have their properties resituated.334 It was clear early on that ethnic cleansing was being 
widely practiced in the Yugoslavian conflict which led the UN Security Council in 1992 to 
call upon all parties “to ensure that forcible expulsions of persons from the areas where 
they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population... cease 
immediately.”335 As a result, the UN Commission on Human Rights established the 
position of a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, who reported about the crimes that 
were taking place during the armed conflict.336 In addition, the UN Secretary General 
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appointed a special impartial commission of experts to investigate the crimes.337 As a 
result of the way the transition took place, an ad hoc tribunal known as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was founded by the United Nations Security 
Council to prosecute those most responsible of the atrocities that took place during the 
conflict.338  
The tribunal worked actively within a jurisdiction that included the crime of forced 
displacement, termed as “deportation and forcible transfer” as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, echoing the universal standards that were exercised in the Nuremberg 
trials.339 Forcible displacement was, indeed, one of the most important crimes committed 
during the conflict,340 which resulted in the ICTY prosecuting a number of those accused of 
this crime.341 In fact, the ICTY has actively developed the parameters of the crimes of 
“deportation” and “forcible transfer” which influenced the international legal system as a 
whole.342 As argued by Dawson and Farber, 
The tribunal has enabled the forcible displacements of several armed conflicts to 
be placed under the magnifying glass of judicial scrutiny and has advanced a 
“system” of international law through the development of legal standards 
applicable to the age-old phenomenon of forcible displacement. ICTY has provided 
a unique opportunity for the international community to define the elements of 
                                                     
337
 Ibid. 
338
 UN Security Council, “Resolution 808,” February 22, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808; UN Security 
Council, “Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 
1991”; As noticed by Korner, this tribunal was established while the conflict was still ongoing. See, Korner, 
Criminal Justice and Forced Displacement in the Former Yugoslavia, 7. 
339
 UN Security Council, “Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991”, Articles 2(g) and 5(d). 
340
 Carl Dahlman and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing: The International 
Community and the Returns Process in post-Dayton Bosnia–Herzegovina,” Political Geography 24, no. 5 
(June 2005): 574–8; Korner, Criminal Justice and Forced Displacement in the Former Yugoslavia, 6; Bell, 
Peace Agreements and Human Rights, 98–117. 
341
 See, for example, Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic Appeals Judgment (ICTY 2006); See also, 
Prosecutor v. Vlastimir Dordevic Trial Judgment (ICTY 2011); See also, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik 
(Appeal Judgment) (ICTY 2009); See also, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic’ Trial Judgment (ICTY 2007); See also, 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic (Trial Judgment) (ICTY 2005); See also, ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milorad 
Krnojelac (Trial Judgement) (ICTY 2002). 
342
 This was discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, sec. ‎4.3.1. 
246 
 
forcible displacement, not in an academic vacuum but rather in relation to actual 
factual events. 343 
 Hence, in the punishing vs. pardoning dilemma in transitional justice, the first won 
utilizing the traditional retributive justice approach. Thus, from a retributive justice 
perspective, rule of law was significantly advanced by holding those responsible of the 
most severe human rights violations accountable to their actions.344  
However, from a restorative justice perspective, the contribution of prosecution 
was arguably small, although not non-existing. One of the functions of public trials is that 
they reveal some truth, which means that already with the prosecution of perpetrators of 
international crimes the issue of truth was partly addressed.345 However, there is major 
difference between criminal prosecutions and truth commissions as truth-seeking 
initiatives that also creates a need for the latter: the role of the victim.346 Criminal 
prosecutions are, by definition, focused on the accused person, trying to find the facts 
that would convict or acquit him and, as such, the victims have a limited role.347 Truth 
commissions are usually designed in order to contribute in victim satisfaction and are seen 
as healing processes, and provide a significant attention to the narrative of the victim.348 
Keen to addressing the need for healing truth-telling initiatives, a number of Bosnian 
NGOs started lobbying for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1997.349 While this 
was resisted first by the ICTY fearing it might interrupt its mandated work, it was later 
agreed to officially form a truth commission.350 This commission was later dissolved 
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without researching the issues in its mandate or writing any reports. Therefore, the truth 
commission experience in Bosnia was an incomplete and the only redress in the question 
on truth was provided by the ICTY. Nonetheless, Bosnia is currently witnessing a debate in 
which human rights organizations and transitional justice experts are demanding the 
establishment of a truth commission that will establish the facts in a non-judicial 
methodology.351 The Bosnian academic and transitional justice expert Goran Simic argued:  
Seventeen years after the war we still do not have all the facts about the war and 
we must make an effort to get them. This is evident when we look at our past and 
realize that [in this region] we have a war every 50 years and have so far wasted 
17 years of peace doing nothing.352 
Simic’s fear of the return of war in the republics of former Yugoslavia stems from 
his belief that retributive justice is not sufficient to advance peace and reconciliation. 
Despite the fact that prosecutions reveal some truth, advocates of restorative justice 
continue to demand a more holistic approach to solve the problem of displacement and 
eventually help the refugees and IDPs to return to their homes in safety and dignity. As 
argued by Bradley, truth commissions have the potential of “challenging ethno-nationalist 
myths” that caused the violence in the first place, allowing for a safe and dignified return 
for the refugees back to their homes.353 However, as will be shown in the reparations 
section, the Bosnian case has offered more remedies to the victims than just holding the 
criminals accountable.  
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5.3.2.2.2 Examples of domestic prosecution of forced displacement: Colombia and 
Estonia 
In addition to being prosecuted in international tribunals, forced displacement has 
also been condemned and prosecuted in some domestic jurisdictions. One significant 
example of a state that introduced the crime of forced displacement in its penal code is 
Colombia.354 In this Latin American country, a decades-long armed conflict between the 
state and a number of guerrillas has resulted in millions of displaced Colombians most of 
whom were displaced within the borders of the state.355 A significant response that was 
introduced to combat displacement in Colombia has been incorporating the duty to 
prosecute perpetrators of the crime of forcible displacement into the domestic penal law 
of Colombia.356 This law was used both for displacements that happened after the 
adoption of the law and the ones that had been committed before.357 When the 
retrospective application of the law was challenged in the Supreme Court, it found that 
the act of forced displacement had been already a crime prior to the adoption of the 
domestic act, since International Law had already condemned it.358  
A similar situation took place in Estonia an Eastern European state that took its 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1992.359 In 1994, the Estonian “Criminal Code” 
(Kriminaalkoodeks) was amended to include a chapter that condemns war crimes and 
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crimes against humanity, including the crime of deportation.360 In 2001, the Estonian 
Parliament adopted a new “Penal Code” (Karistusseadustik) replacing the previous 
“Criminal Code” which condemned forced displacement as both a war crime and a crime 
against humanity punishable by the domestic law.361 In 2003, a Russian and an Estonian 
were convicted by a local court with committing deportation as a crime against humanity 
back in 1949.362 They appealed their conviction at the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) arguing that deportation was not a crime according to the criminal law of Estonia 
in 1949, and that the retrospective application of a criminal rule was contrary to the 
principles of legality.363 The ECHR rejected their appeal on the basis that the crime of 
deportation as a crime against humanity had been considered a crime since the 
Nuremburg trials.364 Furthermore, the court noted that the UN General Assembly adopted 
a resolution in 1946365 affirming the principles of international law recognized by the 
Charter of the Nuremburg Trials.366 According to the court, this affirmation, in addition to 
the International Law Commission’s adoption of the Nuremberg principles,367 meant that 
the “responsibility  for  crimes  against  humanity  cannot  be  limited  only  to  the 
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nationals  of  certain  countries  and  solely  to  acts  committed  within  the specific  time  
frame  of  the  Second  World  War.”368 Eventually, the court concluded:  
The Court notes that even if the acts committed by the applicants could have been 
regarded as lawful under the Soviet law at the material time, they were 
nevertheless found by the Estonian courts to constitute crimes against humanity 
under international law at the time of their commission. The Court sees no reason 
to come to a different conclusion.369 
Hence, the ECHR upheld the Estonian court’s decision and saw that the 
condemnation of the crime of deportation as far back as 1949 was in line with 
international law. 
What can be learnt from both examples is that when a state enters a transitional 
period, the crime of forced displacement can be introduced to its domestic legal system to 
prosecute not only future deportations and transfers but also ones that happened in the 
past. This would not be considered a violation of the principles of legality because 
international law clearly condemned and prosecuted this crime since the end of the 
Second World War. Furthermore, these two examples reinforce the conclusion that for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity there is no statute of limitations and that the 
crime of forced displacement was part of customary international law as early as 1949.  
5.3.2.2.3 Accountability for forced displacement in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 
Unfortunately, the two regimes run by the Israeli legal system (the Civil and 
Military regimes) have never treated the forced displacement of Palestinian civilians as a 
crime. On the contrary, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3, the Israeli legal system has been 
utilized as a tool for deporting and transferring Palestinians since the establishment of the 
state until the current day.370 Furthermore, the peace process has not, thus far, adopted 
any form of condemnation to the displacement problem, not to mention any the 
accountability of the perpetrators. 
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Nonetheless, the issue of accountability for human rights violations has been an 
issue of debate for a number of years. Especially since the increase in the rate of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the OPT after the beginning of the 
Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, attempts to seek remedies from international legal 
and judicial forums increased.371 For example, there were attempts to prosecute alleged 
Israeli war criminals using universal jurisdiction in Belgium,372 the United Kingdom373 and 
Spain,374 but none of these endeavours was successful. 
In December 2008, Israel waged a three-week military operation on the Gaza Strip 
(known as Operation Cast Lead) during which 1419 Palestinians were killed, 82.2% of 
whom were civilians.375 Among the large number of civilian deaths, 318 children and 111 
women were killed.376 Furthermore, the attack resulted in the injury of thousands of 
civilians, the total or partial destruction of thousands of houses, schools, factories, farms 
and other civilian and economic facilities including water and sewage networks.377 One 
third of the population of Gaza Strip was forced to evacuate their homes because of the 
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intensity of the attacks and as a result of Israeli army instructions ordering them to 
evacuate the areas “for their own safety.”378 In the aftermath of this war, the UN Human 
Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution that condemned the Israeli attack379 and 
decided to dispatch a fact-finding mission to document Israeli human rights and IHL 
violations.380 In April 2009, the HRC established the mission and appointed the former 
South African judge and the chief prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR Richard Goldstone381 to 
head it with the mandate 
to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of 
the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 
December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.382 
The report of the mission, generally known as the “Goldstone Report,” 
documented a number of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity committed 
during the operation in Gaza and concluded that these crimes invoke individual criminal 
responsibility.383 Furthermore, the report recommended that the UN Security Council 
require the Israeli government to investigate the alleged crimes and prosecute those 
responsible of them.384 Moreover, the report recommended that, in the absence of good 
faith from the government of Israel, the UN Security Council should “refer the situation in 
Gaza to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.”385  
During and after this war, the voices calling for holding those responsible for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity accountable in front of the ICC were rising. In January 
2009, Palestinian authority initiated an endeavour to give the ICC jurisdiction over the OPT 
by depositing a declaration at the court recognizing “the jurisdiction of the Court for the 
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purpose of identifying, prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices of acts 
committed on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002.”386 This declaration was in 
conformity with Article 12 (3) of the Rome statue which allows for states which are not 
parties to the Rome Statute to accept the statute’s jurisdiction.387 In light of this 
declaration, the ICC Prosecutor’s office determined that before investigating the alleged 
crimes, the office needed to “conduct a preliminary examination to consider all issues 
pertaining to its jurisdiction and to the admissibility of cases potentially arising from the 
situation.”388 Of special concern to the Prosecutor’s office was to determine whether the 
Palestinian declaration “meets the statuary requirements” to provide jurisdiction to the 
ICC over Palestine, including the question “whether Palestine qualifies as a ‘State’ for the 
purpose of article 12(3).”389 This question became the subject of a polarized discussion 
represented in submissions to the ICC Prosecutor’s office as well as in the academic 
sphere.390 The discussion involved the question whether Palestine was a state for the 
purpose of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute; whether the ICC prosecutor has the capacity 
to determine an answer to this question and whether the whole question of determining 
statehood was relevant to the ICC jurisdiction.391 At the end of this almost three-year 
discussion, the Office of the Prosecutor issued a decision declaring that it was beyond its 
capacity to determine whether Palestine was a state and that such capacity was vested in 
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the Secretary General of the United Nations, the UN General Assembly or the Assembly of 
State Parties to the Rome Statute.392 Finally, the decision of the Prosecutor’s Office 
declared:  
The Office could in the future consider allegations of crimes committed in 
Palestine, should competent organs of the United Nations or eventually the 
Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal issue relevant to an assessment of 
article 12 or should the Security Council, in accordance with article 13(b), make a 
referral providing jurisdiction.393 
Hence, while the ICC prosecutor refused to immediately exercise jurisdiction based 
on the argument that he was not in a position to determine the status of Palestine, the 
door was left open to exercise the Court’s jurisdiction once the statehood question was 
resolved in another forum.  
Indeed, in December 2012, the UN General Assembly decided to “accord to 
Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations.”394 Based strictly on 
the declaration of the ICC prosecutor, this status that Palestine acquired in the UN is 
sufficient to grant the ICC jurisdiction on the territory of this state. This situation is 
unprecedented in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict during which no executive measures 
were ever taken by any international institution to punish or even stop crimes against 
humanity and war crimes related to the conflict. As argued by Kearney and Reynolds, the 
main reason behind the long-standing barrier that prevented the Palestinians from using 
the international legal framework as a refuge has been the atmosphere of impunity that 
unconditional western, most importantly US, support for Israel in international forums.395 
Nonetheless, the recognition of Palestine as a state by the UN General Assembly has the 
potential of changing this impunity, should justice be sought at the ICC.  
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In fact, the Palestinian Authority itself is facing a tremendous amount of pressure 
to refrain from referring any case to the ICC.396 In April 2013, the chief Palestinian 
negotiator, Saeb Erekat, published a study that suggested: 
In case the Israeli government starts building in the E1, Giv’at Ha-Matos or Ramat 
Shlomo settlements, the State of Palestine must refer the whole issue [of 
settlement building] to the ICC.397 
Furthermore, Erekat divided the international treaties and conventions that the 
State of Palestine must join into conventions of “immediate priority,” and others of “a 
priority within a period of six months” and finally the “long-term priorities.”398 According 
to Erekat’s study, joining the Rome Statute ICC was to be considered long-term priority 
commenting briefly that “this issue is complicated. Teams of international experts are still 
studying all its aspects.”399 What can be understood from this categorization and brief 
comment is that the Palestinian government is not planning to join the Rome Statue any 
time soon, and will only use it as a political tool, should Israel construct any of the three 
colonies mentioned in his study.400 However, human rights organizations have started 
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campaigning to pressure the Palestinian Authority to join the ICC.401 More importantly, as 
mentioned earlier, it can be understood from ICC Prosecutor’s declaration that the ICC has 
had jurisdiction over the OPT since December 2012, based on the Palestinian declaration 
in 2009 and its recognition as a non-member observer state by the General Assembly. The 
prosecutor made it clear that he refrained from answering the question of statehood, but 
that once this question is answered by other forums that he saw as competent, there is a 
chance to “consider allegations of crimes committed in Palestine.”402 This statement was 
later made milder by the newly appointed prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, during an 
interview in which she stated that if the UN General Assembly accepts Palestine as a non-
member state at the UN, then “we will revisit what the ICC can do.”403 
Should it be determined that the ICC has jurisdiction over Palestine, whether by 
virtue of the Palestinian Authority joining the Rome Statute or by power of the ad hoc 
declaration it issued in 2009, there would be potential to refer Israel’s policy of forced 
displacement to the ICC with certain limitations related to the ICC’s jurisdiction. These 
limitations are concerned with geography and time. First, the ICC jurisdiction will be 
limited to crimes committed in the territory of the Palestinian state. Article 12 (2) of the 
Rome Statute determines that the Court’s jurisdiction extends to “[t]he State on the 
territory of which the conduct in question occurred;” and “[t]he State of which the person 
accused of the crime is a national.”404 Secondly, the ICC’s jurisdiction will be limited to 
crimes committed since the year 2002. Article 11 of the Rome Statute states: 
1.         The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the 
entry into force of this Statute. 
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  2.         If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the 
Court may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the 
entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a 
declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.405 
This provision in the Rome Statute means that there are two options for a state 
joining the ICC in relation to the jurisdiction it gives the ICC. For states that provide 
jurisdiction to the ICC by becoming a member to the Rome Statute or by making a 
declaration, the jurisdiction can either start from the date in which that state became a 
party to the Rome Statute takes effect, or an earlier date if the state’s declaration 
provided such a date.406 In the case of Palestine, the declaration deposited at the ICC’s 
registrar office in 2009 provided recognition of the jurisdiction of the ICC since 1 July 2002, 
the date in which the Rome Statute entered into force.407 
Hence, waves of forced displacement that took place prior to July 2002 will not be 
part of the jurisdiction of the court. Similarly, all displacements that take place within the 
sovereign territory of Israel are also excluded from such jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the 
existence of a potential to prosecute authors of the policies and orders of forced 
displacement in Israel continues to be a unique opportunity that might provide some 
future protection to at least part of the Palestinian civilian population.  
But at the same time, regardless of what happens with the ICC, the transitional 
justice approach to peace and reconciliation and, more generally, the elements of justice 
require a comprehensive treatment of the question of accountability in relation to forced 
displacement, as well as other crimes committed by both parties to the conflict. As seen in 
the cases of Former Yugoslavia, Colombia and Estonia, the condemnation of human rights 
violations by treating them as crimes is needed. As long as forced displacement is 
considered to be part of the law as opposed to a crime, it cannot be expected that the 
violations will stop, especially in light of an ideological motive behind it. The 
criminalization of widespread human rights violations will not only end impunity, but will 
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also set the rules for the development of the local communities in Israel/Palestine to 
refrain from persecution as a method to advance national endeavours.  
5.3.2.3 Reparations: Legal and Institutional Reforms, Return, Restitution and 
Compensation 
During the war that inflicted the exodus of 1948, the UN dispatched Count Falk 
Bernadotte to serve as a mediator in Palestine and instructed him to report to the Security 
Council and the Secretary General.408 In his final report, Bernadotte stressed on the 
importance of providing reparations to the victims of displacement as part of the final 
settlement of the conflict in Palestine.409 He argued: 
no settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right 
of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged by 
the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in 
Palestine. The majority of these refugees have come from territory which, under 
the Assembly resolution 29 November, was to be included in the Jewish state. It 
would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent 
victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish 
immigrants flow into Palestine, and, indeed, at least offer the threat of permanent 
replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for 
centuries.410 
Based on the notion that the prevention of the right of the refugees to return 
would be an offence to justice, Bernadotte recommended: 
The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled 
territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, 
and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and 
payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to 
return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation 
commission.411 
Following this recommendation, the UN General Assembly issued the infamous 
resolution 194, which stated, inter alia, that the General Assembly: 
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Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with 
their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and 
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return 
and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law 
or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible…412 
Similarly, in the aftermath of the 1967 exodus, the UN Security Council adopted a 
resolution: 
calling upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of 
the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to 
facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the 
outbreak of the hostilities.413 
These two resolutions reaffirmed the right of those who had been displaced during 
the war to return. Similarly, the UN General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions to 
support the right of those displaced from the occupied territory to return to their homes. 
First, in 1967 it welcomed “with great satisfaction” the Security Council resolution 237 
mentioned above.414 Then, between 1967 and the current day it has issued resolutions in 
every session reaffirming the right of return of those displaced in the 1967 war. The 
General Assembly first called upon “the government of Israel to take effective and 
immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas 
since the outbreak of the hostilities.”415 In 1969, its resolution 2535 included the right of 
the “displaced persons and the refugees” as part of the “inalienable rights of the people of 
Palestine.”416 In 1975, the General Assembly condemned “the evacuation, deportation, 
expulsion, displacement and transfer of the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories 
and the denial of their right to return.”417 This affirmation of the right of the displaced 
persons to return continued also after the peace process started, with a pattern of calling 
for an “accelerated return through the mechanism agreed upon by the parties.”418 
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The consistency of the UN in demanding the right of the refugees of the two wars 
to return to their homes, and the reference to compensation in resolution 194 reflect an 
understanding to long standing customary international legal principles related to 
redressing the victims of displacement. The right to return, property restitution and 
compensation are, as will be shown below, the legally required reparations to 
displacement in addition to truth and accountably. 
In addition, these remedies have been consistently used by countries referring to 
the transitional justice framework.419 As Duthie argues,  
Transitional justice measures have been developed primarily as means to address 
serious human rights violations as part of a rights based approach to promoting 
accountability for perpetrators, acknowledgment of wrongdoing and redress for 
victims.420 
As argued by Duthie, redressing the victims is part of a holistic approach to 
addressing past human rights violations, and without it the transitional justice process 
would not be meaningful. In the previous section, it was shown that the question of 
prosecuting the perpetrators of gross human rights violations has been a subject of 
disagreement between transitional justice contributors; a gap that was translated into a 
variety of policy options for transitional societies.421 Nonetheless, as this section will show, 
there is no major disagreement among contributors that the implementation of 
international legal principles in providing remedies to the victims is part of the transitional 
justice framework.  
Since the mass displacement that Israel inflicted during the Nakba in order to 
change the demographic character of the areas on which it was established during the 
war, the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes became one of the main 
demands of the Palestinian people to the extent that it was called a “sacred” right.422 The 
Palestinian right to return is backed by international legal principles that the UN 
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recognized through the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions quoted above 
and many others.423 Against this background, coupled with Israel’s consistent rejection to 
repatriate the Palestinian refugees,424  a number of scholars and other contributors have 
devoted considerable efforts advocating for a “rights based approach” to resolving the 
refugee issue focusing on demanding the exercise of all those displaced of their right to 
return home.425 This approach presents its case based on several legal arguments that 
conclude that there are a number of customary international legal principles that grant 
every displaced person, including Palestinians, the right to return to his home. Although 
these arguments have been examined in Chapter 4 and part of the present chapter, it is 
necessary for the sake of the current discussion to summarize them. First, international 
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human rights law recognized prior to 1948 the right of every person to return to his 
country, obviously without excluding displaced persons from such right.426 Secondly, 
forced displacement of civilians is considered a war crime if committed during an armed 
conflict or an occupied territory, and a crime against humanity if perpetrated against any 
civilian population in a widespread or systematic manner.427 Thirdly, the denationalization 
of citizens is illegal; and if during state succession a state does not pass its nationality to its 
habitual residents this act amounts to denationalization according to the international 
laws of nationality and state succession.428 Furthermore, Israel’s use of status revocation 
in the OPT is illegal because an occupying power is obliged to refrain from changing the 
laws in an occupied territory in a way that affects their rights, even in the case of 
annexation.429 
Based on the illegality of Israel’s conduct the law of state responsibility, as argued 
earlier in the present chapter, obliges it to provide meaningful remedies to the displaced 
persons. Such remedy must, as ruled by the PCIJ as early as 1928, “wipe out all the 
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consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all 
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”430 The law of state 
responsibility has consistently required a state to redress the victims by providing 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction.431 When it comes to forcibly displaced 
persons, whether within the borders of a state or across these borders, “restitution” has a 
twofold meaning: first, allowing those who were displaced to return to their homes and 
second allowing them to repossess their property (known widely as restitution of 
property). If those displaced were also stripped from their citizenship or right to reside in 
their cities or villages, the meaningful reparation means necessarily to repatriate them by 
giving them back their citizenship or other status that allows them to live in their homes. A 
reparation process cannot be considered meaningful unless it provided this right.  
Other relevant instruments of international law have recognized the right to 
return, property restitution and compensation. For example, the 1950 statute of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereinafter UNHCR), a UN agency 
concerned with the protection of refugees, determines that the agency has the mandate 
to assist “Governments and... private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation 
of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities.”432 The UNHCR 
deals with the right to return to one’s home of origin and the right to a nationality as legal 
entitlements derived from one’s basic human rights.433 
In 2002, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights appointed Sergio Pinheiro as a Special Rappartour on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.434 Subsequently in 2003, the 
Sub-Commission asked him to draft principles related to the rights of refugees and IDPs 
returning to their homes, aimed at giving “practical guidance to states, UN agencies and 
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broader international community on how best to address complex legal and technical 
issues surrounding housing, land and property restitution.”435 The final report presenting 
the principles, that came to be known as the “Pinheiro Principles,” was submitted and 
subsequently adopted by the UN Sub-Commission in 2005.436 The principles recognized 
everyone’s right “to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her own 
home, land or place of habitual residence.”437 Furthermore, the principles stated that 
“[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right to return voluntarily to their former 
homes, lands or places of habitual residence, in safety and dignity.”438 
In 1998, the “Representative of the Secretary General on internally displaced 
persons,” Francis Deng, submitted a report to the Commission on Human Rights including 
“Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.”439 Principle 6 stated that “[e]very human 
being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or 
her home or place of habitual residence.”440 Principle 28 states:  
Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish 
conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons 
to return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity, to their homes or places of 
habitual residence, or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country.441 
Building on these principles, the Representative of the Secretary General 
submitted a report in 2010 outlining a “Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally 
Displaced Persons.”442 According to this framework, the durable solutions that the 
internally displaced could choose from were listed as: return to the place of origin, local 
integration in the place of refuge or integration in another part of the country.443 The 
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selection of the durable solution is based upon the voluntary choice of the displaced 
person himself.444 Furthermore, any choice the displaced person takes does not forfeit his 
right to return to his home of origin later, as he can exercise this right once return 
“becomes feasible,” despite having benefited from another durable solution earlier.445 
Hence, the right to return of all refugees and internally displaced persons to their 
homes of origin has been consistently recognized by international legal instruments as an 
entitlement that the refugee should enjoy as a remedy of his/her own choice. These 
principles apply to all Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons regardless of 
where they were displaced from and during which wave of displacement. In fact, the 
General Assembly resolution 194446 of 1948 and the Security Council resolution 237 of 
1967447 reflected international legal principles that had existed prior to each of the two 
exoduses. As Salman Abu Sitta insists, “[General Assembly] Resolution 194 is not an 
invitation. It is the embodiment and restatement of international law.”448 Hence, return 
would be exercised, as John Quigley put it, “as a matter of right, not as a matter of Israeli 
grace.”449 
This right is due to be exercised regardless of the reasons that led to the 
displacement. Whether a particular refugee was forcibly displaced or whether he/she left 
voluntarily but was not readmitted later, he would have the right to return in both 
cases.450 
As to the question of the geographical jurisdiction of where the return shall be it is 
that which includes their homes of origin. As such, the 1948 refugees’ return shall be to 
Israel. As Gail Boling argues, 
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Israel’s obligation to repatriate the 1948 Palestinian refugees is … absolute and 
unqualified. Since no other state constitutes a state of origin for this particular 
group of refugees, no other state has any duty whatsoever to repatriate them.451 
Similarly, those who were displaced from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) 
or Gaza Strip have the right to be repatriated in their homes of origin. The exact place 
where the refugees are to return is their homes, as explicitly pronounced by General 
Assembly resolution 194 and shown in the legal analysis above. In addition, those who will 
return will have to receive a similar legal status to the population of the place where they 
will be repatriated. As such, those who return to Israel should be granted Israeli 
citizenship and be treated without discrimination.452 A similar rule applies to those who 
return to the West Bank and Gaza. 
In addition to this, this right of return is optional to every displaced person and it 
also entails a right not to return.453 This is a reflection of the principle of non-refoulment 
that appears in the Refugee Convention454 and which had existed prior to the mass 
displacement of the Palestine refugees and was reflected in General Assembly resolution 
194.455 
The right to return has an individual and a collective character. On the one hand, 
each displaced person can individually chose whether to return or not, but on the other 
hand, the mass expulsion has prevented the right of the Palestinian people to exercise its 
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collective right to self-determination. These two categories of rights are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather complement each other.456 
The second reparation that refugees and IDPs are entitled to is property 
restitution. This remedy is consistent with the law of state responsibility, which gives a 
priority to reversing the injury caused by the wrongful act, or as the Draft Articles of State 
Responsibility provide, by re-establishing “the situation which existed before the wrongful 
act was committed.”457 In 1948, Restitution was also declared as a remedy in General 
Assembly Resolution 194 which declared that the refugees return shall be to “their 
homes.”458 
Although property restitution has an intimate nexus to the right of return, 
especially when it is thought of in the context of the displaced Palestinians, it is separate 
from it. Restitution of property to its owner is certainly due whether such owner made the 
choice of return or decided to stay in exile.459 Their entitlement to their movable and 
immovable property is not less than that of a returning refugee. A displaced persons’ 
exercise of his/her free choice of no return should not be used to deprive him/her from 
other rights. The consistence of this principle with international law, especially in the 
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context of displaced persons, was confirmed by the Pinheiro principles.460 These principles 
provided:  
Refugees and displaced persons shall not be forced or otherwise coerced, either 
directly or indirectly, to return to their former homes, lands or places of habitual 
residence. Refugees and displaced persons should be able to effectively pursue 
durable solutions to displacement other than return, if they so wish, without 
prejudicing their right to the restitution of their housing, land and property.461 
Indeed, restitution is an answer to displacement in general, but more specifically, it 
is a remedy for arbitrary dispossession of property. Therefore, this remedy should be 
implemented regardless of the status of the person who was arbitrarily dispossessed, 
whether refugee, internally displaced or whether displaced as refugee but that status 
ended. The Pinheiro Principles stated that the restitution claim process should be 
accessible  
for refugees and other displaced persons regardless of their place of residence 
during the period of displacement, including in countries of origin, countries of 
asylum, or countries to which they have fled.462 
The hard question in restitution arises concerning the destiny of secondary 
occupants who might be residing in the property of a dispossessed displaced person. In 
such a case, whose interest is to be prioritized: the interest of the claiming dispossessed or 
the interest of the occupant? International law does not give a clear answer to this 
question. However, the Pinheiro Principles provided some general basic guidance rules. 
First, they provided that the human rights of secondary occupants must be protected, 
including that they are not arbitrarily evicted from the property and that any eviction shall 
be done with due process.463 With regards to this, the Pinheiro principles also stated: 
States should ensure that the safeguards of due process extended to secondary 
occupants do not prejudice the rights of the legitimate owners, tenants and other 
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rights holders to repossess the housing, land and property in question in a just and 
timely manner.464 
Hence, according to the Pinheiro principles, a state is expected to develop a policy 
that balances the rights of the “legitimate owners” and the “secondary occupants,” and 
guarantee due process in making claims. Indeed, the conflict of interest between 
legitimate owners and secondary occupants has been tackled by varying policies around 
the world while seeking a transitional justice framework to solving the consequences of 
the displacement problem.  
In addition to return and property restitution, compensation is another way to 
redress the victims. Compensation as a remedy to wrongful acts is invoked when 
restitution has not fully reversed the harm caused by the failure to meet a state’s 
obligation, as the law of state responsibility stipulates.465 Remedies have to be provided to 
repair the wrongful act, in the prioritized form of restitution or in the form of 
compensation, or a combination of both.466 
The compensation to the 1948 refugees was explicitly mentioned in General 
Assembly Resolution 194467 reflecting a widely accepted principle of compensation when 
restitution is impossible.468 This resolution spoke about two kinds of compensation, one to 
“the property of those choosing not to return” and the second for “loss of or damage to 
property” any damages to the property of those displaced.469  A similar conclusion can be 
made toward the property of those who were displaced in the 1967 war or through any 
other method of displacement.470  
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Finally, there is an additional remedy that is required by Israel which has not been 
specifically articulated by contributors working on the Palestinian-Israeli displacement 
problem: legal and institutional reform. As argued earlier, Israel has not only cemented its 
war displacement through discriminatory laws, but it has also been inflicting continuous 
displacement by the power of its legal regimes.471 Obviously, there is a legal requirement 
to reform any discriminatory legal system, but this reform turns into part of the remedy 
process in transitional situations. The Pinheiro Principles stipulate that states “should take 
immediate steps to repeal unjust or arbitrary laws and laws that otherwise have a 
discriminatory effect on the enjoyment of the right to housing, land and property 
restitution and should ensure remedies for those wrongfully harmed by prior application 
of such laws.”472 Similarly, the UN Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally 
Displaced Persons requires that national laws “need to be examined and, when necessary, 
revised to ensure that IDPs do not lose property rights on the basis of an unfair application 
of legal provisions on abandoned property or adverse possession.”473 Clearly, without 
repealing discriminatory laws the whole process of providing remedies to the victims is 
rendered meaningless. This is evident from the path taken in the transitional Israeli-
Palestinian peace agreements which had no reference to Israeli discriminatory laws. As 
shown in Chapter 3 and earlier in the present chapter, forced displacement increased in 
the transitional period. The benefits that are sought by such legal reform are twofold: 
first, as required by the law of state responsibility,474 a legal an institutional reform 
guarantees stopping the violation of international legal commitments. Secondly, such 
reform is essential to give force to the other reparations.475 
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In light of the fears from the threat of the peace process framework on the rights 
of the displaced persons, especially those who were displaced from current day Israel, the 
individual aspect of the right of return was stressed by contributors who referred to a 
“rights-based approach” to resolving the displacement issue.476 The most important 
implication of this approach is that the decision of return is subject to the sole discretion 
of the refugee. As such, the advocates of the rights-based approach have been vocal 
about the invalidity of a provision in any peace agreement that “gives up” the right to 
return. For example, Glen Rangwala argued that 
The right of return has been conceived as a human right, within the sphere of the 
international law of human rights. In this sense, it is absolute and inalienable, and 
– crucially in this contrast—it is non-negotiable at the political level. The right rests 
with the individual, and only the individual can chose not to exercise it at any 
point in time. From this standpoint, a governing authority or international 
representative can no more negotiate away an individual’s right of return than 
they can dispense with that individual’s right not to be tortured.477 
Thus, Rangwala’s argument is essentially that the right of return is non-negotiable 
because it is an individual human right that each of the refugees should be entitled to 
enjoy. Her conclusion was also shared by John Quigley who argued:  
The displaced Palestinians should not have to lobby for their right of return, either 
vis-à-vis Israel or vis-à-vis the Palestinian leadership. The right is guaranteed by 
human right norms. Just as a state that tortures is obliged to desist without being 
cajoled and without negotiation, so a state that refuses to repatriate is obliged to 
desist, namely, by repatriating. 478 
The rights-based school’s conclusion on the right of return is consistent with 
international law. Since, as argued earlier, the right of return is derived from the basic 
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human rights of the displaced person then a political and transitional process needs to 
respond by opening venues that allow the return of refugees to their homes of origin. 
 This leads us to the next question in the current discussion: how does the 
transitional justice framework interact with the rights to return, restitution and 
compensation as well as legal and institutional reform?  
As shown in the literature review in Chapter 1, several authors have discussed the 
use of the transitional justice framework in solving the Palestinian refugees’ problem, but 
either ignored or misinterpreted the meaning of the right of return. The main focus of 
most contributors was on truth commissions, where the issue of return was not discussed, 
as if it had no relation with the question of truth.479 Peled and Rouhana took a different 
approach in their book chapter entitled “Transitional Justice and the Right of Return of the 
Palestinian Refugees.”480 They successfully explained the significance of the Palestinian 
right of return from a Palestinian perspective, and the Israeli denial of such a right in fear 
that exercising it might hinder the Jewish character of the state.481 However, when they 
discussed the right of return as a solution they presented the following statement:  
[T]he Principles of transitional justice would suggest, we argue, the separation of 
the right of return, which is non-negotiable for the Palestinians, from the means 
and ways of realisation of that right in practice, which could be negotiated 
between the two sides.482 
The authors reached this conclusion based on a number of “moral” arguments that 
suggest a high moral value in recognition of the right of return but at the same time taking 
into account the rights that Israel acquired since its existence as a state. After correctly 
stressing the moral value of recognizing the right of the Palestinians to return to their 
homes in Israel and not to any other state the authors argued that “the actual means of 
realisation of the right of return could be negotiated in a way that would take the 
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concerns and interests of Israeli Jews into account.”483 Hence, Peled and Rouhana argued 
for a separation between a right of return and the means to realize such a right. While it is 
not clear from their piece how they reached that conclusion, they suggested as they laid 
out the objectives of their chapter that a “morally and politically sound basis” for a 
“workable solution” could be achieved  
on the basis of a conception of justice that is not merely corrective or 
compensatory, but rather transformative.” They added, “This conception usually 
referred to as ‘transitional justice,’ does not seek to achieve a balance between 
the violated rights and compensatory measures. It aims, rather, to establish the 
principles that should govern the transition from a morally deficient (“barbaric”) 
society or situation to a morally superior (“minimally decent”) one.484 
This statement might explain the framework they used to reach their conclusion 
on separating a moral recognition of the right of return from the actual realization of this 
right. However, the authors understanding of transitional justice clearly contradicts with 
the general conception of transitional justice as defined earlier in this chapter.485 All of 
these definitions stress that the goal of transitional justice is to restore the rights of 
victims of human rights violations. In the transitional justice framework, there is a debate, 
as explained earlier, in relation to retribution. However, in relation to reparations, the 
theory and practice of transitional justice suggest that realizing a victim’s rights is the goal. 
As Duthie argues, “’redressing the legacies’ [of past human rights violations] means, 
primarily, giving force to human rights norms that were systematically violated.”486  
Countries that used the transitional justice framework to resolve the issue of 
displacement have consistently recognized the right of refugees and internally displaced 
persons to return. For example, Colombia adopted a special law for the prevention of 
forced displacement, which anchored a number of principles to protect the rights of those 
displaced in the conflict.487 The right to voluntary return or resettlement was mentioned 
repeatedly in the document, with a very clear statement that the forcibly displaced have 
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the right to return to their places of origin.488 In addition, the law declared that the 
“Colombian people have the right not to be forcibly displaced”489 and that “the families of 
the forcibly displaced shall benefit from the basic right of family reunification.”490 Then it 
provided that the state bares the responsibility “to adopt measures for the prevention of 
forced displacement, and for assistance, protection, socioeconomic consolidation and 
stabilization of persons internally displaced by violence.”491 The law also created a 
“National System for Comprehensive Assistance to Populations Displaced by Violence,” 
which aims at “comprehensively” helping those who were displaced to exercise their 
choice of either return or resettlement and to reintegrate them into their societies again; 
addressing the causes of displacement by aiming at ending violence, fostering 
development, and promoting human rights and international humanitarian law; the 
integration of “public and private efforts” to prevent displacement and assist its victims; 
and finally guaranteeing “timely and efficient management of all economic, administrative 
technical and human resources” in order for justice not to be delayed.492 The law 
developed a system for restitution of property and other types of support in order to help 
those displaced to be reintegrated493 and stipulated that their possession of their real 
estate shall not be considered as disrupted as a result of their forced absence.494 
Similarly, in Timor-Leste the right to return and restitution of property were 
recognized and the state initiated a program called “Together Building Homes” as part of 
its wider reparation program to facilitate either the voluntary return or resettlement of 
those displaced by the conflict.495 However, due to resources restrictions, the state ended 
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up guaranteeing the restitution of the estate and providing cash allocations to help 
repairing damage resulting from partial or total destruction of the property.496 
In Liberia, the state made a declaration expressing its desire to “take further 
confidence building measures to promote the expeditions voluntary and/or organized 
return and reintegration of Liberian IDPs in safety and dignity,”497 and affirming that “ALL 
IDPs shall have rights to their original land being restored upon their return,”[emphasis by 
capitalization of “all” in the original] and that measures will be taken to “facilitate to the 
extent possible, the recovery by the IDPs of their land, all- immovable and to the extent 
possible, movable property...”498 In addition, the declaration offered further access to land 
for purposes of settlement and agriculture.499 
In South Africa, the Apartheid regime had systematically dispossessed and 
displaced native South Africans and concentrated them in small spaces as part of its wider 
racial segregation policy.500 While dispossession started in the early days of the colonial 
presence in South Africa,501 a law that the authorities legislated in 1913, known as the 
“Natives Land Act,”502 had a significant effect in inflicting a wider dispossession policy 
upon the native South African population by designating specific limited areas for their 
use.503 As described by Feinberg, this act was “so important because it was the first major 
piece of legislation that would later comprise the legal structure of apartheid.”504 
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The movement that resisted the apartheid regime, early on, prioritised among its 
liberation goals land restitution and an equitable redistribution of lands.505 As soon as the 
transition started, the 1993 interim constitution of South Africa gave special attention to 
land restitution and included it with the supreme goals of the transitional period and the 
state in general. As noted by Freedman, land restitution and reform was “the only 
constitutionally mandated program that is specifically aimed at redressing past injustices 
by making reparations.”506 
Under the “Equality” Article, the interim constitution provided:  
Every person or community dispossessed of rights in land before the 
commencement of this constitution under any law which would have been 
inconsistent with subsection (2) had that subsection been in operation at the time 
of the dispossession, shall be entitled to claim restitution of such rights[..]507 
Then, the constitution gave a relatively detailed outline on the principles that 
should be followed in land restitutions. First, it determined that the goal of this 
constitutional provision was to restore lands that were taken from their owners in 
violation of the prohibition against racial discrimination after a fixed date that the 
constitution decided to be 19 June 1913 (i.e. the date of the enactment of the Natives 
Lands Act).508 The constitution designed the restitution to take place within a mechanism 
of claims, with the state being the only respondent in all such claims.509 If the 
dispossessed land was owned by the state, then it would be restored to the possession of 
its owners.510 Otherwise, if the owner was a private person, then the court might order 
the state to buy it or expropriate it as long as compensation is paid to the secondary 
occupier.511 Should the actual restitution be not feasible, then the state may provide an 
alternative state land, pay compensation to the claimant or offer an “alternative relief.”512 
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Based on this constitutional requirement and on the overall restorative justice 
philosophy of the transition in South Africa, the government further developed a 
comprehensive land reform policy, published in a document called “White Paper on South 
African Land Policy,”513 comprised of three elements: land restitution, land redistribution 
and land tenure reform.514 Land Restitution was designed to respond to the clear 
constitutional demand of returning lands that were taken from their owners based on 
laws of racial discrimination since 1913 as explained above. Land redistribution, in 
contrast, had a wider and longer term scope, aiming at reforming land ownership on the 
national level. The white paper explained the objective of this programme as follows:  
The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with 
access to land for residential and productive uses, in order to improve their 
income and quality of life. The programme aims to assist the poor, labour tenants, 
farm workers, women, as well as emergent farmers.515 
The method of implementing this program was through the “willing-buyer willing-
seller arrangements,” which is a policy that targeted disadvantaged persons and 
communities, mostly those who were discriminated against during the apartheid regime 
and were not allowed to own land, and encouraged them to buy land from land owners. It 
did this by aiding them with funds and facilitating the process.516 Among the priority list of 
those who should benefit from the land redistribution program are those who were 
dispossessed or displaced outside the scope of the definition provided by the 
constitutional restitution program, either because they (or most probably their ancestors) 
were dispossessed before 1913 or because they were not dispossessed as a result of 
discriminatory laws but rather through some other procedure.517 
The third program, the Land Tenure Program, came to address other land-related 
problems that resulted from the mess created by the laws and regulations of the previous 
regime, especially ownership relations in the previous Bantustans. In particular, it aimed 
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at stabilising and strengthening the tenure rights on residential and other estates for 
those who never managed to acquire stable rights. The reform aimed at making evictions 
of such persons more difficult and to add further guarantees to people’s title to their non-
owned houses and lands.518 This program was to be implemented in several steps and 
contexts, aiming eventually at building a “non-racial system of land rights for all South 
Africans,” in accordance with “the Constitution’s commitment to basic human rights and 
equality.”519 To this end, the South African parliament enacted a number of acts that 
aimed at reforming land relationships and protecting the disadvantaged from the threat of 
evictions.520 
Hence, the approach of South Africa in terms of land restitutions and reforms was 
comprehensive, and is certainly a serious attempt to remedy the injustices of the past but 
without harming the reconciliation goal. The land policies did not simply accept the status 
quo created by the injustices of the past, but rather initiated a number of individual and 
collective reparations aiming at both immediate and long term redress. In assessing the 
transitional justice process of land reform in light of its relationship with international law, 
one can say that it can be easily seen that the constitutional declaration of equality 
between all South Africans, the restitution policy and all the other legislations and policies 
in this regard are following the principles of guaranteeing non-discrimination, accepting 
state responsibility, and fostering development of the whole society without harming the 
overarching reconciliation objective. To this extent, the policy can be seen as an honest 
attempt to address South Africa’s legacy. 
In Bosnia, the right of return was an important element of the peace process. It 
was incorporated into the internationally supported Dayton Peace Agreement, which 
allocated a special annex for redressing the issue of the refugees. It stated: 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes 
of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which 
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they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated 
for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and 
displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return of 
such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been 
accorded temporary protection by third countries.521 
This article of the agreement clearly corresponds with the international legal 
obligation to recognize right to return to one’s “home of origin.” Furthermore, the 
agreement reaffirmed the right to have one’s property “restored” or, if this was 
impossible, to receive compensation for that property. In addition, the agreement 
provided that the return of the refugee is an urgent matter and an “important objective of 
the settlement of the conflict.”522 This provision in the agreement came at a time in which 
elements within the conflict parties were against the notion of return of other 
ethnic/religious groups.523 Against this background, the agreement incorporated further 
provisions to guarantee that the return will not be disrupted by any of the parties. These 
guarantees were not in simple promise or agreement, but in the incorporation of 
measures which included the “repeal of domestic legislation and administrative practices 
with discriminatory intent or effect;”524 prevention of incitement;525 the protection of 
minorities;526 and the “prosecution, dismissal or transfer” of persons in official positions 
“responsible for serious violations of the basic rights of persons belonging to ethnic or 
minority groups.”527 
Furthermore, restitution of property was an important part in the transition. The 
Dayton Peace Agreement stated that those displaced by the conflict “shall have the right 
to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities 
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since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.”528 
Williams argues that the Bosnian example is the “first of successfully implemented mass 
restitution in the wake of full-blown conflict.529 In the Bosnian restitution experience, the 
international community continued to exercise pressure for repealing laws and 
regulations that made restitution claims unsuccessful.530 While at the earlier stages of the 
Bosnian transition restitution was linked to return, this fact changed over time to the 
effect that restitution and return became two separate issues.531 Within a decade from 
the end of the war, the Bosnian authorities managed to process more than two hundred 
thousand successful restitution claims.532 
Moreover, the international pressure also resulted in the vetting of a number of 
officials claimed to be obstructing the legal reform.533 Special attention was given to 
reforming the judicial system by vetting judges, encouraging the appointment of a more 
ethnically representative judicial body and by making the judicial authority not 
accountable to the executive authority, but rather more independent as an authority in 
itself.534 In addition, the police system, which participated in ethnic cleansing during the 
war, went through a reform and vetting process by force of the peace agreement itself 
and administered by the UN.535 Despite the imperfections of the Bosnian transitional 
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justice experience in terms of its address of the displaced persons issue, this experience 
demonstrates how international law goes hand-in-hand with the quest for peace. 
The pattern detected by the examples above shows that the practice of countries 
seeking to start a transitional justice process concerning displacement follows certain 
parameters. First, the right of every displaced person to return to his home of origin is 
always guaranteed and encouraged. In fact, the whole transitional justice process on the 
issue of refugees is about advancing justice in reference to human rights norms. Duthie 
argues that the most significant contribution that “transitional justice can make to 
resolving displacement is facilitating the integration or reintegration of displaced 
persons.”536 This conclusion is consistent with the general theory of transitional justice 
which works to promote measures that aim at redressing the victims of human rights 
violations.537 Secondly, while restitution of property, and especially real estate, is 
practiced widely as a preferred remedy, compensation is subject to the financial 
constraints that will dictate being creative about reparations and substituting a full dry 
legal conception of reparation with general programs that address the different needs of 
individuals as well as the society as a whole. This is especially true in cases where 
displacement was widespread. Finally, what seems to be the non-negotiable side of 
transitional justice are the measures that aim at ensuring non-repetition. Every state that 
walks the walk of transitional justice is expected to repeal discriminatory laws and 
introduce constitutional, legislative or administrative guarantees that ensure that what 
happened in the past would not happen again. The justice process would be rendered 
meaningless should it not change the circumstances that led to the same human rights 
violation it is trying to redress. The case studies presented above demonstrate that these 
are the pillars of reparation in a transitional justice process that tries to redress the 
displaced persons. 
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Hence, the theoretical and practical examination of the implications of transitional 
justice on the right of return lead to the conclusion that there is no justification to assume 
that this framework is not “corrective or compensatory” as Peled and Rouhana suggest.538 
Nor can one find any evidence to propose that there is a separation between the right of 
return in principle and the means to achieve this right in practice. On the contrary, 
transitional justice is about redressing human rights violations. 
Furthermore, what would the recognition of the right of return mean if it was not 
coupled with strong policies that guarantee the non-repetition of the crime of forced 
displacement and redress the victims? As seen in the examples above, the transitional 
justice approach meant changing the legal system by introducing new constitutions, 
statutes, policies and programs that guarantee the exercise of one’s rights. In other words, 
the previously confiscated rights of the victims dictate the parameters of the transitional 
justice process.  
As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, forced displacement in Palestine/ Israel has been 
the product of an ideological inclination to change the demographic fabric of 
Palestine/Israel translated into laws and military orders that inflicted and cemented 
displacement. The effective application of the right to return is, therefore, an essential 
requisite to end an era of racial discrimination and ethnic cleansing and to finally open a 
new page in the history of the Palestinians and the Israelis based on equality rather than 
racial segregation. Unfortunately, one is reminded that under the current political 
circumstances and power balance, it seems to be impossible to implement the right of 
those who were displaced from what became Israel in 1948 to return. Regardless of this 
political fact, the transitional justice framework does not offer alternative solutions that 
take into consideration the ethnic composition of any state.  
Hence, the transitional justice framework suggests that the issue of forced 
displacement can be redressed through a comprehensive approach that is based on Israel 
assuming its responsibility. A transition will only be meaningful when Israel, first, adopts 
the principle of equality in its legal system, repeals all laws that inflict displacement and 
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other forms of discrimination and recognizes the applicability of international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law on every territory under its jurisdiction. 
Reparations will become possible only when the Israeli legal system is reformed.  
In the case that a Palestinian state becomes free of occupation, this state will also 
have to carry some of the burdens of the transition, especially with return and restitution. 
Furthermore, it will be the obligation of this state to also ensure that no discriminatory 
laws are applicable in its territory, and to reform the legal system in a way that would 
allow for a successful property restitution program to take place. It will be the Palestinian 
responsibility to have an effective judicial and administrative regime that would be able to 
redistribute land in a fair way that would not violate the rights of either the displaced 
persons or the secondary occupants.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has first reviewed the way the Palestinian refugees and displaced 
persons’ plight was addressed in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process framework and 
found that this process has not provided remedies to any of the victims of displacement, 
whether those who were displaced from Israel or the OPT. While the Oslo framework has 
postponed the issue of the 1948 refugees, it also has not given immediate remedies to any 
of the other refugees or displaced persons. As shown above, the “admission” of those 
who were displaced during the 1967 war and the repatriation of those whose residencies 
was revoked was blocked by Israel.  
Then, the present chapter turned into defining the framework that governs the 
consequences of a wrongful act in international law. This framework includes the law of 
state responsibility which stipulates that a state is obliged to reverse its illegal conduct by 
providing restitution, compensation and satisfaction. These three elements of reparation 
need to be provided in a meaningful way that would redress the victims. Furthermore, in 
cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, there is a legal obligation to 
prosecute those responsible for those crimes.  
Against this background, this chapter then turned to examining the appropriate 
transitional justice measures that can meaningfully redress the victims of Israel’s forced 
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displacement policy. It did so by first defining the transitional justice framework as well as 
introducing its features, principles, measures and goals. The main goal of the transitional 
justice framework is to promote durable peace through the advancement of justice. The 
conception of justice on which this framework is built is based on international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law. Hence, the mission of transitional justice is 
to promote comprehensive remedies that would meaningfully redress the victims of gross 
human rights violations.  
The four main categories of the transitional justice framework, namely, truth, 
accountability, reparations and legal and institutional reform were then examined in 
theory and practice. The analysis of the practice in each of the remedies focused on 
examples of states that used the transitional justice framework to redress victims of 
displacement. Important lessons were drawn in relation to the parameters governing the 
reference to transitional justice in each of the categories of remedies.  
In terms of truth commissions, it was found that there are countries that have 
articulated their forced displacement problems with truth commissions. These 
commissions sought to bring about a comprehensive understanding related to the gross 
human rights violations that took place during the conflict or suppressive regime. In most 
cases, the commissions represented a forum for victims as well as perpetrators in order to 
help the entire society to come to terms with the legacies of the past. However, this was 
not the only contribution that truth commissions expected to make. Each commission was 
charged with suggesting appropriate measures to redress the victims and to prevent the 
repetition of the violations in the future, which was an important tangible outcome of the 
truth seeking process. Hence, while truth itself is a remedy, it does not suffice alone to 
redress the victims, but rather needs to be followed up by a comprehensive program of 
remedies that can meaningfully repair the harm caused by the human rights violations. 
This means that truth commissions, as part of the transitional justice framework, are not 
aimed at providing lip service to the victims but rather to promote their rights in a 
meaningful and comprehensive way.  
In addition to truth seeking, transitional justice is concerned with the accountability of 
human rights violations perpetrators. Two schools of thought have debated the question 
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of accountability: The restorative justice school preferred reparation over punishment, 
while the retributive justice school saw that justice cannot be established without the 
prosecution of perpetrators of mass human rights violations. According to the principles of 
individual criminal responsibility, states have the obligation to prosecute perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations. However, a number of countries have preferred to follow a 
restorative justice model and give amnesty to perpetrators of human rights violations. 
Other countries have developed their legal systems to allow the prosecutions of 
performers of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide and prosecuted persons 
responsible for the crime of forced displacement. They even applied the criminal law for 
this crime retrospectively, and prosecuted persons who were responsible of the crime of 
forced displacement since as far back as 1949, as the Estonian experience provides. 
Similarly, all international courts and tribunals since the Second World War have 
condemned the crime of forced displacement, and in the case of Former Yugoslavia 
several alleged criminals were prosecuted for this crime. In the case of Palestine, there has 
been a complete impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. However, its recent acceptance as a non-member observer state at the UN 
might change this situation, although until the current day political interventions have 
blocked this path. In the case of a genuine transition to peace, Israel and Palestine will 
face the question of accountability and will be required to develop policies to articulate it. 
The transitional justice framework would suggest that sweeping the issue of accountability 
under the carpet will not bring about the justice and peace sought by both nations.  
Finally, this chapter has studied what a comprehensive program of reparations for 
displaced persons entails and found that such a program must incorporate a combination 
of repatriation, property restitution and compensation. Furthermore, for these 
reparations to be effective there is a need for a comprehensive legal and institutional 
reform within Israel/ Palestine. As shown above, countries that introduced reparations to 
the victims could not do so without a comprehensive reform of their legal systems, 
administrative structures and judiciaries. South Africa introduced its land restitution 
program through its transitional constitution and developed further program to 
redistribute land and end the era of racial segregation that the apartheid regime had kept 
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with its discriminatory legal system. Similarly, Bosnia had to change its legislations and vet 
officials who might block the return of the refugees for such repatriation to take effect. 
Similarly, Colombia adopted a law that reaffirms the right of the refugees to return and 
developed a system to provide reparations for the victims. Another example is Liberia who 
guaranteed the return of its IDPs to their homes by virtue of an official declaration. In 
Timor-Leste, the state restored lands to those who were displaced. Hence, it can be 
concluded that a transitional justice process cannot meaningfully redress the victims of 
forced displacement unless it guarantees their right to return and property restitution, 
and provides appropriate other reparations. Equally importantly, an essential part of the 
reparation process is that a state reforms its legal system to guarantee the non-repetition 
of the crime and the redress of the victims.  
In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, forced displacement has been part of 
the legal system itself. The victims of forced displacement are continuously increasing as a 
result of their being subject to discriminatory laws that were designed to deport or 
transfer them. Hence, the demand for reparations for the victims of displacement of the 
1948 and 1967 wars refugees should be coupled with a demand to introduce deep legal 
and institutional reforms. The Oslo peace process framework has not only failed to bring 
about peace, but has also failed to provide remedies for the victims of forced 
displacement. Moreover, it has ignored important issues like institutional reform, which 
led to an accelerating rate of displacement. The transitional justice framework in South 
Africa, for example, was not only about providing reparations to the victims of apartheid, 
but also about ending the apartheid regime and opening a new page in the history of 
South Africa where no racial discrimination is accepted. Among the most significant 
establishments of the transitional justice process in South Africa is the incorporation of 
the principle of equality into its constitution. Unless this principle is adopted by Israel/ 
Palestine, any attempt to bring about peace, not to mention justice, will be meaningless. 
This is what a transitional justice framework entails.  
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General Conclusions  
Since the early stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Israel has consistently 
inflicted intentional forced displacement on Palestinian communities and individuals, 
resulting in the displacement of more than 66% of the Palestinian population.1 As shown 
in Chapters 2 and 3, these displacements have taken place through a variety of methods 
that were designed and implemented by Israel’s army and legal system. During the wars 
of 1948 and 1967, Israel’s war operations displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians 
and turned them into refugees and IDPs. Historical research based on Israeli archives as 
well as testimonies of the victims and previous Israeli soldiers demonstrates that the 
displacements that took place during the wars were intentional. The goal of these forced 
displacements was to thin out, as much as possible, the Palestinian population in order to 
tilt the demographic balance in areas under Israeli control in favour of a Jewish majority. 
After each of the two wars, Israel cemented its displacements through a number of 
regulatory measures that had the effect of excluding the displaced persons from enjoying 
the legal status that would allow them to reside in their homes. Furthermore, the refugees 
were prevented from returning to their homes by “prevention of infiltration” laws and 
military orders that criminalized any attempted unauthorized return of the victims of 
displacement. 
Moreover, the Israeli legal system has been actively innovating a series of laws, 
policies and measures that continue to inflict more and more displacements throughout 
the years. These measures include the revocation of residency status, the denial of family 
unification and child registration based on discriminatory criteria and the freezing of the 
Palestinian population registry in such a harmful way that has resulted in a large number 
of additional forced displacements. The regulatory regime of displacement is designed to 
exercise further control on the Palestinian population in order to thin out the number of 
non-Jews under Israeli jurisdiction and control. All the policies that were examined within 
the scope of this study are discriminatory: they only harmed Palestinians. When it comes 
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to the right to reside and immigrate, Israel adopts separate legal frameworks that 
distinguish Jews from non-Jews. Any Jew in the world is entitled to Israeli citizenship 
under the Law of Return and the Nationality Law,2 and Jews do not need any special 
permit to live in Israeli colonies in the West Bank. Furthermore, while Palestinian family 
unification and child registration are extremely limited by the regulatory restrictions 
developed by Israeli state institutions, Jewish families enjoy full protection and respect 
under a legal framework that recognizes the right of every Jew and family member of a 
Jew to immigrate to Israel and choose his preferred place of residence. 
As shown in Chapter 4, Israel’s systematic policies of forced displacement are 
contrary to international law. First, they are contrary to international human rights law 
which guarantees one’s right to “return” or to “enter” his country, and prohibits racial 
discrimination. Secondly, these policies violate international humanitarian law which 
stipulates that a state must refrain from deporting or transferring any civilian population 
in the context of armed conflict or occupation. Furthermore, international humanitarian 
law forbids an occupying power from changing the laws in an occupied territory in a way 
that would violate the basic rights of the population. By introducing a legal system that 
excludes hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the OPT from the right to reside in their 
homes, Israel has violated the protection provided by international humanitarian law to 
the Palestinian population. Thirdly, Israel has violated the customs that regulate 
nationality in situations of state succession. In a situation where a state succeeds another, 
the successor state is obliged to grant habitual residents within its jurisdiction its 
nationality. By legislating a citizenship law that excluded all those who were displaced 
during the 1948 war from its citizenship, Israel actively violated its obligation to recognize 
their status as its citizens. Finally, forced displacement has been consistently condemned 
as a war crime and a crime against humanity since the aftermath of the Second World 
War. It is a war crime if conducted in the context of an armed conflict or an occupation, 
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and a crime against humanity when committed in a widespread or systematic manner. 
The legal regime of displacement reflects a systematic manner of committing this crime; 
and the fact that the majority of the Palestinian population has been permanently 
displaced by Israel indicates that Israel’s policy is widespread. Hence, the perpetrators of 
this crime are individually liable for it and the state of Israel is responsible to redress the 
victims. 
Despite the fact that displacement has been on-going since 1948, no remedies 
have been provided to the victims thus far. Unfortunately, the “peace process” framework 
which was initially launched in a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in the late 
1970s, and later joined by the PLO and Jordan, has failed to provide any solutions to the 
displaced persons until the current day. First, the “peace process” framework has 
postponed the negotiation on the 1948 refugees issue to the final status negotiations. 
Israel’s position on this issue is that it will not accept responsibility on the 1948 exodus 
and will not allow the refugees to return. Secondly, the bilateral agreements between 
Israel and Egypt, Jordan and the PLO provided that the “admission” of the “displaced 
persons” of the 1967 war would be resolved by negotiations in the context of a 
“continuing committee,” the decisions of which were blocked by Israeli negotiators. 
Furthermore, the destiny of those whose residencies were revoked was also blocked by 
Israeli negotiators. In addition, the peace process failed to address other methods of 
displacement, as well as important questions related to the displacement issue including 
truth, accountability of the perpetrators of gross human rights violations, legal and 
institutional reform, and comprehensive reparations. What made the problem even worse 
is that Israel developed new ways and patterns of displacement since the beginning of the 
peace process. On a daily basis, there are new victims added to the long list of Palestinian 
refugees and IDPs.  
In light of this dilemma, contributors from different schools of thought have 
advanced proposals to solve certain aspects of the displacement issue. Advocates of the 
rights-based approach presented their arguments with a methodology strictly 
representing the parameters of international law. By referring to the rules of state 
responsibility, as well as other general principles of international law, the contributors of 
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the rights based approach have advocated for a strict implementation of the right to 
return, restitution and compensation.  
In contrast with this approach, a “realistic” approach contributed to the discussion 
by using arguments that echo the utilitarian theoretical framework. In light of the great 
imbalance of power and the suffering of the Palestinian people in general and the 
refugees and displaced persons in particular, and with the prospect of the potential 
emergence of a Palestinian state as a result of the “peace process” framework, the 
advocates of this approach called for forfeiting the Palestinian claim on the right of return. 
This conclusion was reached by weighing the options available in light of the political 
situation and suggesting a possible political answer. In light of Israel’s stress on preserving 
a Jewish majority, the supporters of the realistic approach saw that it would be better to 
achieve fewer rights than what international law stipulates in a possible peace than no 
rights at all in an impossible peace. Hence, this school does not claim any links to justice 
theories but rather bases its conclusions on philosophical, moral and practical reasons.  
In the context of the same dilemma, a new stream of literature has emerged while 
the transitional justice framework was gaining universal recognition, questioning whether 
transitional justice can be implemented in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Part of this 
stream focused on truth and reconciliation commissions, and suggested that such 
commission could help with redressing the Palestinian refugee problem. Some of the 
contributors in this approach also suggested separating between Israel’s recognition of 
the right of return and the implementation of this right, but still framed it under the 
umbrella of transitional justice. Since the transitional justice discourse is still in its 
“infancy,”3 as Dumper noted, the Palestinian-Israeli literature has not yet developed a 
frame of reference to parameters in the transitional justice framework. The gap between 
this stream and the rights based approach raises questions on the relationship between 
transitional justice and international law; and, consequently, on its position among other 
approaches and frameworks attempting to offer solutions to the problem.  
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This thesis has been designed to address these questions by defining the 
parameters of a transitional justice approach in the context of the transitional justice 
theory and practice. It did so by applying a transitional justice methodology, which 
requires a comprehensive approach in understanding the human rights violations and in 
examining appropriate remedies. Furthermore, this framework’s conception of justice is 
based on international law. Hence, this thesis used the standards of international human 
rights law; international humanitarian law; international refugee law; and international 
criminal law as its terms of reference.  
Chapter 5 explored the main concepts of the transitional justice framework and 
then examined examples that represent the restorative and retributive justice approaches 
focusing on their responses to the crime of displacement. This discussion reaffirmed that 
the conception of justice to which the transitional justice framework refers is based on 
international law. Transitional justice aims at redressing the legacies of mass human rights 
violations through reinforcing these rights and creating mechanisms for them to be 
practiced. Furthermore, the transitional justice framework’s responses to the issue of 
forcible displacement have incorporated a full range of remedies including truth 
commissions, criminal prosecutions of the perpetrators, reparation to the victims and 
institutional and legal reforms.  
Among these remedies, the question of truth is an understudied topic in the 
context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in general, and the displacement problem in 
particular. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it has never been addressed in the context 
of the “peace process.” Hence, a clear understanding of the truth is vital when it comes to 
forcible displacement and dispossession because these are the core issues of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, at least from the victims’ point of view. The Palestinian 
collective memory refers to the mass exodus that took place in the 1948 war as the Nakba 
(the Catastrophe) and to the contemporary systematic and widespread displacements as 
the Continuous Nakba. While these “catastrophes,” as seen from the victims’ perspective, 
are still denied by Israel until the current day, truth commissions have the potential of 
providing an answer.  
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Truth commissions are usually designed to end the patterns of denial that are 
coupled with a systematic violation of human rights. As shown in Chapter 5, the mandates 
of truth commissions usually require them to dig deep into the human rights violations, in 
an attempt to reach an understanding of their nature, why they took place, whether they 
were systematic or isolated incidents and who was responsible for them. Truth 
commissions seek to help the society to achieve closure with its past by advancing truth 
and acknowledgment. In other words, they are tools for providing satisfaction and 
advancing reconciliation. Moreover, these commissions are usually designed to 
recommend further reparations to redress the victims and guarantee non-repetition of 
the atrocities. Truth commissions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Timor-Leste have examined 
policies of forced displacement and acknowledged responsibility over the suffering of the 
victims. Furthermore, these commissions suggested reparations and policies so that their 
governments would redress the victims of displacement. 
In the Palestinian-Israeli context, the work of several historians in the past and the 
stream of “new historians” in Israel has revealed the great amount of suffering inflicted 
upon those who were forcibly displaced and the methods in which they were deported or 
transferred. Similarly, the work of the contemporary civil society and academics, to 
monitor, document, report and resist the Israeli physical and regulatory measures that 
inflict further displacement and dispossession have exposed these policies to the world. 
All those who closely monitor the policies that Israel has designed since 1948 until now 
understand that their aim is to alter the ethnic and religious demographic balance in Israel 
and in the OPT to tilt in favour of maintaining a Jewish majority. This “truth” is out there, 
well documented and even published in the form of discriminatory laws that are part of 
the Israeli regime of displacement. In fact, Israel’s declassification of parts of its own 
archives and  enactment of a Freedom of Information Act have allowed academics and 
civil society to know parts of the secret unpublished information, including regulations, 
procedures and numbers of victims. All of this information is certainly useful for a 
transitional justice process. However, as explained in Chapter 5, only knowledge is not 
sufficient to establish truth, but it must also be combined with acknowledgment. Truth 
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commissions in other countries show that acknowledgment is a key element of 
reparation.  
But once an acknowledgment has been established, redressing the victims 
becomes imperative in the transitional justice framework. This redress takes place in the 
form of addressing the question of individual criminal responsibility, providing reparations 
to the victims and introducing legal and institutional reforms that would guarantee non-
repetition.  
Since forced displacement is considered a war crime and a crime against humanity, 
the perpetrators are individually responsible for their crimes and an obligation to 
prosecute them exists in international law. Many persons in public offices in Israel seem to 
be criminally liable to committing the crime of “deportation” or “forcible transfer of 
civilian population.” It was shown in Chapter 5 that the theories and practices of 
transitional justice suggest that there are two ways to deal with such alleged criminals: 
prosecution or pardon. In the case of prosecution, there are three options: ad hoc criminal 
tribunals similar to the ICTY, national prosecutions like the system developed by Colombia 
or by reference to the ICC.  
Of course, all these options would depend on political circumstances. In November 
2012, the PLO finally managed to get recognition from the UN General Assembly as a non-
member observer state in the UN. This status might enable it to become a member of the 
Rome Statute, giving the ICC jurisdiction on any crime Israel commits in the OPT. At the 
same time, the ICC might also gain jurisdiction based on a declaration to accept the 
jurisdiction of the ICC that was deposited by the Palestinian Authority in 2009. The 
application of measures of international criminal justice has been obstructed by political 
factors and there is pressure on the PLO to refrain from requesting the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.  
The other policy option is amnesty or a combination of prosecutions and 
amnesties. This option is favourable to some transitional countries especially when they 
reach the transition through negotiations. Usually, when amnesty is considered, the 
transitional states frame it so as to make it clear that this is not equal to impunity. The 
main element that is required to make such distinction is the perpetrator’s 
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acknowledgment of wrongdoing and the requesting of a pardon. A combination of both 
amnesties and prosecutions can be ideal in countries where the number of those who are 
involved in the violation is large. Israel certainly falls under this category as shown in 
Chapters 2 and 3. In most models where pardon is granted, an obligation to tell the truth 
and acknowledge responsibility is usually practiced and is seen as part of the closure with 
the legacy of the past.  
In all cases, and regardless of whether past displacements will be prosecuted, it is 
essential, and stipulated by international law, that the Palestinian and Israeli domestic 
legal systems condemn forced displacement as a crime. This is likely to have the effect of 
bringing about the end of a long standing systematic policy of displacement. As long as 
displacement is part of the law, not against it, the crime of forced displacement will not 
stop.  
The third remedy is promoted by the transitional justice framework is reparations. 
This form of redress is subject to the consensus of all schools of transitional justice. While 
there have been differences between the schools of restorative and retributive justice on 
whether the perpetrators of mass human rights violations should be punished or 
pardoned, and whether truth commissions interrupt criminal justice or support it, there is 
consensus that redressing the legacies of the past and applying policies that guarantee 
non-repetition are necessary.  
As practiced in other countries in transition, a reparation program for displaced 
persons in Palestine must include durable solutions with its three elements of return, 
resettlement or integration in the countries of refuge. The right to return to one’s home of 
origin has been guaranteed and practiced widely among countries that sought to redress 
the victims within the transitional justice framework. Such return applies to both refugees 
and internally displaced persons, regardless of whether they actually continue to have a 
refugee status or not. Israel and Palestine, only if Palestine gains independence or 
sufficient effective control over a territory, then the Palestinian authorities too have the 
obligation to allow all those who were displaced from their territory to return to their 
homes of origin. This right entails restoring their lost status that would allow them to be 
treated equally as their neighbours, including Israeli and Palestinian citizenships (if 
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Palestine succeeds to act as a state). Similarly, a person who was displaced from 
Jerusalem to the West Bank and from the West Bank to Gaza should be entitled to receive 
a status that does not discriminate between him and his neighbours in their homes of 
origin.  
What matters, specifically in the Palestinian displacement case, while performing a 
reparation program is the way to approach the refugees and IDPs and the terminology 
that should be used. This is why any remedy for the conflict that seeks justice for refugees 
and IDPs must include a clear acknowledgement of the right of return, since it has become 
an important element of the Palestinian identity as a whole. Salman Abu Sitta put this 
notion in the following words: “for all Palestinians, the right of return is sacred. It is built 
into their psyche.”4 As a result, the exercise of this right must be done in a way that 
acknowledges it as return, contrary to the terminology used in the Camp David and Oslo 
peace agreements. It is neither simply “admission” nor “reissuance of lost identity cards.” 
It is the return of a forcibly displaced population. The Palestinians continue to keep the 
keys of their dispossessed homes in Israel and the OPT. The key of their houses, kept and 
handed from one generation to another, is known in the Palestinian culture as “the key of 
return.” 
In addition, the right to property restitution is closely linked with return, although 
it is a separate right. Every person who was dispossessed of his/her property should be 
able to receive it back regardless of when this dispossession took place. The main problem 
that will rise in this situation is with limited resources, especially when it comes to 
rebuilding homes that were demolished. In 1948 alone, Israel demolished more than 500 
Palestinian villages to prevent refugees and IDPs from return. An immediate rebuilding of 
all those villages as well as all the homes that were demolished during the course of the 
conflict might be impossible. This problem can be addressed by adopting a program of 
restitution over a number of years as was practiced in several contexts. Another problem 
will rise when secondary occupants reside in the homes of the refugees or IDPs. For such 
cases, international law does not provide a clear answer about whose interest would be 
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prioritized. What must be respected in such cases, though, is the right of the secondary 
occupants themselves not to be evicted arbitrarily and to be offered compensation if 
evicted after due process. The returning refugee or IDP might also accept to be given 
another property in the vicinity of their original home.5 In all cases, as has been seen in 
several countries adopting the transitional justice approach, the state takes responsibility 
and designs special policies and programs to redress the victims while protecting the 
legitimate concerns of the secondary occupant.  
In addition to return and restitution, the refugees and IDPs are legally entitled to 
compensation. Given the large numbers of victims, the transitional justice approach offers 
alternative general reparations to compensate for their refugeehood and to help them 
reintegrate into their societies. This might include education, vocational training, 
agricultural aid and many other forms of benefits that will help those displaced to exercise 
their return in safety and dignity.  
The last, but certainly not less important, remedy for the crime of forcible 
displacement is the obligation to perform comprehensive reforms in Israel/Palestine that 
would not only make the return of those displaced possible, but also guarantee the non-
repetition of the crime of forced displacement. As shown above, transitional communities 
usually address the displacement problem by repealing discriminatory laws and 
regulations, incorporating principles like equality into the legal system and vetting officials 
who might disrupt the transition or the return. All these measures are of a great priority in 
the Palestinian-Israeli context. The “peace process” framework has completely overlooked 
the obligation and need to incorporate the end of a long era of discriminatory laws. 
The transitional justice framework follows the parameters of the general principles 
of international law and expects a state to reform its legal system in order to, as Duthie 
put it, give force to the human rights norms that had been violated.6 This means that 
Israel has to change its regime on nationality law which gives any Jew around the world 
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the right to become an Israeli citizen and denies most of the native non-Jewish population 
their right to enjoy such citizenship. This law explicitly excludes all those who were 
displaced from enjoying such citizenship only on the basis of their racial or religious 
background. It also denies citizens who were born abroad from registering their children 
born abroad as citizens of Israel, a regulation that only affects non-Jews because Jews can 
always claim their citizenship according to the law of return. Similarly, Israel has to reform 
its Entry into Israel Law, which has been used to displace thousands of Jerusalemite 
Palestinians and to prevent other thousands from registering their children on the basis of 
noncompliance with the “centre of life” policy, as explained in Chapter 3. While all these 
policies of persecution were not addressed in the Oslo peace process, they would not be 
tolerated in a transitional justice process. The concept of justice during times of transition 
entails that justice is advanced by promoting and enforcing rights.  
Similarly, in the process of transitional justice, repealing the legal military regime in 
the OPT becomes a top priority. Membership in the Palestinian community, whether it 
becomes an independent state or not, shall become regulated in a way that does not 
discriminate against those who were displaced. All the laws and regulations of residency 
status, prevention of infiltration and movement restrictions must be repealed and 
reformed to allow the refugees and IDPs to enjoy non-discrimination.  
Moreover, a transitional justice process entails institutional reform. Public offices 
that dealt with residency, child registration, family unification, citizenship and the like 
must undergo a serious institutional reform on the basis of non-discrimination. Equally 
importantly, there is an urgent need to reform Israel’s judicial system. As explained in 
Chapters 2 and 3, not only did this judicial system fail to prevent the recurrence of the 
forcible displacement of the Palestinians or to provide remedies for the victims, but it also 
actively participated in designing the legal regime according to which forcible 
displacement was committed. The Israeli judiciary consistently refused to refer to 
international legal standards in relation to displacement. For example, as shown in 
Chapter 4, the court denied the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, especially 
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Article 49,7 the implementation of which would have prevented displacement that is 
referred to in the Convention as a “gross violation.” Furthermore, Israel has never 
recognized the applicability of international human rights treaties to the OPT. The legal 
framework that the Israeli Supreme Court adopted only included the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Regulations, as well as selected articles from the GCIV, and with the court’s own 
interpretation of them. A transitional justice process necessarily entails the acceptance of 
the applicability of human rights norms.  
Using this approach to remedies, this thesis has sketched the parameters of a 
transitional justice framework in repairing forced displacement; showing what types of 
remedies can be implemented while redressing the victims of Israel’s forced displacement 
policies. Therefore, the methodological implementation of the transitional justice 
framework in the current study has offered a contribution to knowledge of its relevance 
and applicability to the conflict. One of the main factors that led to this contribution is 
that this research tackled the displacement problem more comprehensively than most of 
the available literature. This comprehensiveness, as shown in Chapter 1, included two 
elements: a wide scope of factual examination as well as a holistic approach to discussing 
appropriate remedies. For example, the understudied relationship between Israel’s 
Prevention of Infiltration Law and military orders was highlighted in this study. In light of 
this relationship, the most recent amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Military 
Order8 in the West Bank was understood in its context. This regulatory tool was first 
initiated in the aftermath of the 1948 War as a method to prevent the return of any 
person who was displaced by the war.9 Israel enacted the same law in the form of military 
orders in the West Bank and Gaza in the aftermath of the 1967 for the same purpose.10 
                                                     
7
 HCJ 698/80, Kawasme et al v. The Minister of Defence et al. (1981). 
8
 Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (Amendment No. 2) (Judea and Samaria)(No. 
1650) 5769-2009, 2009, An English translation is presented by HaMoked, available at: 
http://hamokeden.red-id.com/files/2010/112301_eng.pdf. 
9
 The Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954, Sefer Ha-Chukkim No. 
16, of the 27th Av, 5714 (26th August, 1954), P. 160, 1954. 
10
 Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (West Bank) (No. 106), of 5727, 1967; Military 
Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (West Bank) (No. 125), of 5727, 1967; Military Order Regarding 
Prevention of Infiltration (West Bank) (Amendment No. 1) (No. 190) of 5782, 1967; Military Commander for 
the Judea and Samaria, Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration (Judea and Samaria)(No.329), 
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Within this context, the latest amendment of the “Prevention of Infiltration” as a 
displacement tool can be accurately understood. Similarly, the pattern of de-nationalizing 
Palestinians in Israel and revoking residencies from Palestinians in the OPT shows a 
consistent systematic trend of excluding as many Palestinians as possible from the permit 
that allows them to enjoy residency rights in their homes. Furthermore, when Israel’s 
continuous contemporary displacements are put in the context of the findings of the “new 
historians” in Israel who exposed the ideological motives behind “transfer,” a better 
understanding to the problem can be achieved. By widening the scope of factual 
examination, the current study has avoided the major shortcoming of the rights-based 
approach which is, as expressed by Zreiq, “renunciation of the frame, the historical 
context.”11 The macro picture that has been sketched in Chapters 2 and 3 shows how 
systematic and widespread Israel’s practice of displacement is.  
The other element of comprehensiveness that this study has followed is related to 
remedies. As shown earlier, the transitional justice framework promotes a holistic 
approach to redressing the victims of gross human rights violations. The current thesis has 
shown that only through a combination of appropriate measures to addressing 
displacement as a crime can the redress of displaced persons be meaningful. This study 
has addressed the lack of literature that learns from international experiences of 
displacement12 by examining the transitional justice responses to displacement in South 
Africa, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Colombia, Timor-Leste, Estonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Finally, it should be noted that attempts to transfer the failures of the Oslo peace 
framework into a transitional justice approach will be counterproductive. While 
transitional justice is a multi-disciplinary field that incorporates contributions from legal, 
political, psychosocial and other fields of knowledge; it should be remembered that this 
                                                                                                                                                                 
5729, 1969, English Translation is presented by HaMoked, available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2010/112300_eng.pdf; Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration 
(Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai) (No. 82) for 5727, 1967; Military Order Regarding Prevention of Infiltration 
(Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai) (No. 290) for 5729, 1969. 
11
 Raef Zreik, “Palestine, Apartheid and the Rights Discourse,” Journal of Palestine Studies 34, no. 1 
(October 1, 2004): 78. 
12
 Michael Dumper, Palestinian Refugee Repatriation: Global Perspectives (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 
2006), 8; Dumper, The Future for Palestinian Refugees: Toward Equity and Peace, 185. 
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field is first and foremost based on justice. Hence, compromising the element of justice in 
this field will render its use meaningless. At the same time, transitional justice responses 
to human rights violations are not based on a one-size-fit-all approach. Each conflict or 
suppressive regime needs special attention to the rights of all stakeholders, and as such 
will need a carefully crafted transitional justice process. In the Palestinian-Israeli context, a 
transitional justice approach will certainly have to take into account the rights, interests 
and duties of Palestinians and Israelis who have been divided by conflict. A comprehensive 
transitional justice approach will not only address displacement and other violations 
committed by Israeli perpetrators, but will also include Palestinian violations as well. It is a 
victim-centered approach, and it focuses on the whole scope of atrocities regardless of 
who perpetrated them or who was the victim. Hence, it should not be feared that a 
transitional justice framework which recognizes the Palestinian right to equality and 
return would compromise the rights of the Jewish population. On the contrary, this 
framework aims at advancing reconciliation by cementing everyone’s rights in legal 
responses that attempt to guarantee justice for all. 
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